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[T]he odds against bringing human rights abusers to justice remain astonishingly
high. Indeed, the absence of effective means of sanctioning abuses reveals a tragic
anomaly of the post-World War II era. On the one hand, the nations of the world,
all but universally, have committed themselves to a series of detailed covenants in
which they have pledged to one another and to the larger international community
that they will respect human rights. On the other hand, far more extensive and
terrible violations of human rights have occurred than during any other period
except for World War II tself
Aryeh Neier, War Crimes
INTRODUCTION
In a one week period of March 2003, three ostensibly unrelated events
transpired that typify a central theme in United States (U.S.) foreign policy since
World War 1I. First, in early March, the inauguration of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) was heralded in The Hague. However, no representative from the
United States attended, an event described by some "as world justice's biggest step
since an international military tribunal in Nuremberg tried Nazi leaders after World
War 11.0 ' The reason no U.S. representative attended the groundbreaking event was
because the U.S. is not a party to the tribunal. In fact, the U.S. has been attempting
to undermine the tribunal by "persuading other countries to seal bilateral
agreements exempting all U.S. citizens from the court's authority 4
Clerk to Judge Daniel Friedman, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; J.D., Boalt
Hall School of Law; B.S., Weber State University. I would like to thank my parents, Russ and Donna,
whose love and support made all things possible. I would also like to thank Weston Clark, whose
encouragement made this a reality and whose insightful questions, comments, and suggestions proved
invaluable.
i. ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES 253 (1998).
2. Abigail Levene, U.S. Stays Away as Global Criminal Court Gets Going, Reuters, available at
http://www.cjcj.org/press/globalcourt.html (Mar. 10, 2003).
3. Id.
4. Id. It was reported in August 2002 that the Bush administration was utilizing coercive threats
to obtain these exemptions. Citing provision of the antiterrorism laws, the Bush administration
allegedly warned foreign diplomats that their nations could lose all U.S. military assistance if they
become members of the International Criminal Court without pledging to protect Americans serving in
their countries from its reach. Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Warns World Court Could Cost Aid,
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The same day the inaugural events for the ICC were being held, a U.S. federal
appeals court held that Kuwaiti, Australian, and British citizens captured in
Afghanistan in the course of the U.S. "war on terror" were not entitled to challenge
their detentions at the Guantanamo Bay naval base.5 The court held that habeas
corpus relief was unavailable to aliens held outside U.S. territory 6 On grounds that
appeared to strain logic, the court refused to grant the detainees the minimal right
to have an independent judicial body evaluate the evidence supporting their
continued incommunicado detentions. 7 The court held it lacked jurisdiction to
evaluate the merits of the detainees' claims, effectively insulating their detentions
from challenge in the judicial branch.8 However, the real effect of the ruling was to
give unlimited discretion to the president and military regarding the detention of
foreign nationals captured in foreign interventions and held on foreign U.S. bases. 9
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Aug. I1, 2002, at Al. While the administration publicly stated that
the exemptions were sought to protect American soldiers from "politically motivated charges,
privately the administration admitted the real concern is the "vulnerability of top civilian leaders to
international legal action. Elizabeth Becker, On World Court, U.S Focus Shifts to Shielding Officials,
N.Y TIMES, Sept. 7, 2002, at A4. An unnamed senior administration official admitted, "'Henry
Kissinger, that's what they really care about."' Id. "'We always figured that the Kissinger precedent
was behind this outrageous position, but it has taken some time for the Americans to admit it, said a
senior diplomat whose country is a strong supporter of the court. Id.
5. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003); see
also James Vicim, U.S. Court Rejects Appeals by Afghan War Detamess, Reuters, available at
http://mailman.efn.org/pipermail/local activists/2003-March/002552.html (Mar. 11, 2003). But see
Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding opposite of Al Odah), stay granted, 2004 U.S.
LEXIS 998 (2004).
6. Al Odah, 321 F.3d 1134.
7 The U.S. recently announced it would relent and allow few detainees to meet with defense
attorneys. Vanessa Blum, Tactics Shift in War on Terrorism, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 10, 2003, at
4. However, the Bush "administration does not back off from its position that individuals designated as
enemy combatants even those who are U.S. citizens can be held indefinitely without access to legal
counsel. Id.
8. Id. But see Gherebi, 352 F.3d 1278; Frank Davies, Guantanamo Sovereignty Issue Key to
Captives Fate, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 28, 2003, at A12 ("For the first time, federal appeals court in
San Francisco recently ruled that detainees at the prison camp are entitled to constitutional rights in
U.S. courts because the United States 'possesses and exercises all the attributes of sovereignty on the
base."). "At last report, the 600 Guantanamo detainees were being held in what one U.S. official called
the 'legal equivalent of outer space. There have been more than 30 suicide attempts at Camp X-Ray
and reportedly 5% of the detainees are being treated for psychological disorders. Gerald D. Skoning,
Our 'Disappeared' NAT'L L.J., Oct. 27 2003, at 23. "The International Red Cross said that many
detainees held by the US military in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were suffering 'a worrying deterioration'
in mental health because Washington had ignored appeals to give them legal rights. Mental Health
Fear Over Guantanamo, BELFAST NEWSL., Oct. 11, 2003, at 17
9. The Bush administration has announced that some of the detainees will be tried by military
commissions. James Meek, The People the Law Forgot, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 3, 2003, at 1. But
"a uniformed source with intimate knowledge of the mood among the current military defence team
[indicates] that there is deep unhappiness about the commission set up. Id. The source described the
commission's structure in unflattering terms: "'Its like you took military justice, gave it to prosecutor
and said: "modify it any way you want .... Id. The commission has been described by lawyer
representing some of the British detainees as "'multi-headed hydra with [deputy secretary of defense]
Paul Wolfowitz's face on every head."' Id. This is because of
the enormous power vested in the US deputy secretary of defence, Paul Wolfowitz, who
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The court appeared unconcerned that the detentions were accidental,' ° or even
worse, lacked supporting evidence and possibly violated international laws and
obligations. "
The third event came less than a week later Before U.S. forces invaded Iraq,
the Bush administration publicly identified nine Iraqi officials who it asserted
"would be tried for war crimes or crimes against humanity after an American-led
attack on Iraq."' 2 Despite that at the time the announcement was made,
international public opinion seemed to question the validity of the Bush
administration's preemptive war in Iraq, 13 the administration, without irony, issued
a decision to seek prosecutions based on international law against Iraqi officials.
The list of Iraqi officials who were to be prosecuted was also issued without any
attempt to explain the apparent contradiction between the decision to prosecute
them and the the administration's contrary position with respect to the ICC.
These three events are mentioned as an introduction to the broader problem of
which this Article seeks to address but a tiny part. The problem is exemplified by
the almost total lack of domestic public reaction to the three events, and the
absence of public outcry epitomizes the American publics's reaction to the many
arguably questionable foreign policy actions of the U.S. in the past fifty-plus years.
is the commissions appointing authority The judges seven in a capital case are appointed
by Wolfowitz. Any judge can be substituted up to the moment of verdict, by Wolfowitz.
The military prosecutors are chosen by Wolfowitz. The suspects they charge, and the
charges they make, are determined by Wolfowitz. All defendants are entitled to
military defence lawyer, from a pool chosen by Wolfowitz. The defendants are entitled
to hire a civilian lawyer, but they have to pay out of their own funds, and by revealing
where the funds are, they risk having them seized on suspicion of their being used for
terrorist purposes, on the order of Wolfowitz. Defendants need not lose heart completely
if convicted. They can appeal, to a panel of three people, appointed by Wolfowitz. When
it has made its recommendation, the panel sends it for a final decision to Wolfowitz.
Id
10. "[T]here is little doubt that some of [the] detainees captured in Afghanistan may be victims
of guilt by association or being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Skoning, supra note 8. Clive
Stafford-Smith, a defense attorney for some of the Brtions held at Guantanamo Bay, told The Guardian
that one of the commission prosecutors told him that the prosecutor "'think[s] 30% of the people in
Guantanamo Bay [had] nothing to do with anything. They were just in the wrong place at the wrong
time."' Meek, supra note 9.
II. Amnesty International USA claims the "continued denial of access to legal counsel violate[s]
U.S. obligations under international law. Vicin, supra note 5. See generally Meek, supra note 9. The
Bush administration's "first step away from international norms was to refuse to categonse the
Afghanistan captives as prisoners of war. Id. "It calls them 'enemy combatants, a term not recognized
in intemational law. Id The position of the Bush administration was further eroded by its cynical
assertions during the invasion of Iraq that U.S. soldiers were entitled to the full protection of the Geneva
conventions. See, e.g., U.S. General Says No Access to American POWs, Reuters, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/wire/US/reuters20030330l158.html (Mar. 30, 2003).
12. Report: U.S. Names Iraqis to Face War Crimes Trial, Reuters, available at
http://www.abcnews.go.comwire/Politics/reuters20030316._88.html (Mar. 16, 2003). For one of the
officials named in the list, the administration reportedly gave as grounds for seeking the prosecution
that the individual was accused of "hiding weapons of mass destruction. Id.
13. See America Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties But Post-War Iraq Will
Be Better Off, Most Say, The Pew Research Center, available at http://people-
press.org/prints.php3?PagelD=680 (Mar. 18, 2003).
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Unfortunately, this problem has profound implications for the continued existence
of the international legal system. It is a problem that is difficult to frame precisely,
but one that pervades domestic public opinion about U.S. foreign policy Author
Ariel Dorfman describes the problem as such:
The history of America, and the very particular sort of empire that it became,
seems to have allowed the process of the infantilization of the adult to be
accompanied by images or intimations of innocence which were uniquely
powerful and all its own. America has been interpreted, time and again, as the
domain of innocence. In a sense, a more extraordinary feat than changing thirteen
colonies into a global empire in less than two centuries is that the U.S. managed to
do it without its people losing their basic intuition that they were good, clean, and
wholesome. Its citizens never recognized themselves as an empire, never felt
bound by the responsibility (or the moral corruption) that comes with the exercise
of so much power. The Americans wanted the spoils of empire, but were
not ready to assume the excruciating dilemmas that went with the knowledge of
what they were imposing upon others. They desired power which can only come
from being large, aggressive, and overbearing; but simultaneously only felt
comfortable if other people assented to the image they had of themselves as naive,
frolicsome, unable to harm a mouse. Unlimited frontiers, abundance and plenty,
the feeling of being reborn at every crossroads, led to the belief that growth and
power need not relinquish, let alone destroy, innocence. Whatever obstructed and
contradicted this vision was painted over by a curious sort of memory that
reshaped the recent and receding past into myth as it moved. 14
In short, the problem is that Americans tend to evaluate their own nation's
actions and actors with red, white, and blue-colored glasses.
It is against this tide of sentiment that this Article seeks to move. It attempts
to be a counter-narrative to the deeply held but unstated belief among vast numbers
of the American public that U.S. government and military officials can never be
international criminals because international law really only exists to protect
Americans from others. Because the majority of the American public sees the U.S.
and its actors as perpetually innocent in deed and in motive, U.S. officials have had
license to carry out great many actions that upon further examination might cause
great consternation among the informed electorate.
This Article seeks to address a single thread of this grand tapestry of
collective denial: Henry Kissinger's role in the killing of East Timorese civilians
by the Indonesian military in the mid-1970s. 5 It is no doubt a topic about which a
majority of Americans are completely unaware, illustrating Ariel Dorfman's point.
Because the extent of Henry Kissinger's role in and responsibility for the death of
innocents in East Timor is vastly larger than this Article can possibly hope to
reach, the discussion is limited to a few select topics. The topics selected were
chosen somewhat arbitrarily but are intended to give a basic foundation to the
discussion of the broader topic, that is, holding U.S. officials like Henry Kissinger
14. ARIEL DORFMAN, THE EMPIRE'S OLD CLOTHES 201-02 (1983).
15. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER 90-91 (2001).
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responsible for the international laws they violate.
Section I of this Article bnefly addresses Henry Kissinger's history as it
relates to the extent and nature of his authority during the relevant periods of time,
and it recounts some recent attempts to hold him and other world leaders
accountable for past transgressions of domestic and international law Section I
also lays forth the currently known evidence supporting the case against Henry
Kissinger with respect to his role in East Timor.
Section I! begins with an overview of the possible international criminal laws,
both statutory and common, that could serve as a basis for trying Henry Kissinger.
The bulk of Section I! focuses on the body of international law known as "crimes
against humanity First, the historical evolution of the doctrine is explored; then
some current case law in the field is examined. Finally, Section 1I attempts to apply
the currently known evidence about Henry Kissinger's involvement in East Timor
against the common law doctrine of "crimes against humanity
Section III attempts to define the problem of Kissinger and others like him
avoiding prosecution as one of a fundamental double standard in international
relations. The double standard is enforced by the overwhelming power of the
United States vis-a-vis any other country or conceivable bloc of countries. Because
the United States is able to project, militarily and culturally its own vision (and
version) of justice on a worldwide scale, the views of the American public are
uniquely and disproportionately mfluential in world affairs.
Further, because the American public suffers from an ability to reshape its
history in order to (re)confirm its "innocent and harmless" self-conception, the
myth of American innocence becomes the accepted and acceptable history and
version of events. This double standard, it is argued in Section II, seems to have
several important implications, many of which are unpleasant, including the
possibility of further strife and the use of international law as a tool of oppression.
SECTION 1: THE CRIME
His own lonely impunity is rank; it smells to heaven. If it is allowed to persist then
we shall shamefully vindicate the ancient philosopher Anacharsts, who
maintained that laws were like cobwebs: strong enough to detain only the weak,
and too weak to hold the strong. In the name of innumerable victims known and
unknown, it is time for justice to take a hand
Christopher Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger
16
A. Kissinger s Positions of Power
To understand why the responsibility for foreign policy actions of an entire
nation may be laid at the feet of a single leader or a small cadre of leaders, it is
16. Id. at xi.
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necessary to understand the context in which the actions transpired. More
precisely, when assessing his culpability it is important to understand the positions
of power held by Henry Kissinger during the relevant years.
Following the hotly contested presidential election of 1968, which saw
Richard Nixon claim victory over then Vice President Hubert Humphery, Nixon
made Kissinger, as his very first appointment, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs (currently known as the National Security Advisor). 7 In
that position, Kissinger "revised and fashioned [the National Security Council
apparatus] to serve his needs and objectives."' "S
Sometime in 1969 during Nixon's first official year as president, Kissinger
was also appointed as chairman of the "Forty Committee, a position he held until
1976.'9 While not a well publicized decision-making body, and one that has gone
through at least three name changes since its inception, it is indeed an actual
governmental body and not simply the fiction of conspiracy theorists. The Forty
Committee, originally known as the "Special Group" under the Eisenhower
administration, was established as a "monitoring or watchdog body to oversee
covert operations. '20 President Ford described the Forty Committee as being
charged with the task of reviewing "'every covert operation undertaken by our
government. ,, 2i In sum, "Kissinger may be at least presumed to have had direct
knowledge of, and responsibility for" every major American covert operation
occurring between 1969 and 1976.22
Completing his triumvirate of power positions, Kissinger was sworn in as the
56th Secretary of State on September 22, 1973.23 Kissinger retained his position as
National Security Advisor and his chairmanship of the Forty Committee. 24 He was
the first person in U.S. history to "simultaneously [hold] the positions of National
Secruity Advis[olr and Secretary of State., 25 Although Kissinger lost his post as
17. Id. at 15 (emphasis in original). The National Security Advisor acts as chairman of the
National Security Council, "a position where every important intelligence plan" must pass for approval.
Id. at 78 (emphasis added). Prior to this appointment, Kissinger was an academic who closely allied
himself with Republican Nelson Rockefeller. Id. at II. How a "mediocre and opportunist academic"
was able to leapfrog to the highest echelons of power is a question open to debate. Id. at 16. While the
mere fortuity of election events or perseverance of Kissinger s character could be responsible, author
Christopher Hitchens has suggested far more sinister machinations were at play in this quite incredible
promotion. Id. at 6-16.
18. History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997 The White House Website, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).
19. See generally HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 16-18 (providing brief history of this quasi-secret
government body). See also History of the National Security Council, supra note 18.
20. HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 16.
21. Id. at 17
22. Id. at 18.
23. See Henry Kissinger Biography, Nobel -Museum, at
http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/1973/kissinger-bio.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2003); see also
Henry A. Kissinger, 1973 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, at http://www.personal-selection.com/
Kissinger.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
24. HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 78.
25. See History of the National Security Council, supra note 18.
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National Security Advisor under Ford on November 3, 1975,26 he later admitted
that the loss "in no way diminished his real power.", 27 In addition to the Forty
Committee, Kissinger also "chaired six NSC-related committees: the Senior
Review Group (non-crisis, non-arms control matters), the Washington Special
Actions Group (serious crises), the Verification Panel (arms control
negotiations), the Intelligence Committee (policy for the intelligence
community), and the Defense Program Review Committee (relation of the defense
budget to foreign policy aims). ' 28 Kissinger's accumulation of many key
government positions during his tenure in office led his former aide to describe
him as "no less than acting chief of state for national security ,29
Because Kissinger arguably had more power over U.S. foreign policy
decisions than anyone, save for the president himself, it would not be unreasonable
to hold him responsible for any major foreign policy decision made when he held
these prestigious positions. However, the case against Kissinger goes far beyond
mere circumstantial evidence of knowledge and potential control. It is simply
important to note that a few leaders can be responsible for the foreign policy
actions of an entire country, and more importantly, deserve to stand trial for their
commission. Moreover, because the trial of one powerful government official
never precludes prosecutors from trying other participants later, there is no
sufficient justification for failing to prosecute the most notorious culprits.
B. The Crimes of Kissinger
The allegations of the criminal activity surrounding Kissinger are not new*
numerous authors have charged Kissinger, Nixon, and others in the Nixon and
Ford administrations with bending and violating international and domestic law in
executing their foreign policy decisions.30 While conventional wisdom holds that
Kissinger will never stand trial for both administrations' violations of international
law, several recent developments have raised the (remote) possibility of bringing
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. See also HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 38.
29. HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 78 (internal quotation marks omitted). Kissinger's National
Security Council aide Roger Morris purportedly made the statement. Id. Kissinger's real influence
within both the Nixon and Ford administrations cannot be adequately understood by a simple recitation
of his official positions; his influence over both the presidents and their policies was allegedly immense.
See generally History of the National Security Council, supra note 18 (describing Kissinger as
"dominating U.S. foreign policy dunng the Nixon Presidency, and as keeping "Ford's confidence
and unlimited access"). For example, because of Ford's relative inexperience in foreign affairs, he
"relied almost exclusively on Kissinger's expertise and advice. Id.
30. See generally SEYMOUR M. HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER: KISSINGER IN THE NIXON WHITE
HOUSE (1983); WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, SIDESHOW- KISSINGER, NIXON, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF
CAMBODIA (1987); ANTHONY SUMMERS, THE ARROGANCE OF POWER: THE SECRET WORLD OF
RICHARD NIXON (2000); LARRY BERMAN, No PEACE, No HONOR: NIXON, KISSINGER, AND BETRAYAL
IN VIETNAM (2001); John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled)
Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1990); John Hart Ely, The
American War in Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42
STAN. L. REV 1093 (1990).
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Henry Kissinger to justice for some of the crimes ascribed to him.
The first development was Great Britain's decision to allow General Pinochet
to be extradited to Spain on torture charges and to deny him diplomatic immunity
as a former head of state.3 1 Although Pinochet was later released before facing the
extradition because of severely declining health, the precedent justifying efforts to
bring other architects of atrocity was firmly established by the British House of
Lords.32
Since the Pinochet case, several countries and aggrieved families have taken
an interest in bringing Kissinger before a court to answer for his actions. While
Kissinger was vacationing in France, a magistrate summoned him on May 29
2001 to answer questions about his involvement in and knowledge of Operation
Condor.33 Kissinger left his hotel that very day surrounded by bodyguards and
refused to answer the magistrate's questions;34 the U.S. Embassy later informed the
French that Kissinger was "too busy" to answer questions about his involvement.
35
The U.S. Embassy also told the French government that if they wanted to question
Kissinger, they should have used diplomatic channels rather than serving a
summons on the Former Secretary of State at his hotel.36 Apparently the French
magistrate had made such a request of Washington in 1999 but received no
response.37
3 1. For a full background on this case, see Melinda White, Pinochet, Universal Jurisdiction, and
Impunity, 7 Sw J. L. & TRADE AM. 209 (2000). Kissinger has essentially admitted that the Pinochet
precedent opened the door to the possibility of other former leaders being held to answer for their prior
transgressions of international law. See Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July-Aug., 2001, at 86.
32. See id. at 215-16. Another development was the publication of book by Christopher Hitchens
that specifically attempted to lay forth the criminal case against Henry Kissinger. In The Trial of Henry
Kissinger supra note 15, Hitchens attempted to outline all of the major foreign policy decisions for
which Kissinger could be prosecuted. While the book was light on legal analysis, his work does provide
useful summary of the current state of the evidence against Kissinger. For criticisms of Hitchens's
book, including its sparse legal analysis, see Douglass W Cassel, Jr., Crimes in Print, Not Battle, CHIC.
DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 7, 2001, at 5; Douglass W Cassel, Jr., Hitchens Hatchet Job, CHIC. DAILY L.
BULL., Mar. 1, 2001, at 5; Douglass W Cassel, Jr., Grave Charges, Tough Standard, CHIC. DAILY L.
BULL., Feb. 15, 2001, at 5; Faisal I. Chaudhry, Reviewing the International Law of Accomplice
Liability: Henry Kissinger in Pinochet' Chile, KISSINGER WATCH, Jan. 10, 2002, at 4, available at
http://www.icai-online.orgxp-resources/icai/kw 15.pdf.
33. The magistrate was investigating the alleged kidnapping and murder of five French citizens in
Chile by the Pinochet regime. See Adam Sage, Kissinger Summoned by French Magistrate, TIMES
(London), May 30, 2001, at I1. Recently declassified CIA documents alerted the magistrate to the
possible connection of Kissinger to the crimes committed by Pinochet. Id. "Operation Condor was a
coordinated effort in the 1970s by the secret police forces of seven South American dictatorships. The
death squads of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Ecuador, and Bolivia agreed to pool
[their] resources to hunt down, torture, murder, and otherwise 'disappear' one another's dissidents.
Christopher Hitchens, The Fugitive, NATION, June 25, 2001, at 9. Kissinger has been alleged to have
heavily supported the covert murders and "disappearances" in South America, himself deeply involved
in the covert operations of the CIA as chairman of the Forty Committee. See id.
34. Hitchens, supra note 33.
35. Sage, supra note 33.
36. Hitchens, supra note 33.
37. Id.
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Just days after Kissinger received his summons in France, a judge in
Argentina indicated he might also seek to depose Kissinger in another
investigation regarding Operation Condor.38 On September 10, 2001, the family of
a slain Chilean military commander brought suit in federal court against Kissinger,
Richard M. Helms and other Nixon-era officials for "organizing and directing a
series of covert activities that resulted in [the Chilean commander's]
assassination., 39 The very next day, a similar suit was filed in Chile alleging
Kissinger and associates assisted dictators Augusto Pinochet of Chile and Jorge
Videla of Argentina in committing crimes against humanity 40 Thus, whatever
sense of security Kissinger once had about never facing such a prosecution must be
wavering.
While most of the legal action has been connected to Kissinger's role in South
America, there are several other viable areas of inquiry Beyond South America,
there are Kissinger's policy actions in Indochina and the allegedly illegal
bombings of Laos and Cambodia; the political assassination of a democratic leader
in Bangladesh; the encouragement of a bloody division of Cyprus by Greece and
Turkey- and the slaughter of 300,000 people, mostly civilians, in East Timor.4i
Ironically Kissinger's alleged crimes in East Timor are probably the least known
by the American public and yet are perhaps his most atrocious and those most
supported by available evidence.
C. East Timor
42
On December 7 1975, Australian journalists picked up this radio broadcast
from East Timor: 'The Indonesian forces are killing indiscriminately Women and
children are being shot in the streets. We are all going to be killed. This is an
appeal for international help. Please do something to stop this. ,43 The
Indonesian invasion of East Timor commenced on that day resulted in a slaughter
of 100,000 East Timorese in the first year alone. 44 Nearly a full third of the
population, 200,000 out of a total population of just 650,000, perished in the
38. Id., see also Marc Cooper, Restoring Chile Past, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2001, at M6.
39. Bruce Zagaris, Nixon Administration Officials Sued in Chile and U.S. for Atrocities in
Operator [sic] Condor 17 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP (Nov. 2001).
40. Id.
41. All of these incidents and the evidence of Kissinger's responsibility in them are explored in
detail in HITCHENS, supra note 15.
42. The East Timor Action Network/US is grassroots political organization fighting to protect
human rights in East Timor. It maintains an excellent website at: http://www.etan.org (last visited Nov.
20, 2003).
43. Eric Black, East Timor Highlights Inconsistent U.S. Policy, Indonesia Invaded the Island with
Advance US. Knowledge, and US.-Supplied Weapons Were Used in the Slaughter of Tens of
Thousands, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), June 6, 1999, at 19A.
44. Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, 1975-76, in NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK No. 62 (Dec. 6, 2001) (William Burr & Michael L. Evans eds.), at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2003) (internal citations
omitted throughout) [hereinafter Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion]; see also Ben Kiernan,
Dramatic U-Turn for US and Australia, BANGKOK POST, May 19, 2002, at 1.
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twenty-five year campaign.
1. Background
In April of 1974, Portugal's authoritarian government was overthrown by a
leftist military revolt, which consequently encouraged independence movements in
the Portuguese colony of East Timor.46 The new Portuguese government supported
a gradual transition to independence for the colony 47 Tucked in the southern edge
of the Indonesian archipelago, the tiny island nation was split between two
factions. The first faction was an unstable coalition formed in January of 1975
between the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), with the support of the elites and
"senior Portuguese colonial administrators, 48  and the "vaguely leftist, 49
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), with a constituency
of the "younger Timorese and lower-level colonial officials." 50 While Fretilin had
a "more progressive stance toward full independence from Portugal, the common
ground between the UDT and Fretilin was the eventual decolonization and
independence of East Timor.5i
The second main faction influencing East Timor was Indonesia and its
supporters within East Timor. Amid the power vacuum left by Portugal's political
instability and inability to control East Timor,52 Indonesia graciously filled the
void with thoughts of annexing the tiny island nation and making it Indonesia's
twenty-seventh province.53 To this end, the Indonesian government supported the
pro-integration Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti) with financial
assistance and propaganda; however, the party never enjoyed much popular
support.54
With the UDT-Fretilin alliance crumbling in the summer of 1975, Fretilin
45. Black, supra note 43; see also MICHAEL PARENTi, AGAINST EMPIRE 26-27 (1995) (discussing
America's role in East Timor, Indonesia, and other countries as part of an aggressively interventionist
foreign policy). Besides outright murder, many of deaths are also attributable to "starvation or disease
in [the] camps where the Indonesians had incarcerated [the East Timorese] so the population could be
controlled while the military tried to eliminate the remaining resistance. Black, supra note 43; see
Michael Richardson, How U.S. Averted Gaze When Indonesia Took East Timor INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
May 20, 2002, at 2 ("In 1979, three years after Jakarta formally annexed East Timor as an Indonesian
province, the U.S. Agency for International Development estimated that 300,000 East Timorese-
nearly half the population- had been uprooted and moved into camps controlled by the Indonesian
armed forces.").
46. Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Briefing Paper- Indonesia and Portuguese Timor (Nov. 21, 1975), in
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK NO. 62 (Dec. 6, 2001) (William Burr &
Michael L. Evans eds.), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc3a.pdf
(last visited Nov. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Briefing Paper" Indonesia and East Timor].
50. Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44.
51. Id.
52. HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 91.
53. Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44.
54. Id.
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sought control of the government. It evidenced its popular support by winning
fifty-five percent in local elections in July of 1975." After a brief military skirmish
between Fretilin and UDT supporters (which was largely provoked by Indonesian
propaganda),5 6 Fretilin gained political and military control of nearly all of East
Timor.57 Despite having control over the country, Fretilin moderated its position on
independence. Rather than demanding immediate independence, Fretilin began to
advocate an approach similar to the plan of gradual independence it had developed
with the UDT 58
In October of 1975, General Suharto, the dictator of Indonesia and a close
U.S. ally, began to grow weary of purely political tactics and experimented with
sending "Indonesian special forces to infiltrate secretly into East Timor in an
effort to provoke clashes that would provide the pretext for a full-scale invasion." 59
Because the first wave of attacks failed to provoke any response from the West,
Indonesia increased the cross-border attacks by its troops "outfitted with American
[military] equipment. ' 6° Although Fretilin petitioned the United Nations (U.N.)
and requested that it call for the immediate withdrawal of the invading forces, the
Indonesian attacks finally drove Fretilin to unilaterally declare independence on
November 28, 1975.61 On December 7 1975, Indonesia launched a full-scale
invasion of East Timor using American supplied weapons almost exclusively 62
2. A Note About the Evidence
It should be noted at the outset that this Article does not intend to present a
full account of the evidence against Kissinger for his alleged crimes in East Timor.
In fact, no author could compile such a presentation on any of the violations of law
alleged against Henry Kissinger because of the sheer lack of access to the most
61probative evidence. Upon leaving the State Department, Kissinger made an
55. Id.
56. "The outbreak of civil war disrupted Portuguese plans for orderly decolonization, prompting
its officials to retreat from Dili [, East Timor] to the offshore island of Atauro. In effect, Portugal
abandoned East Timor. Richardson, supra note 45.
57. Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44.
58. Id.
59. Id., see also HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 91 (discussing how the "infiltration of Indonesian
regular units into East Timor" was motivated to subvert the local government); Black, supra note 43
(noting that the "CIA reported that Indonesia had sent agents into East Timor to provoke violent
incidents so it could claim- as Indonesia soon did claim- that it was intervening to quell a civil war").
60. Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44.
61. Id. Fretilin made the unilateral declaration of independence "apparently in the belief that a
sovereign state would have greater success in appealing for help from the United Nations. Richardson,
supra note 45. According to Jose Ramos-Horta, Fretilin's foreign affairs spokesman at the time, "'The
unilateral declaration was an act of desparation, essentially forced upon the leadership of Fretilin in the
face of abandonment from everybody."' Id.
62. Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44., see also HITCHENS, supra note
15, at 91; Black, supra note 43; Richardson, supra note 45.
63. Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44; see also HITCHENS, supra note
15, at xi, 3, 76. "Alistair Hodgett, Amnesty International's American media director, says his agency
can do little until the government declassifies reams of information. James Ridgeway, Manhattan
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"extraordinary bargan"64 in which he gave his papers to the Library of Congress
with the condition that they remain under seal until five years after his death.65
Thus, what evidence still exists and has not been destroyed by Kissinger remains
under lock and key and the world remains unable to uncover the crucial evidence it
needs to bring this alleged international criminal to justice. 66
Because the most penetrating evidence cannot be accessed, this Article can
only hope to construct a general outline of facts surrounding Kissinger's
involvement in the massacre of one-third of East Timor's population. However, the
existing evidence does seem compelling enough to justify an extended
investigation into the matter accompanied by the declassification of more
documents on the subject.67 Although an international body or foreign state would
probably require substantial evidence before indicting a former head of state or
high ranking official, the currently available evidence appears at least convincing
enough to proceed with further investigation,68 including the declassification and
release of all relevant documents on the matter. 69 The key implication of observing
Milosevic, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 21, 2001, at 34.
64. HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 76.
65. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 455 U.S. 136, 141 (1980). In
1980, the United States Supreme Court effectively placed the documents held at the Library of
Congress outside the reach of the American public, in whose name they were created. See generally id
The documents "include authentic telephone transcripts of virtually every important meeting
[Kissinger] had. Scott Armstrong, Forum Discussion: Regarding Henry Kissinger Feb. 22, 2001,
available at http://www.harpers.org/RegardingHenryKissinger.html.
66. HITCHENS, supra note 15, at xi. The impossibility of building case against Kissinger without
access to these documents is amply demonstrated by the problems encountered by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation in its
ongoing investigation of General Pinochet. The FBI has been pursuing this more actively
than has been publicly reported. But even public reports acknowledge that there's now
enough information to indict General Pinochet in the United States. However, the best
evidence is in the Library of Congress. The FBI is getting some access to that evidence,
but it has to negotiate with Henry Kissinger's lawyers. These are government records
needed in a criminal investigation for which the United States government has to
negotiate access.
Armstrong, supra note 65.
67 The National Security Archive at George Washington University has been active in locating
documents relating to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor and the U.S.'s role in it. Through the
Freedom of Information Act, the National Security Archive was able to get two key pieces of evidence
declassified by the Gerald R. Ford Library on December 6, 2001. The National Security Archive was
also able to find several other crucial documents in the National Archive. All of the documents are
available from its website at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2004). The National
Security Archive was also able to obtain two memoranda related to Kissinger's activities in South
America in December 2003. See Duncan Campbell, Kissinger Approved Argentinian 'Dirty War
GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 6, 2003, at 23.
68. Following 1999 outburst of violence in East Timor and the subsequent intervention by U.S.
troops, human rights commission called on the U.N. to set up war crimes tribunal, and the human
rights group East Timor Action Network urged the U.N. to extend the tribunal's jurisdiction to the
alleged crimes by Kissinger. Ridgeway, supra note 63.
69. The claim that these papers cannot be released due to national security concerns rings
particularly hollow. A full quarter of a century has passed since the events that gave rise to these State
Department and National Security documents occurred. Any claim that the documents contain
"sensitive material" must be treated with skepticism; the documents should be released, in whatever
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that the most relevant and revealing evidence is under lock and key is that the
"insufficient evidence" argument cannot be maintained. Until access to that
evidence is allowed, any dismissal of Kissinger's culpability for a lack of evidence
would be hasty and premature.
3. The Evidence Against Kissinger
It is initially important to note that President Ford and Secretary of State
Kissinger actually visited General Suharto in Jakarta on December 6, 1975, the day
prior to the full-scale invasion. 7 It is also important to note that Kissinger and Ford
were fully apprised of the situation in East Timor and were well aware of General
Suharto's intentions for the region as far back as July of 1975.71
redacted form is necessary to protect the perceived national security interest, and yet still allow for
full accounting of Kissinger's crimes. Moreover, as former Kissinger aide Roger Morms has aptly
stated:
In my experience very, very few of the redacted documents that are withheld from the
American public or Congress or from history concern genuine matters of national
security. It would be hard to estimate, but I would say 90 to 95 percent of the secrets
kept by the American government are secrets of expedience and political convenience,
usually attendant on the administration in power, but sometimes on the reputations of
people who are still powerful, such as Henry Kissinger, so that his successors would in
their own interest, of course, and as part of the club mentality that obtains here, try to
prevent the release of incriminating documents. This is, as a famous governor of ours in
New Mexico once said, "a whole box full of Pandoras. Once you start opening this box,
culpability, as I said earlier, does not stop with Henry Kissinger. The foreign policy
establishment, and by larger extension the American political establishment, has very
great stake in the maintenance of these secrets. And Henry's secrets curl far beyond
murder and mayhem and genocide and great crimes of state. They curl back to corporate
and other collusions that are with us even today. Ultimately, what's at stake here is not
the national security, but national profit. And a good deal of money was made. The
foundation for the current oligarchy that prevails in American policy today foreign and
domestic was laid during the Nixon years. So these are very momentous matters, but
don't let anybody tell you that it's authentic national security. That's nonsense. This is
self-protection. But until we change our methods of governance, you're stuck with it.
Roger Morris, Forum Discussion: Regarding Henry Kissinger Feb. 22, 2001, available at
http://www.harpers.org/RegardingHenryKissinger.html.
70. See HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 91; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger Daily Schedule (Dec. 5 and 6, 1975), in NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC
BRIEFING BOOK No. 62 (Dec. 6, 2001) (William Burr & Michael L. Evans eds.) available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBBNSAEBB62/doc5.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2003); U.S.
DEP'T OF State, Memorandum from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to President Ford: Your Visit
to Indonesia (Nov. Dec., 1975), in NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK No.
62 (Dec. 6, 2001) (William Burr & Michael L. Evans eds.), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBBINSAEBB62/doc3.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2003); Briefing
Paper Indonesia and Portuguese Timor supra note 49.
71. A recently declassified Memorandum of Conversation, detailing meeting between President
Ford, General Suharto, Kissinger, and others, shows that American officials were cognizant of
Indonesia's military ambitions in East Timor and expressed no reservations about the impending
invasion. At July 5, 1975 meeting between General Suharto and President Ford, the following
exchange occurred:
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On December 6, 1975, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger met
General Suharto in Jakarta in a brief one-day stopover following a trip to Beijing.
72
Suharto: The third point I want to raise is Portuguese decolonization. Starting with
our basic principle, the new Constitution of 1945, Indonesia will not commit aggression
against other countries. So Indonesia will not use force against the territory of other
countries. With respect to Timor, we support carrying out decolonization through the
process of self-determination. In ascertaining the views of the Timor people, there are
three possibilities: independence, staying with Portugal, or to join Indonesia. With such a
small territory and no resources, an independent country would hardly be viable. With
Portugal it would be a big burden with Portugal so far away. If they want to integrate
into Indonesia as an independent nation, that is not possible because Indonesia is one
unitary state. So the only way is to integrate into Indonesia.
President [Ford]: Have the Portuguese set a date yet for allowing the Timor people to
make their choice [about whether to become independent, remain with Portugal, or
integrate into Indonesia]?
Suharto: There is no set date yet, but is is [sic] agreed in principle that the wishes of the
people will be sought. The problem is that those who want independence are those who
are Communist-influenced Those wanting Indonesian integration are being subjected to
heavy pressure by those who are almost Communists. I want to assert that Indonesia
doesn't want to insert itself into Timor self-determination, but the problem is how to
manage the self-determination process with majority wanting unity with Indonesia.
These are some of the problems I wanted to raise on this auspicious meeting with you.
President: I greatly appreciate the chance to learn your views. I would like to
mention OPEC.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Ford and Suharto (July 5,
1975), at 6, in NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK No. 62 (Dec. 6, 2001)
(William Burr & Michael L. Evans eds.), available at http://www.gwu.edu/
-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/docl.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2003) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Ford and Suharto].
Although Kissinger was not present at this exchange and only later joins the meeting, it is
important because it proves three things (Kissinger was no doubt well aware of its basic content). First,
that despite Suharto s official declarations that he did not intend to invade East Timor, he was clearly
hedging in that direction. He outlines the possible choices for the East Timorese people and then
decrees that the "only way is to integrate [East Timor] into Indonesia. Id. Despite Suharto's claim that
the pro-integration forces were supported by a majority of the population, Kissinger and Ford must have
known this was not the case following the local elections held that month that clearly demonstrated the
pro-independence Fretilin party enjoyed not only a plurality but clear majority of popular support. See
text accompanying supra note 61.
Second, that if Kissinger and Ford truly believed Suharto had no plans for an armed invasion in
East Timor as he stated, they should have questioned Suharto's veracity after it became known to them
that he was ordering armed invasions of the country in the fall of 1975. See Ford, Kissinger and the
Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44; see also HiTCHENS, supra note 15, at 91; Black, supra note 43;
supra note 59.
Third, the explicit reason for not allowing the pro-independence movement to succeed even if it
had won the majority of support in democratic elections was that Fretilin was "Communist-influenced"
and "almost communist. See Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Ford and Suharto,
supra see also Briefing Paper- Indonesia and Portuguese Timor supra note 49 (calling Fretilin and
the independence movement "vaguely leftist") Thus, the underlying reason for a possible Indonesian
invasion was to overthrow duly elected government solely because of its member's political views.
72. Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44.
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It is during this meeting that Kissinger and Ford allegedly gave the "green light" to
General Suharto to commence his invasion of East Timor.73 The issues raised are
central to any case against Kissinger: did Kissinger and Ford have previous,
credible knowledge of the impending invasion, and, if so, what were their policy
actions following disclosure of the information? For his part, Kissinger has also
understood that this is a crucial issue in his defense and has taken great care to
claim that he had no real knowledge about Indonesia's planned attack.74 Kissinger
has in the past said: "[East] Timor was never discussed with us when we were in
Indonesia. At the airport as we were leaving, the Indonesians told us that they were
going to occupy the Portuguese colony of Timor. It was literally told to us as
we were leaving.,
7 5
However, newly uncovered State Department documents directly refute this
statement. A recently declassified State Department telegram 76 containing the
transcripts of the December 6, 1975 meeting between General Suharto, President
Ford, and Secretary of State Kissinger specifically rebuts Kissinger's claim that he
was uninformed about the planned invasion:
77
39 [Suharto-] I would like to speak to you, Mr. President, about another prbelm
[sic], Timor. In the latest Rome agreement the Portuguese government wanted
to invite all parties to negotiate. Similar efforts were made before but Fretilin did
not attend. After the Fretilin forces occupied certain points and other forces were
unable to consolidate, Fretelin [sic] has declared its independence unilaterally. In
consequence, other parties declared thei [sic] intention of integrating with
Indonesia. If this continues it will prolong the suffering of the refugees and
increase the instability in the area.
73. Id. Philip Liechty, a former CIA agent in Indonesia at the time of the invasion, has commented
on film that General Suharto "was explicitly given the green light to do what he did" by President Ford
and Kissinger. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; The Hidden Horror N.Y TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at
A23.
74. On July 11 1995, Kissinger spoke at an event in New York sponsored by the Learning Annex.
After his talk, he took questions from the audience. Members of the East Timor Action Network present
at the event rose to question Kissinger about his policy toward East Timor. East Timor Action Network,
Ask Kissinger About East Timor- Confronting Henry Kissinger (Aug. 1995), at
http://etan.org/news/kissinger/ask.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2004). The transcript is also reprinted in
HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 93-98.
75. HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 94; see also Richardson, supra note 45.
76. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Telegram from the American Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger (Dec. 6, 1975), in NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK
NO. 62, Dec. 6, 2001 (William Burr & Michael L. Evans eds.), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchivNSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc4.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter Telegram from the American Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger].
77 Other documents also show that Kissinger had advance knowledge of the planned invasion.
One in particular has been cited in Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44. It is
State Department cable Kissinger received on December 4th or 5th "suggesting the Indonesians had
plans to invade East Timor. Id., see also id at fn. 25. The cable itself, Plans for Indonesian Invasion
of East Timor is still classified, but it is cited by its title and number in list of cables Kissinger
received while on his trip to East Asia. The list is available at National Archives, Record Group 59,
Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, 1958-76, Box 227 President Ford's Trip to the Far East
(Follow-Up) Nov./Dec. 1975.
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40. Ford- The four other parties have asked for integration?
41. Suharto- Yes, after the UDT, Indonesia found itself facing a fate accompli
[sic]. It is now important to determine what we can do to establish peace and
order for the present and the future interest of the security of the area nd [sic]
Indonesia. These are some of the considerations we are now contemplating. We
want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action.
42. Ford- We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand
the problem you have and the intentions you have.
43. Kissinger- You appreciate that the use of US-made arms could create
problems.
[44.] Ford- We could have technical and legal problems. You are familiar, Mr.
President, with the problems we had on Cyprus although this situation is different.
45. Kissinger- It depends on how we construe it: whether it is in self defense or is
a foreign operation. It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We
would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens
after we return. This way there would be less chance of people talking in an
unauthonzed way. The president will be back on Monday at 2:00 PM Jakarta
time. We understand your problem and the need to move quickly but I am only
saying that it would be better if it were done after we returned.
46. Ford- It would be more authoritative if we can do it in person.
47 Kissinger- Whatever you do, however, we wil [sic] try to handle in the best
way possible.
48. Ford- We recognize that you have a time factor. We have merely expressed
our view from our particular point of view.
49. Kissinger- If you have made plans, we will do our best to keep everyone quiet
until the president returns home.
50. [Kissinger-] Do you anticipate a long guerilla war there?
51 Suharto- There willprobably [sic] be a small guerilla war. The local kings are
important, however, and [sic] they are on our side. The UDT represents former
government officials and Fretelin [sic] represents former soldiers. They are
infected the same as is the Portuguese army with communism.
7 8
78. Telegram from the American Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
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This is an important piece of evidence because it shows that Kissinger and
Ford: (1) had knowledge of the impending invasion; (2) had the opportunity to
object to an invasion they knew would involve the illegal use of American
supplied military equipment; and (3) failed to express any objection or raise
reservations about the invasion or about how it would be carried out.79 It also
shows Kissinger had plans to deceive the American people (and presumably
Congress) about the nature of the invasion. This evidence is crucial because
American law forbade the use of U.S.-supplied weapons by recipient governments
for any purposes but self-defense and required State Department officials to stop
all shipments of arms to any country offending this law.
80
This last point is particularly important in the case against Henry Kissinger-
first, as Secretary of State, he had the duty to uphold American law and halt arms
shipments to Indonesia after he learned of its planned invasion of East Timor, a
duty he clearly breached; second, it demonstrates that as a direct result of his
illegal acts, potentially hundreds-of-thousands of Timorese were massacredsi
However, Kissinger's culpable acts extend beyond mere omissions to act and in
fact include affirmative acts to deceive Congress about the invasion in East Timor
and about American arms shipments to Suharto s military machine. 2
After the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, Kissinger, following the plan he
laid out in the December 6, 1975 meeting with Suharto, worked diligently to
continue the flow of weapons to the Indonesian military After subordinate
officials in the State Department wrote a memorandum recommending that the
arms shipments to Indonesia be halted pursuant to American law, and the
memorandum was cabled to Kissinger while he was abroad, Kissinger, upon his
return, discussed the memorandum in a meeting with other State Department
officials:
supra note 76.
79 According to the CIA, Suharto was reluctant to invade for fear of losing U.S. military aid.
Black, supra note 43.
80. See HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 100-01; Black, supra note 43; Ford, Kissinger and the
Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44; Richardson, supra note 45.
81. A 1977 congressional subcommittee investigating the arms shipments to Indonesia found that
"U.S. supplied weapons to Indonesia roughly doubled between 1975 and 1978, the period when the
killing in East Timor was at is peak. Black, supra note 43. While it is impossible to know if the
Indonesians could have carried out their invasion without new infusion of military equipment from the
U.S., it is particularly interesting to note that in the meeting of December 6, 1975, General Suharto
asked for United States assistance in the construction of an M-16 rifle plant, complaining that defending
his territory "requires substantial small arms. Telegram fom the American Embassy in Jakarta to
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger supra note 76. Kissinger responded that the United States would
"favor" such a plan and President Ford indicated the United States would be "enthusiastic about such a
concept. Id. Also, because of Indonesia's need for U.S. financial support, it was known that the U.S.
could use the threat of withdrawing aid to exert substantial leverage over Indonesian policy. See supra
note 79
82. While it is easy to confuse violations of American law and international law in this matter, this
Article attempts to draw firm line between the two. It is important to stress that Kissinger's possible
violations of American law do not necessarily make him culpable for international crimes. It is also
important, however, to have full understanding of all of Kissinger's actions in this matter before
considering the legal requirements of international criminal law.
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Participants: The Secretary [Henry Kissinger;] Deputy Secretary Robert
Ingersoll[;] Under Secretary for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco[;] Under Secretary
Carlyle Maw[;] Deputy Under Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger[;] Assistant
Secretary Philip Habib[;] Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor[;] Jerry Bremer,
Notetaker[.] Date: December 18, 1975 Subject: Department Policy
The Secretary- I want to raise a little bit of hell about the Department's conduct in
my absence. Until last week I thought we had a disciplined group; now we've
gone to pieces completely. Take this cable on East Timor. You know my attitude
and anyone who knows my position as you do must know that I would not have
approved it. The only consequence is to put yourself on record. It is a disgrace to
treat the Secretary of State this way What possible explanation is there for it?
I had told you to stop it quietly. What is your place doing, Phil, to let this happen?
It is incomprehensible. It is wrong in substance and in procedure. It is a disgrace.
Were you here?
Habib: No.
Habib: Our assessment was that if it was going to be trouble, it would come up
before your return. And I was told they decided it was desirable to go ahead with
the cable.
The Secretary- Nonsense. I said do it for a few weeks and then open up again.
Habib: The cable will not leak.
The Secretary- Yes it will and it will go to Congress too and then we will have
hearings on it.
Habib: I was away. I was told by cable that it had come up.
The Secretary- That means that there are two cables! And that means twenty guys
have seen it.
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Habib: No, I got it back channel-it was just one paragraph double talk and
cryptic so I knew what it was talking about. I was told that Leigh thought that
there was a legal requirement to do it.
Leigh: No, I said it could be done administratively. It was not in our interest to do
it on legal grounds.
Sisco: We were told that you had decided we had to stop.
The Secretary- Just a minute, just a minute. You all know my view on this. You
must have an FSO-8 [Foreign Service Officer, class eight] who knows it well. It
will have a devastating impact on Indonesia. There's this masochism in the
extreme here. No one has complained that it was aggression.
Leigh: The Indonesians were violating an agreement with us.
The Secretary- The Israelis when they go into Lebanon-when was the last time
we protested that?
Leigh: That's a different situation.
Maw: It is self-defense.
The Secretary- And we can't construe Communist government in the middle of
Indonesia as self-defense?
Leigh: Well
The Secretary- Then you're saying that arms can't be used for defense.
Habib: No, they can be used for the defense of Indonesia.
The Secretary- On the Timor thing, that will leak in three months and it will
come out that Kissinger overruled his pristine bureaucrats and violated the law.
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How many people in L [the legal adviser's office] know about this?
Leigh: Three.
Habib: There are at least two in my office.
The Secretary- Plus everybody in the meeting so you're talking about not less than
15 or 20. You have a responsibility to recognize that we are living in a
revolutionary situation. Everything on paper will be used against me.
The Secretary- It cannot be that our agreement with Indonesia says that the arms
are for internal purposes only. I think you will find that it says that they are
legitimately used for self-defense. There are two problems. The merits of the case
which you have a duty to raise with me. The second is how to put these to me. But
to put it into a cable 30 hours before I return, knowing how cables are handled in
this building, guarantees that it will be a national disaster and that transcends
whatever Deputy Legal Adviser George Aldrich has in his feverish mind.
I took care of it with the administrative thing by ordering Carlyle Maw to not
make any new sales. How will the situation get better in six weeks?
Habib: They may get it cleaned up by then.
The Secretary- The Department is falling apart and has reached the point where it
disobeys clear-cut orders.
Habib: We sent the cable because we thought it was needed and we thought it
needed your attention. This was ten days ago.
The Secretary- Nonsense. When did I get the cable, Jerry9
Bremer: Not before the weekend. I think perhaps on Sunday.
83. Irony noted.
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The Secretary- You had to know what my view on this was. No one who has
worked with me in the last two years could not know what my view would be on
Timor.
Habib: Well, let us look at it-talk to Leigh. There are still some legal
requirements. I can't understand why it went out if it was not legally required.
The Secretary- Am I wrong in assuming that the Indonesians will go up in smoke
if they hear about this?
Habib: Well, it s better than a cutoff. It could be done at a low level.
The Secretary- We have four weeks before Congress comes back. That's plenty of
time.
Leigh: The way to handle the administrative cutoff would be that we are studying
the situation.
The Secretary- And 36 hours was going to be a major problem?
Leigh: We had a meeting in Sisco's office and decided to send the message.
The Secretary- I know what the law is but how can it be in the US national interest
for us to give up on Angola and kick the Indonesians in the teeth? Once it is on
paper, there will be a lot of FSO-6's who can make themselves feel good who can
write for the Open Forum Panel on the thing even though I will turn out to be right
in the end.
Habib: The second problem on leaking of cables is different.
The Secretary- No, it's an empirical fact.
Eagleburger: Phil, it's a fact. You can't say that any NODIS [most restricted
distribution cable] will leak but you can't count on three to six months later
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
someone asking for it in Congress. If it s part of the written record, it will be
dragged out eventually
The Secretary- You have an obligation to the national interest. I don't care if we
sell equipment to Indonesia or not. I get nothing from it. I get no rakeoff. But you
have an obligation to figure out how to serve your country. The Foreign Service is
not to serve itself. The Service stands for service to the United States and not
service to the Foreign Service.
Habib: I understand that that s what this cable would do.
The Secretary- The minute you put this into the system you cannot resolve it
without a finding.
Leigh: There only one question. What do we sav to Congress if we re asked?
The Secretary- We cut it off while we are studying it. We intend to start again in
January. 
84
This key piece of evidence is particularly damaging to Kissinger. First. it
shows there was a real effort on the part of lower State Department officials to
uphold American law and arms agreements, and that Kissinger was extremely
upset by this effort because it directly conflicted with his stated intentions. Second,
that the plan to continue supplying weapons to Indonesia, despite the results in
East Timor, was a well-considered and specific policy action on his part. Third,
that if the issue of use of the weapons by Indonesia became a problem, Kissinger
was prepared to call the action self-defense against the "communist government"
of East Timor. And finally if Congress investigated the matter, the State
Department's "official position" would be that it would cut off the arms supply
while it was studying the issue. In fact, the "bogus cutoff never occurred. 85
These actions show a concerted effort on the part of Kissinger and others in
84. Mark Hertsgaard, The Secret Life of Henry Kissinger- Minutes of 1975 Meeting with
Lawrence Eagleburger NATION, Oct. 29, 1990, at 473, available at http://etan.org/news/kissinger/
secret.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2004) (emphasis added).
85. Black, supra note 43. Despite the purported six-month review of whether Indonesia had
actually broken United States law by the State Department, weapon shipments already scheduled to go
to Indonesia prior to the invasion continued to flow. During the review period, the United States made
"four new offers of military equipment sales to Indonesia including maintenance and spare parts for the
Rockwell OV-10 Bronco aircraft, designed specifically for counterinsurgency operations and employed
during the invasion in East Timor. Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44;
Richardson, supra note 45.
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the State Department to deceive Congress about the arms shipments and the
invasion of East Timor, and to aid and abet the Suharto regime in its massacre
there. This conspiracy to continue the arms shipments, including weapons
specifically used against the Timorese population, continued after the initial
invasion. Again, Kissinger was a major player in this endeavor. In a July 17 1976
State Department staff meeting, the issue of whether the United States should
accept an invitation by the Indonesian government to send a diplomatic
representative with a delegation of the Indonesian Parliament to East Timor arose:
Secretary Kissinger: Why is it in our interest to [send a diplomatic
representative]? I'm just trying to understand the rationale.
Mr. Miller [an adviser from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs]: Well, I
don't think, sir, we think in terms of it weakening the Indonesians in Timor; but
it s trying to keep, let's say, Congressional sentiment with regard to Indonesia
from being rekindled-which we think is a fairly satisfactory [sic] condition.
Mr. Habib: There s no need to take this action. The Indonesians are trying to get
an international-and especially U.S. and other blessing [sic] - before they ve
done it. Let them go ahead and do what they ve been doing. We have no
objection. They re quite happy with the position that we have taken. We ve
resumed, as vou know, all of our normal relations with them; and there isn't any
problem involved
Secretary Kissinger: Not very willingly-
Mr. Habib: Sir 9
Secretary Kissinger: Not very willingly. Illegally and beautifullv.
86
Again, this revealing piece of evidence helps unravel facts and assists in
building the case against Kissinger. It is crucial to note that Kissinger himself
admits that he and the State Department for which he was responsible broke
domestic law by continuing the arms shipments to Indonesia and resuming normal
relations with the murderous Suharto regime. The fact that he is beamingly proud
of this accomplishment is perhaps the most despicable aspect of the entire case.
To briefly summarize the evidence against Kissinger on the issue of the
Indonesian invasion of East Timor, it can at least be argued that there is a credible
case against Kissinger for materially assisting General Suharto in the murder of
nearly one-third of East Timor's population. He knew about the planned invasion
and did nothing to stop the Indonesians from illegally using American-supplied
86. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Transcript of Staff Meeting (June 17, 1976), in NATIONAL SECURITY
ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK No. 62 (Dec. 6,2001) (William Burr & Michael L. Evans eds.),
available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchivINSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc6.pdf (last visited Nov 20,
2003) (emphasis added).
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weapons to carry out the attack. Furthermore, although it was his legal duty to
inform Congress of the invasion and recommend suspending arms transfers to
Indonesia following the attack, he not only failed to fulfill that duty but also
affirmatively assisted in executing a plan that did just the opposite. As a result of
his failure to object to the planned invasion, it is arguable that tens-of-thousands
perished in the ensuing attack. Moreover, as a result of his deceit to Congress and
his actions continuing the arms flow to Suharto, hundreds-of-thousands of
Timorese were killed. While these conclusions may be fairly debatable, what is not
debatable is that there is at least a plausible question about whether the charges are
accurate. While the existing evidence may or may not be adequate to support an
indictment, there is clearly enough on Kissinger to justify opening the stacks of
boxes containing the documents that could verify his culpability The fact that
Kissinger does not want the documents declassified only seems to justify the
position afortiori.
SECTION II: THE CRIME DEFINED
While some aspects of the law relating to crimes against humanity remain
ambiguous, that law core principle is both clear and widely accepted: atrocious
acts committed on a mass scale against racial, religious, or political groups must
be punished
Diane F Orentlicher, Settling Accounts
87
While there are several legal frameworks by which to analyze Kissinger's
deeds, including the possibility of private action in domestic courts,8 8 this Article
focuses exclusively on the failure to bring Kissinger to justice for his alleged
violations of international law. Though several possible methods of bringing
perpetrators of international crimes to justice are available, this Article will only
discuss customary international law and specifically the doctrine of "crimes against
humanity
A. International Criminal Law
While the title of this section implies that there is a cohesive body of criminal
and human rights law at the international level, this implication would be
inaccurate. This area of law is better characterized as a patchwork of codified,
narrowly tailored laws that protect basic human rights. Underlying this framework
of positive law is customary international law, acting as an imperfect net to catch
the crimes that slip through the patchwork or as an additional penalty where
specific conventions are also applicable.89 The various precedents set by the
87 Diane F Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2594 (1991).
88. See Zagaris, supra note 39.
89. Indeed, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States explicitly
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Nuremberg trials are the primary source of customary international law, more
commonly referred to as "crimes against humanity "90
I Human Rights Conventions9'
Since World War II, various coalitions of the international community have
agreed to adhere to a number of conventions aimed at protecting against certain
human rights violations. For example, in 1951 the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide entered into force three years after it
was adopted by the United Nation's General Assembly 92 In 1966 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights followed, 93 as did the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in
1987 94 The United States has been laggard in approving and enforcing these
conventions; it began enforcing the Genocide Convention as late as 1989 the
Convention on Civil and Political Rights in 1992, and the Torture Convention in
1994.9'
Another set of applicable positive law, at least in the context of armed
conflict, is the various war crimes conventions, 96 typified by the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 97 As the names of these conventions imply, they seek to
recognizes customary international law as source of governing law. It indicates that "[a] state violates
international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones" any one of a list of
enumerated crimes, including genocide, slavery, torture, racial discrimination, or any other "consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1986) (defining "Customary International
Law of Human Rights"). While the statute only refers to the acts of states, it is interesting to note that
the comments to the restatement indicate that there is a presumption that the section has been violated if
such enumerated acts are tolerated and go unpunished by state, especially when the perpetrators are
state officials. Id. § 702 cmt. b. However, others argue that customary international law fails to provide
any recognizable legal standards and is little more than "utopian vaporings. ROBERT H. BORK,
COERCING VIRTUE 18-19 (2003). Bork accuses American scholars of employing international law as a
"weapon in the domestic culture war. Id. at 21. To Bork, "[ilnternational law is little more than
organized hypocrisy. Id. at 29 Moreover, Bork argues that the "entire enterprise of controlling armed
force by 'law' accomplishes little other than teaching disrespect for law and serving as the basis for
accusations of lawlessness after the fighting begins. Id. at 39.
90. See Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2585-92.
91. For a brief overview of various international human rights agreements, see Orentlicher, supra
note 87 at 2563-85.
92. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 195 1) [hereinafter "Genocide Convention"].
93. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter "Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"].
94. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112, 23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified 24 I.L.M. 535 (entered into force Jun.
26, 1987,for the United States Nov. 20, 1994) [hereinafter "Torture Convention"].
95. U. S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 387, 392, 472 (2000), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/legal affairs/tifindex.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2003).
96. War crimes are defined as "violation[s] of international law governing war. Major
Christopher Supernor, International Bounty Hunters for War Criminals: Privatizing the Enforcement of
Justice, 50 A.F.L. REV. 215, 218 (2001).
97 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
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protect the defenseless, the wounded, non-combatants, and prisoners of war from
grave human rights abuses by warring nations or factions. 98 While both
international and domestic courts have defined "war crimes" by looking to both
codified agreements and customary law," and commentators have argued that the
Geneva Conventions are themselves customary law,I °° this Article draws a
distinction between codified war crimes01' and crimes against humanity as defined
and recognized by common law practices. 102
Although there is significant overlap between the coverage of war crimes law
and the law defining crimes against humanity, professor Aryeh Neier draws two
conceptual distinctions between the twin bodies of law 103 First, "crimes against
humanity" is a more encompassing concept because it takes into account crimes
committed during times of peace, while the concept of "war crimes" is limited to
acts committed "in times of armed conflict or occupation."' 04 At the same time, the
concept of "war crimes" is more encompassing because "it applies to even a single
crime committed in violation of the laws of war, regardless of whether that crime
was part of a widespread practice,"'10 5 whereas "crimes against humanity" requires
each act to be committed as part of a systematic or widespread practice and often
requires that the practice be motivated because of political, ethnic, or religious
reasons. 106
Though the prospect of bringing Kissinger to justice under one of the specific
human rights conventions or under the numerous war crimes conventions is
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
98. Id.
99. Supernor, supra note 96, at 218.
100. See generally Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Lmv, 81 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 348 (1987).
101. The issue of the Geneva Conventions and their applicability has been hotly debated recently
because of the United States military's treatment of captives from the war in Afghanistan. See Kenneth
Roth, Bush Policy Endangers American and Allied troops, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 5, 2002, at 7" see
also supra note 8, and accompanying text.
102. While this distinction is artificial and is used only for the purposes of bottling the concept of
crimes against humanity in this Article, it is useful to narrow the focus of the concept of crimes against
humanity. The risk of failing to make this distinction is the problem of unnecessary redundancy and
confusion. An act becomes a crime against humanity because it was also a war crime and thus part of
customary law. It is important to note, however, that the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (2) (1986) defines customary law as "a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from sense of legal obligation. It would appear from
this definition that all intemational agreements are a part of customary law, at least insofar as they are
actually "followed" in "general and consistent" manner.
103. "Crimes against humanity is simultaneously broader and a narrower concept than war
crimes." NEIER, supra note I, at 17
104. Id.
105. Id. However, some commentators believe that only "grave breaches" of war crimes statutes
are actually prosecuted and that perhaps this distinction is illusory. See Supemor, supra note 96, at 218.
106. NEIER, supra note 1, at 17
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intriguing, this Article will focus on crimes against humanity as defined by
customary law There is an additional reason for this limited focus besides the
inherent need to limit the scope of the discussion. Because Kissinger's actions and
their consequences for the people of East Timor are the focus of the factual
inquiry the doctrine of "crimes against humanity" appears to be a more promising
avenue to explore. A reason it is promising is the nature of the tragedy itself: a
massacre against a largely defenseless civilian population should not be
shoehorned into war crimes law by construing it as an armed conflict. From a
rhetorical and conceptual standpoint, assessing Kissinger's guilt under the rubnc of
"crimes against humanity" simply produces a better result. The extermination of
nearly a third of a nation's population is a crime against humanity and its
architects must be held to the utmost penalty and public scorn. 1
07
2. The Inherent Tension between International Law and National Sovereignty
The natural tension between international law and national sovereignty is
perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the area of human rights and criminal law
The notion that past or present national leaders could be brought up on charges,
real or imagined, in another country seems like a destabilizing proposition and one
fraught with possibilities for abuse. However, professor Diane Orentlicher stresses
that although states are given the first opportunity to try nationals within their own
jurisdiction for crimes against humanity, the importance of punishing perpetrators
of crimes against humanity justifies extending permissive international jurisdiction
over them and "an exception to the bedrock principle of international law-respect
for national sovereignty "'0'
Indeed, this principle is recognized by the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States in section 702, which indicates that "[a] government may
be presumed to have encouraged or condoned acts [in violation of international
customary law] if such acts, especially by its officials, have been repeated or
notorious and no steps have been taken to prevent them or to punish the
perpetrators."' 1 9 Thus, a state has the duty to prosecute acts committed by its
officials or risk being in violation of customary international law itself.
Furthermore, international law affirmatively requires that states investigate
and prosecute crimes against humanity In 1973, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted Resolution 3074, proclaiming the "[pirinciples of international
co-operation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty
of war crimes and crimes against humanity ,,"i0 The first principle establishes that
"crimes against humanity, wherever they are committed, shall be subject to
107 This Article does not intend to imply that war crimes law or other specific human rights
conventions would not be a fruitful area of law to investigate if Kissinger were ever to be brought to
justice. It simply is outside the bounds of this Article to discuss the merits of such an investigation.
108. Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2593.
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702, supra note 89.
110. G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30 at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9326 (1973),
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/28/ares28.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2003).
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investigation and the persons against whom there is evidence that they have
committed such crimes shall be subject to tracing, arrest, trial and, if found guilty
to punishment.""' While the second principle recognizes every state s right to try
its own nationals,' 12 principle five provides that where there is evidence that a
certain individual is guilty of crimes against humanity, that person "shall be
subject to trial and if found guilty to punishment."" 3 Thus, while states are given
the right of first refusal to try their own nationals, international law countenances
international jurisdiction where a state exercises that right despite contrary
evidence.' 4
Moreover, the justification for the very first prosecutions of crimes against
humanity at Nuremberg also supports the view that international jurisdiction is
permissible where necessary to prosecute grave human rights violations." l5 In those
cases, the innovation of crimes against humanity and prosecution of them was
justified on natural law grounds. The basic notion was that because crimes against
humanity inherently "offended humanity itself," the right to prosecute such crimes
on an international level, must also inherently exist." 6 Thus, a person who commits
crimes against humanity is "'an enemy of all mankind' - over whom any state
[can] assert criminal jurisdiction."' 
17
While the fear of international prosecution of crimes impinging on national
sovereignty is no doubt a real one, the procedural safeguards explicitly written into
international law should allay this fear. As long as a state follows the letter and
spirit of international law and brings to justice those whose crimes are sufficiently
supported by evidence, a state can assure itself that it has not broken international
law, and more importantly that its national sovereignty will be the utmost
respected.
3. Crimes Against Humanity
a. History
Following World War i, the Nuremberg tribunal was commenced for the
purposes of trying and punishing those Nazi officials responsible for the war itself
and the grave human rights catastrophe perpetrated prior to and during that
conflict. ' 8 These prosecutions "inaugurated the branch of international law
I 11. Id. at 79.
112. Id.
113. Id. (emphasis added). Note that the word "shall" indicates the action is mandatory and not
permissive.
114. Compare id. ivuh THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2001)
(supporting pure universal jurisdiction), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-lapa/univejur.pdf (last
visited Nov. 20,2003).
115. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2555-60.
116. Id. at 2556.
117. /d. at 2557
118. See generally id. at 2555-60. 2587-90, Opinion and Judgment of May 7. 1997 Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, 618-23 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia 1995), available at
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recognizing and protecting human rights."" 9 These prosecutions also gave rise to a
number of new and unique legal innovations, one of which was the recognition of
the concept of crimes against humanity 120 Since the Nuremberg prosecutions,
"crimes against humanity" as a legal doctrine has largely languished in the dustbin
of history and atrophied from disuse. 12 1 However, in recent years the doctrine has
been revived by the international criminal tribunals authorized by the United
Nations for Rwanda and Yugoslavia.122 Because the doctrine of "crimes against
humanity" is defined by customary international law, an examination of the
definitions used at Nuremberg and employed by the tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda is an expedient place to begin.
123
Crimes against humanity as defined by Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter, consisted of "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war;
or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated."'' 24 Initially, a few
important issues are raised by this seemingly straightforward definition. First,
crimes against humanity as the Nuremberg Charter defines them, require a war
nexus.125 Although this was a relatively minor requirement during the Nuremberg
prosecutions because the world had recently emerged from the single largest
conflict in the history of mankind, this requirement has substantial implications,
not only for a possible prosecution of Henry Kissinger, but also for all subsequent
prosecutions. Because alleged crimes against humanity in recent times have largely
occurred in the context of internal civil disputes, an important question is whether
the Nuremberg tribunals properly considered the future impact of the war nexus
requirement. Moreover, regardless of the propriety of the nexus requirement at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/triaic2/judgement/index.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2003).
119. Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2555. Critics of customary law as source of binding norms
openly admit that they believe that the Nuremberg trials were not justified by international law, but
amounted only to victors' justice. For example, Robert Bork asserts that the "pretense that customary
international law justified the [Nuremberg] trials and punishments was just that: a pretense. BORK,
supra note 89, at 18. For Bork, the trials at Nuremberg were nothing more than "victors
determin[ing] the 'law' retroactively. Id. at 20. "The only 'law' that is certain and knowable in
advance is that the victors will kill or impnson the leaders of the loser, writes Bork. Id. at 19.
120. NEIER, supra note i, at 16. However, Robert Bork believes "[ilt is somewhat nauseating to
hear of the law forbidding 'crimes against humanity" when it is obvious [to him] that what is involved
is not law but politicized force. BORK, supra note 89, at 29.
121. See Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2559-60.
122. The international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda each maintain excellent
websites. The URLs are http://www.un.org/icty/ and http://www.ictr.orgl, respectively.
123. Customary international law is arguably molded and formed by each and every international
legal proceeding, or lack thereof. For example, John Hutson, dean of the Franklin Pierce Law Center,
recently wrote that the failure of the U.S. to afford the Guantanamo Bay detainees rights under the
Geneva Conventions, see supra note 1, was itself creating customary international law precedent. John
Hutson, Status Quo Is Not an Option, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 12, 2004, at 38.
124. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, with Annexed Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, Art. 6(c), 59 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 284 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
125. Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2589.
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Nuremberg, a more fundamental question is whether the requirement should
continue or be junked as ill considered in light of recent historical developments.'
26
The second major issue raised by the definition is the lack of a requirement
that the acts be committed because of race, religion, or for political reasons.
Although persecutions on the basis of these characteristics is one method of
proving crimes against humanity under the definition above, it is only one
alternative among many 127 However, while this was a non-issue at Nuremberg, it
has become particularly salient in the context of the international criminal tribunals
for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.i
28
b. Recent Developments: Yugoslavia and Rwanda
29
In May of 1993, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 827
establishing a criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and setting forth the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 30 Under the articles of the Statutes establishing the
Tribunal, the Tribunal is handed responsibility for prosecuting "serious violations
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991." '' The Tribunal is charged with investigating and
prosecuting individuals in the former Yugoslavia for "[girave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 ,,2 "[v]iolations of the laws or customs of war,
' 133
genocide, 134 and crimes against humanity i35
126. Id. This issue is further elaborated below. See infra notes 136-37, 147-49, and accompanying
text.
127. See Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 651.
128. This issue is further discussed below. See infra notes 149-50, and accompanying text.
129. The statutes of the tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda are particularly helpful in attempting
to define the customary law underpinning crimes against humanity for several reasons. First, both
Statutes were enacted within the last decade, making them relevant to modem circumstances. Second,
because the doctrine of "crimes against humanity was largely ignored after the Nuremberg trials until
the Statutes for these two tribunals breathed new life into it, the Statutes for the tribunals are a natural
starting point for identifying any post-Nuremberg developments in the doctrine. Lastly, because each of
the tribunals have been active in applying the law to numerous defendants, substantial body of
jurisprudence has developed to give context to the Statutes and crimes contained therein.
130. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/827 (1993), amended
by S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3878th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/I166 (1998), amended
further by S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4240th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000),
amended further by S. C. Res. 1411, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4535th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1411
(2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2003)
[hereinafter Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia].
131. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, at Art. 1.
132. Id. at Art. 2. Article 2 lists several acts in particular that are enumerated as prohibited by the
Geneva Conventions. Some of the enumerated acts include: "(a) willful killing; (b) torture or inhumane
treatment [and] (h) taking civilians as hostages. Id at Art. 2(a)-2(h). For a brief description of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, see supra notes 96-101, and accompanying text.
133. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 3. Like Article 2, Article 3
makes all violations of the laws of war actionable under the statutes but goes on to enumerate a few
examples. These include use of "poisonous weapons, the destruction and attack of undefended cities,
and "plunder of public or private property. Id. at Art. 3(a)-3(e).
134. Id. at Art. 4. The statutes require the acts enumerated under this article to be undertaken with
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In addition to proving one or more of the above delineated crimes, the
prosecutor is also required to prove "[i]ndividual criminal responsibility" pursuant
to Article 7 of the Statutes. 36 Article 7 specifically addresses the problem of
inferiors disclaiming responsibility because of their asserted lack of decision-
making control; 13 7 it also addresses the mirror image of this problem: namely the
responsibility of superiors for acts of subordinates.3 3 Article 7 also addresses the
issue of trying individuals who are government officials or heads of state. 
139
In all three cases, the Statutes of the Tribunal are liberal in casting the net of
criminal responsibility, holding subordinates liable for their acts regardless of
whether they were following orders from superiors, holding superiors liable for the
acts of their subordinates when they knew or had reason to know about the acts,
and eliminating the defense of immunity for government officials and heads of
state acting in their official capacities. In construing international law broadly
Article 7 of the Statutes of the Tribunal preemptively excludes most of the
"standard" defenses employed in criminal trials of military and political leaders.
In the Statutes' definition of crimes against humanity, the Tribunal is granted
the power and responsibility to prosecute individuals responsible for certain
enumerated acts "directed against any civilian population."1 40 The enumerated acts
are: "(a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e)
imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial, and
religious grounds; [and] (i) other inhumane acts."' 141 Comparing the definition in
the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia to the one employed at Nuremberg, it is
clear that the core of the doctrine of "crimes against humanity" has remained
"intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group Id. at Art. 4(2). Acts that evince
such intent include: "(a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; [and] (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Id. at Art. 4(2)(a)-4(2)(e).
135. Id. at Art. 5.
136. Id. at Art. 7 Article 7 imposes criminal responsibility on any "person who planned, instigated,
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime"
set forth in the foregoing articles. Id. at Art. 7(I).
137 Article 7 states: "[t]he fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government
or of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of
punishment if justice so requires. Id. at. Art. 7(4).
138. Article 7 holds superiors criminally responsible for acts of their subordinates where the
superior "knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done
so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to
punish the perpetrators thereof." Id. at Art. 7(3).
139. In one of the more groundbreaking sections of the statutes, Article 7 explains that "[t]he
official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible
Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
Id. at Art. 7(2). This subsection to the article is invaluable precedent insofar as the prosecution of
Kissinger is concerned. This subsection specifically disallows the notion of immunity for acting or
former heads of state or high government officials for acts undertaken in their official capacities.
Following the letter and spirit of this precedent would render the defense that Kissinger was acting in
his official capacity a nonstarter.
140. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 5.
141. Id. at Art. 5(a)-5(i).
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unchanged.
The differences, while minor, are important to recognize. First, the Statutes of
the Tribunal for Yugoslavia are more detailed in their enumeration of specific acts
that fall within the definition, including the acts contained in the Nuremberg
definition in addition to imprisonment, torture, and rape.' 42 Second, in addition to
proving the accused committed one or more of the enumerated acts, Article 5 of
the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia limits criminal liability to acts
"committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character." 143
This war nexus requirement is less burdensome than the stricter requirement at
Nuremberg in that it includes internal armed conflicts (or rather "civil conflicts")
within its reach. 44 However, it is important to note that the armed conflict nexus
requirement survived in the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia in some lesser
form from the Nuremberg Charter's definition of "crimes against humanity"
In sum, the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia changed the core of
"crimes against humanity" jurisprudence very little from its inception at
Nuremberg. Although formulated nearly fifty years apart, the similarity between
the definitions lends credence to the notion that the doctrine of "crimes against
humanity" is customary law The fact that after half a century the same underlying
wrongs are considered to be so grave as to warrant an international response
bolsters the argument that these prohibitions are universally recognized and nearly
timeless in their application. The definition of "crimes against humanity" in the
Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda lends further credence
to the continuity and universality of the doctrine.
In November of 1994, the U.N. Security Council followed its own lead and
passed Resolution 955 establishing a tribunal for Rwanda. 14' After years of violent
civil war and accusations of gross human rights violations, 146 the Security Council
142. Id. at Art. 5. Cf Nuremberg Charter, supra note 124, at Art. 6(c).
143. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 5.
144. The necessity of loosening this requirement in the context of the Yugoslavian conflict is
evident. Because the armed conflict occurred within the borders of the former state of Yugoslavia, the
Tribunal would have had no power if the Statutes had propounded war nexus requirement similar to
that imposed at Nuremberg. See supra notes 119-20, and accompanying text. Moreover, had the conflict
significantly spilled into neighboring states, it is still doubtful that such conflict would have risen to
the level of intemational armed conflict. See Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2589-90 (discussing the
ambiguity of the war nexus requirement under the Nuremberg Charter, and detailing how the war nexus
requirement could be viewed either as "an element of crimes against humanity" or "merely limitation
on [the Tribunal's] jurisdiction"); infra notes 150-51, and accompanying text.
145. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), amended
by S.C. Res. 978, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3504th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/978 (1995), amended further
by S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3877th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/I165 (1998), amended
further by S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4240th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000),
available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/Resolutions/955e.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2003)
[hereinafter Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda]. Like the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, the Statutes of the
Tribunal for Rwanda are appended to this Security Council resolution, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
146. See, e.g., Bruce W. Nelan, A Recurring Nightmare; The Bloodletting Between Hutu and Tutst
Now Threatens to Erupt Across the Border from Rwanda, TIME, Apr. 10, 1995, at 50.
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finally sought to bring the alleged perpetrators of the acts to justice. Like the
Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Article I of the Statutes of the Tribunal for
Rwanda sets forth the Tribunal's primary jurisdiction: "[tihe International Tribunal
for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda." 147 The
Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda also followed the same basic structure with
regard to delimiting the crimes the Tribunal had authority to investigate and
prosecute. The Statutes authorized the Tribunal to prosecute genocide, 148 crimes
against humanity, 149 and "violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions and of Additional Protocol l1.'i15 The Statutes of the Tribunal for
Rwanda also contain an article explicating when individual criminal responsibility
can be assigned that closely tracks Article 7 of the Statutes of the Tribunal for
Yugoslavia.i 5i
Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal for Rwanda defines the Tribunal's
power to prosecute individuals for crimes against humanity The Article states that
"[tihe International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic,
racial, or religious grounds." iS 2 The enumerated acts that qualify under this Article
are precisely identical to those listed under Article 5 of the Statutes of the Tribunal
for Yugoslavia, 53 namely- "(a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d)
deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political,
racial, and religious grounds; [and] (i) other inhumane acts."
'iS4
Comparing the definitions of "crimes against humanity" employed by the
Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, a few important distinctions can be drawn.
The first is the substitution of the phrase "as part of a widespread or systematic
147 Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. I. Article I limits the scope of the
Tribunal's investigation to acts that occurred during the 1994 calendar year. Id. Cf. Statutes of the
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. I (granting the Tribunal for Yugoslavia the power to
prosecute all acts committed "since 1991").
148. Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 2. Article 2 tracks, nearly word
for word, Article 4 of the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130.
149 Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3.
150. Id. at Art. 4. Article 4 gives the Tribunal the authority to prosecute "persons committing or
ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977
Id. Article 4 goes on to list several of these violations, including "violence to life" (murder and torture),
hostage taking, terrorism, rape, and pillage. Id. at Art. 4(a)-4(h). See Geneva Conventions of 1949,
supra notes 96-97, and accompanying text; see also Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra notes
132-33, at Art. 2-3 (defining war crimes slightly differently and enumerating a different list of acts).
151. Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 6; see also Statutes of the Tribunal
for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, Art. 7 supra notes 136-39, and accompanying text. The only difference
between the two articles is the inclusion of feminine pronouns, to match the masculine pronouns, in the
Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda. See supra note 137
152. Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3; see also Statutes of the
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, Art. 5; supra notes 132-36, and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 141, and accompanying text.
154. Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3(a)-3(i).
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attack" in the latter for the phrase "in armed conflict, whether international or
internal in character" in the former. 55 This substitution is a very important
difference because it affects the underlying facts that the prosecutor is required to
prove to find the defendant guilty While the Statutes of the Tribunal for
Yugoslavia retain a vestige of the war nexus requirement from the Nuremberg
Charter, 156 the Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda expressly disclaim this
requirement. However, while the Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda drop the war
nexus requirement, they simultaneously add the requirement that the attack occur
"on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. ' I' 57 This strict
requirement is entirely absent from the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia and
the Nuremberg Charter.158
Comparing the three definitions of crimes against humanity from the
Nuremberg Charter and the Statutes of the Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
it is clear that there is a basic agreement about the fundamental contours of the law,
namely the acts that constitute the crime. Although the acts that can give rise to
prosecution for crimes against humanity have been expanded since Nuremberg, the
core of the law-that "massive atrocities against persecuted groups" will not be
tolerated-remains unchanged. 59 However, while the basic tenets of the law have
held steady two important peripheral issues arose after Nuremberg: whether the
doctrine of "crimes against humanity" should contain a war nexus requirement,
and whether it should contain a requirement that the acts be motivated by the
racial, religious, or political status of the persecuted group.
c. The Law Applied: Elements of the Crime
In 1995, Dusko Tadic became the first person charged with crimes against
humanity since the Nuremberg trials, a span of fifty years. 6° A Serb prison guard
known as "the Butcher of PrUedor, Tadic was charged with a litany of atrocious
human rights violations. 16 1 The case generated judicial opinions that gave context
155. Compare Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3 with Statutes of the
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, Art. 5.
156. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 124, at Art. 6(c); supra note 125, and accompanying text.
157 Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3
158. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, Art. 5; Nuremberg Charter, supra
note 124, at Art. 6(c).
159. Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2595.
160. Ed Vulliamy, In Times of Trial, THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 31, 1995, at T6.
161. Id. Ed Vulliamy of The Guardian sums up the factual allegations against Tadic:
When the hurricane of violence came, Tadic was in the eye of the storm.
Tadic, say the indictment and papers, visited Omarska [a prison camp] daily (or nightly),
usually in military fatigues. He tortured, raped and beat prisoners in sessions involving
'truncheons, iron bars, rifle butts, wire cables and knives' The indictment has him
jumping on prisoners' backs and, as their unconscious bodies were taken away in
wheelbarrows, emptying fire extinguisher in one of their mouths. Prisoners were forced
to perform oral sex on each other; many were never seen again and there are six named
murder victims on the indictment. According to background papers, three were killed
with metal rods and knives, whereupon a fourth was forced to bite off their testicles.
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to the crimes listed in the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia162 and in
particular, explained the legal elements necessary to hold an individual guilty of
crimes against humanity under the definition set forth in those Statutes.
63
The Trial Chamber I1, with respect to crimes against humanity first noted that
the Statutes require the prosecutor to prove both that the defendant committed one
or more of the crimes charged in Article 5 (defining crimes against humanity)
164
and that the defendant was individually responsible under Article 7 paragraph .1,6
The Trial Chamber I1 then exhaustively examined the elements of Article 5 of the
Statutes, preferring to address the Article 7 issues for all of the charges, including
the Article 2 (Geneva Convention)' 66 and Article 3 (war crimes) 67 charges, in a
separate section. 168
Briefly, a few important points about crimes against humanity at least insofar
as they are defined by the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, can be culled
from the various opinions in the Tadic case.
i. The War Nexus Requirement
First, although a war nexus requirement is present in the Statutes, the
requirement goes against the modem trend and is perhaps ill considered. The
"when in armed conflict" requirement, 69 as defined by the Appeals Chamber on an
interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction in the Tadic case, 170 requires "a resort to armed
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State."'1
7'
In defining the nexus required between the act and the armed conflict, the Appeals
Chamber held: "[i]t is sufficient that the alleged crimes were closely related to the
hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the
conflict."'172 However, as the Trial Chamber II observed, the requirement "deviates
Id., see also Amended Indictment, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
former Yugoslavia 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/tad-2ai951214e.htm
(last visited Nov. 24, 2003). Tadic was found guilty of I I of the 31 counts listed in the indictment. For
brief accounting of the charges of which he was found guilty and innocent, see Press Release, Tadic
Case: The Verdict (May 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/pl90-e.htm (last visited
Nov. 24, 2003)..
162. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic.
163. Id. at 557-76, 618-92.
164. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 5.
165. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 625; see also supra note 136,
and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 132, and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 133, and accompanying text.
168. Opinion and Judgment of May 7 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 661-92.
169 Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 5; see also supra notes 135-36,
and accompanying text.
170. Decision of Oct. 2, 1995, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, at 70 (int'l Crim. Trib. for
the former Yugoslavia 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm
(last visited Nov. 14, 2003); see also supra note 144, and accompanying text.
171. Decision of Oct. 2, 1995, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, at 70.
172. Id.
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from the development of the doctrine after the [Nuremberg] Charter" and is
completely omitted from the definition of crimes against humanity in the Statutes
of the Tribunal for Rwanda.17 Despite the explicit war nexus requirement in the
Statutes, the Appeals Chamber noted that "[ilt is by now a settled rule of
customary international law that crimes against humanity do not require a
connection to international armed conflict."'1
74
Examining the war nexus requirement from the perspective of its implications
for future trials, it is arguable that the requirement is outmoded and unfit for future
prosecutions of crimes against humanity In fact, under certain circumstances,
application of the requirement would seem to produce paradoxical results. For
example, for the requirement set forth by the Appeals Chamber to be satisfied,
there must be either the use of "armed force between States or protracted armed
violence" between groups within a State. 75 Therefore, to satisfy this requirement,
any group which is being murdered, enslaved, or tortured176 must acquire and use
weapons against their attackers in order to be protected by international law
However, if the persecuted population has no means of escalating the incident to
the level of "armed conflict, then the perpetrators of grave human rights
violations appear to be off the hook. This paradoxical result certainly cannot be
what was intended when the law of crimes against humanity was first
conceptualized.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Statutes of the Tribunal for
Rwanda specifically exclude this requirement 77 and the realization that such a
requirement, as interpreted by the Appeals Court in the Tadic case, could possibly
exclude from coverage the twenty-five year long "skirmish" between Indonesian
soldiers and the entire East Timorese population.' 78 While this issue is further
discussed below, 179 it is enough to say here that because East Timor was not an
officially recognized state at the time and yet not necessarily an Indonesian
territory (with the status of Portugal as colonial power in flux), this struggle may
not have achieved the sacred status of "armed conflict" under a strict interpretation
of the Appeals Chamber's definition. 180
173. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 627" see also supra notes
147-48, and accompanying text.
174. Decision of Oct. 2, 1995, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 141. The Appeals Chamber was
nevertheless compelled to require the nexus to armed conflict be proved since the Security Council,
aware of the absence of the requirement under modem conceptions of customary law, explicitly
required the nexus in the Statutes.
175. Id. at 70.
176. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 5; see also supra note 133, and
accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 147-48, and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 45, and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 213-18, and accompanying text.
180. Compare supra notes 46-47, 52-53, 59-62, and accompanying text with Decision of Oct. 2,
1995, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 70; see also supra note 175, and accompanying text.
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it. The Directed Against a Civilian Population Requirement
The second major issue raised by the Tadic case was the meaning of the
"directed against a civilian population" requirement.'' Although the requirement
may on face seem simple to apply it actually has three independent elements, each
of which must be addressed and satisfied. 182 The first sub-element is the
requirement that the persecuted population be "civilian" in nature. The conclusion
that can be drawn from the Trial Chamber Il's opinions in the Tadic case is that the
term "civilian" is to be construed broadly and should not be a difficult hurdle for
the prosecutor The Trial Chamber 11, borrowing from precedent, held that "a wide
definition of civilian population is justified" and that "the presence of those
actively involved in the conflict should not prevent the characterization of a
population as civilian."'
' 83
The second sub-element to be satisfied is the requirement that the attack be
against a civilian population. The Trial Chamber II noted in the Tadic case that the
term is meant,
"to imply crimes of a collective nature and thus exclude single or isolated acts
which do not rise to the level of crimes against humanity." 84 However, as the
Trial Chamber If also noted, this definition implies a number of independent
issues that must be resolved: "the acts must occur on a widespread or systematic
basis, there must be some form of a governmental, organizational or group
policy to commit these acts and the perpetrator must know of the context
within which his actions are taken, [and] the actions [must] be taken on
discriminatory grounds."1
85
The Trial Chamber II held that the first requirement "can be fulfilled if the
acts occur on either a widespread basis or in a systematic manner." i 6 It Is
interesting to note that reading this requirement into the term "population" actually
renders the definition of crimes against humanity in the Statute of the Tribunal for
Rwanda redundant in part. 87 As is mentioned above, 8 8 the definition of "crimes
against humanity" in the Rwandan Statutes replaces the war nexus requirement
181. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 5: see also supra note 140, and
accompanying text.
182. Opinion and Judgment of May 7 1997 Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 635.
183. Id. at 643 (internal citations omitted).
184. Id. at 644 (internal citation omitted).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 646 (emphasis added). Later the chamber refined the definition and explained the
policy behind the requirement:
It is therefore the desire to exclude isolated or random acts from the notion of crimes
against humanity that led to the inclusion of the requirement that the acts must be
directed against civilian "population, and either a finding of widespreadness, which
refers to the number of victims, or systematicity, indicating that pattern or methodical
plan is evident, fulfils this requirement.
Id. at 648.
187. See Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3.
188. See supra note 147, and accompanying text.
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with the requirement that the crimes be "committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack" but otherwise retains the language of the Statutes of the
Tribunals for Yugoslavia, including the "civilian population" language. 8 9 Thus,
reading a "widespread or systematic" requirement into the term "population"
renders the identical language in the Rwandan Statutes redundant.
For the second requirement, that there must be a policy of some kind, the
Trial Chamber 11 held that "such a policy need not be formalized and can be
deduced from the way in which the acts occur." 190 Circumstantial evidence of a
policy includes showing the acts occurred "on a widespread or systematic basis
that demonstrate[d] a policy to commit those acts, whether formalized or not."' 9'
Therefore, meeting the above requirement of being widespread or systematic
appears to create a presumption that the acts were taken pursuant to a policy 192
The third requirement read into the term "population" by the Trial Chamber 11
in the Tadic case is that the prosecutor must prove "discriminatory intent on
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds."'193 Even though the
discriminatory intent requirement was expressly absent from the statutory
language, the Trial Chamber 11, relying in part on statements by Security Council
members, concluded that the requirement should nonetheless be read into the
Statutes. 94 As the chamber noted, the discriminatory intent requirement was
explicitly included in the Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda.' 95
iii. Mens Rea: The Intent Nexus Requirement
The third major issue raised by the Tadic case was the requirement that "the
act not be unrelated to the armed conflict."' 196 As the Trial Chamber II noted,
this requirement involves a two-step analysis. First, the defendant's act must occur
"within the context of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian
population."'197 Second, "the act must not be taken for purely personal reasons
unrelated to the armed conflict."' 98 "Thus if the perpetrator has knowledge, either
189. See Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3.
190. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 653.
191. Id.
192. An additional issue under this requirement is whether or not the "policy" at issue must be
state policy. Drawing on American case law from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Trial
Chamber 11 held that "although policy must exist to commit these acts, it need not be the policy of a
State. Id. at 655 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)).
193. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 652.
194. id.
195. Id., see also Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3; supra notes 149-
50, and accompanying text
196. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997 Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 656.
197. Id., see also supra notes 176-78, and accompanying text. The Trial Chamber I1 held that "in
addition to the intent to commit the underlying offence the perpetrator must know of the broader
context in which his act occurs. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 656;
see also Judgment and Sentence of June 1, 2000, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-1 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for Rawanda 2000), available at 39 INT'L LEGAL MATEMALS 1338, 1340-41 (2000).
198. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 656. As for this second
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actual or constructive, that these acts were occurring on a widespread or systematic
basis and does not commit his act for purely personal motives completely unrelated
to the attack on the civilian population, then the intent nexus requirement has
been satisfied. i99
iv. Individual Criminal Responsibility 
2
1
The last requirement to be proved is individual criminal responsibility as set
forth in Article 7 of the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia.2' This
requirement involves a three-step inquiry 202 First, the prosecutor must show
intent, "which involves awareness of the act of participation coupled with a
conscious decision to participate by planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or
otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime.20 3 Second, the
prosecutor is required to prove the defendant either directly participated or that the
conduct of the accused contributed to the commission of the illegal act." 20 4 Finally
the prosecutor must show the requisite "amount of assistance before one can be
held culpable for involvement in a crime."205
As for the requirement that the prosecutor prove intent, the Trial Chamber II
noted that precedent supported the conclusion that "knowledge and intent can be
inferred from the circumstances." 2° It also held that "[a]lthough intent founded on
inherent knowledge, proved or inferred, is required for a finding of guilt, the Trial
Chamber need not find that there was a pre-arranged plan, to which the accused
was a party, to engage in any specific conduct."
20 7
For the second step of the inquiry, the requirement of "direct contribution,"
the Trial Chamber II summarized the case law and drew three general conclusions
about the requirement: "direct contribution does not necessarily require the
participation in the physical commission of the illegal act," 20
8 "participation in the
commission of the crime does not require an actual physical presence or physical
assistance," 209 and "mere presence at the scene of the crime without intent is not
requirement, the Trial Chamber Ii noted "that the act cannot be taken for purely personal reasons
unrelated to the armed conflict, [and] while personal motives may be present they should not be the sole
motivation for the act. Id. at 658.
199. Id. at 659.
200. It is important to emphasize that the Trial Chamber II addressed the Article 7 requirements for
all of the charges, including charges under Article 2 (violations of the Geneva Conventions), Article 3
(war crimes) and Article 4 (genocide), in a single section. See supra notes 156-60, and accompanying
text.
201. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 7; see also supra notes 136,
153, 165, and accompanying text.
202. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 674.
203. Id.
204. Id. (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 681.
206. Id. at 676.
207. Id. at 677
208. Id. at 679.
209. Id.
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enough.,21°
For the final step, determining whether the particular defendant rendered
enough assistance so as to justify culpability, the Trial Chamber II specifically
refused to line-draw, instead preferring to examine whether the necessary amount
of participation had been proved on a case-by-case basis. 211 While no bright-line
rules were proffered, a few general conclusions can be drawn from the cases the
Trial Chamber 11 reviewed in its opinion. Briefly, acts sufficient to meet the
threshold include providing material support212 and failing to prevent others from
acting. 213 The Trial Chamber I1 also recognized that "not only does one not have to
be present but the connection between the act contributing to the commission and
the act of commission itself can be geographically and temporally distanced. '2 1n
d. A Brief Note on Statutes of Limitation and Crimes Against Humanity
Since 1968, a U.N. convention has provided that crimes against humanity are
not subject to any statute of limitations. 21 5 As a result, "[a] trial could take place
twenty or thirty or forty years later., 21 6 This principle disallows those guilty of the
most heinous human rights violations to hide behind the shield of time. As
professor Aryeh Neier notes, the principle has been used to try more than 7,000
former Nazi officials in Germany since 1950.217 The policy behind the principle is
also sound. The notion that a person guilty of the most heinous human rights
violations should go free on a technicality is preposterous. As a normative matter,
a defendant should not escape punishment merely because the community of
nations has been laggard in bringing him or her before a tribunal.21 i
The preceding brief examination of the law of crimes against humanity was
intended to leave the reader with the notion that it is not simple to convict a
defendant under the law. Therefore, when a grossly incomplete factual record more
210. Id. (internal citation omitted). The Trial Chamber 11 discussed the In re Tesch case in which
two businessmen were tried for war crimes for supplying Zyklon B gas to the Auschwitz concentration
camp during World War II. The two men were found guilty of "supplying the means" ofextermination
with knowledge "that the gas was to be used for the purpose of killing human beings [, specifically
allied nationals]. In re Tesch (Zyklon B case), 13 Ann. Dig. 250, 252 (British Military Ct. 1946).
211. Opinion and Judgment of May 7 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 681.
212. See id at 684.
213. Id. at 686.
214. Id. at 687 A related issue is whether one act alone is sufficient for the purposes of "crimes
against humanity jurisprudence. The Trial Chambers II addressed this issue and concluded that "a
single act by perpetrator taken within the context of widespread or systematic attack against
civilian population entails individual criminal responsibility and an individual perpetrator need not
commit numerous offences to be held liable. Id. at. 649.
215. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 68 (1969), reproduced from G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR,
23rd Sess., 1727th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2391 (1968).
216. NEIER, supra note I, at 249.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 212-13. A statute of limitations not only benefits the criminal defendant, it also
provides politically expedient excuse for states that refuse their treaty obligations and moral
responsibility by failing to bring massive violators of human rights to justice.
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or less satisfies the requirements, one can be sure that the alleged perpetrator
deserves further scrutiny
B. Applying the Law" Crimes Against East Timor as Crimes Against Humanity
For purposes of examining the strength of the case against Henry Kissinger, it
is useful to examine the known facts2 19 against the backdrop of the law of "crimes
against humanity" as it is explicated in the various opinions generated by the Tadic
case. Since the preceding examination focused upon them and it is arguable they
represent customary international law as well as any other model, the hypothetical
"crimes against humanity" statutes to be applied here will be the same as those
found in the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia.220
I Indonesia, East Timor, and the War Nexus Requirement
Notwithstanding whether the war nexus requirement should, as a normative
matter, be a requirement for proving a violation of the law of "crimes against
humanity, it is arguable that the conflict between East Timor and Indonesia would
have satisfied the requirement nonetheless. It requires the use of armed force
between states or between organized groups and governmental authorities within a
state.221 First, it could be said that East Timor was an independent state at the time,
regardless of international recognition, for several reasons. For instance, East
Timor's colonial ruler, Portugal, supported independence for the tiny island
nation 222 and a majority of the East Timor's population appeared to support
independence as well. 23 In the alternative, it could be argued that the East
Timorese coalition supporting independence was an "organized group" within
Indonesia at the time of the armed conflict.2 24 Under either interpretation, the war
nexus requirement would be satisfied.
However, the more important question is whether the war nexus requirement
should be an element of "crimes against humanity" law as a matter of good policy
As was argued above,225 given the possibility that such a requirement could
produce a paradoxical result and a severe miscarriage of justice, the better course
seems to be that taken by the Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, which do not
require the nexus to war.
226
219. It is worth reiterating that the U.S. government is still withholding majority of the most
probative evidence. See supra Section I.C.2.
220. Whether Kissinger's actions appropriately satisfly the required legal elements under the
Statutes will also be discussed. See infra Section II.B. i-ii.B.4.
221. See supra note 171, and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 47-44, and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 55-58, and accompanying text.
224. See id.
225. See supra notes 168-72, and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
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2. Directed Against A Civilian Population: Indonesian Attacks Against East
Timor
Since there is little doubt that many of the casualties during Indonesia's three
decade long siege of East Timor were civilians and because the bar is set
deliberately low, this element appears to be satisfied.227
The three issues arising under the "population" element also seem to be
resolved in favor of culpability As for the first requirement that the acts be either
systematic or widespread, the killing of nearly a full third of the entire population
of East Timor, a sixth in the first year alone, seems to indicate the acts were both
widespread and systematic. 228 The next requirement, a two-prong test demanding
(1) evidence that the acts occurred pursuant to a policy and (2) a showing that the
defendant knew the context within which he or she took the actions, is also easily
satisfied by the available factual record 229 First, there appears to be a presumption
that this element is satisfied when the widepread or systematic requirement is
satisfied,23 ° which it appears to be, and second, the acts were taken pursuant to a
plan devised by General Suharto and known to Kissinger.2 3 ' The final requirement,
proof of discriminatory intent, can be shown by a number of statements from both
Suharto and Kissinger with respect to the political affiliations of the East Timor
population.
2 32
A brief note about the "fighting communism" defense is in order at this
juncture. Although the laws defining "crimes against humanity" do not
countenance such a defense, some critics may argue that Kissinger was simply
following the politically prudent course of action given the context of the Cold
War. This argument, however, misses the core of the definition of crimes against
humanity which encompasses all persecutions based on political affiliation. 233 It
also misconstrues the facts of the case. At no point did Suharto ever claim that
227. Compare supra note 39, and accompanying text and supra note 41, and accompanying text
with supra note 183, and accompanying text.
228. Compare supra notes 44-45, and accompanying text with supra note 186, and accompanying
text.
229. See supra notes 190-88, and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 192, and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., supra note 59, and accompanying text; supra note 71 (discussing how Kissinger and
Ford were aware Suharto was hedging in the direction of invading East Timor as many as five months
before the invasion); supra note 78, and accompanying text (revealing conversation between
Kissinger, Ford, and Suharto in which Suharto announced his plans to invade East Timor the day prior
to the invasion).
232. See, e.g., supra note 71 (showing that Suharto's spoken motive for invading East Timor was
Fretilin's supposed links to communism); supra note 78, and accompanying text (in which Suharto
again mentions Fretilin's supposed communist links as reason justifying the invasion); supra notes
84-85, and accompanying text (in which Kissinger justifies selling arms to Indonesia because East
Timor is "Communist government").
233. See supra note 193, and accompanying text.
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Indonesia's invasion was aimed at defending his country from an attack by East
Timor, and, notwithstanding Kissinger's comments to the contrary,234 such a claim
would be fanciful given the severe disparity in military capabilities between East
Timor and Indonesia. Lastly, since the State Department's own internal documents
called Fretilin "vaguely leftist, '235 the massacre of 200,000 people on the off
chance that they were attempting to spread "communist instability" seems
preposterous.
3. Intent Nexus Requirement: Supplying Weapons to a Murderous Regime
This element, as construed by the Trial Chamber I1 in the Tadic case, requires
the actor have either actual or constructive knowledge of the widespread or
systematic nature of the attacks and a purpose to contribute to these attacks.236
Showing Henry Kissinger was aware of the widespread and systematic nature of
the Indonesian attacks on East Timor is unproblematic given the extensive
intelligence information he was privy to in his multiple positions of power.237 As
for the second requirement, all that need be shown is that personal motives alone
did not trigger the act.238 This requirement can be readily shown from Kissinger's
and Ford's statements to Suharto on the day prior to the invasion, in which
Kissinger and Ford offered to support Suharto's planned invasion in no uncertain
terms. 239 It is also evidenced by statements Kissinger made to his underlings in a
State Department meeting in which Kissinger openly acknowledged flouting
240United States law to assist the Indonesians. Interestingly, Kissinger's own words
show that personal motives were not behind his decision to continue the flow of
weapons to Indonesia. At another point in the same State Department meeting,
Kissinger, while discussing the weapons sales to Indonesia, told the other State
Department officials present that he got "nothing from" the sales, he received "no
rakeoff" from them.24'
234. See supra notes 83-84, and accompanying text (revealing that Kissinger intended to play the
"fighting communism" card if Congress decided to hold hearings on East Timor).
235. See Briefing Paper' Indonesia and Portuguese Timor supra note 49.
236. See supra notes 188-91, and accompanying text.
237. See discussion supra Part I.A; see also supra note 23 1.
238. See supra note 198, and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., supra note 78, and accompanying text (in the repnnted transcript of the meeting
between Suharto, Ford, and Kissinger, Kissinger assures Suharto that he and the administration will
favorably "influence the reaction in America" to the imminent Indonesian invasion of East Timor).
240. See, e.g., supra notes 83-84, and accompanying text (in the reprinted Memorandum of
Conversation of State Department meeting eleven days after the invasion, Kissinger chides his aides
for allowing lower ranking State Department officials to go against his wishes and recommend
suspension of arms to Indonesia).
241. Id; see also HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 106. Admittedly the claim is quite suspicious given
that the accusation was never made. Echoing the sentiments of Queen Gertrude in Hamlet, Kissinger
"doth protest too much, methinks. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 2, line 240.
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4. Individual Criminal Responsibility- Aiding and Abetting Suharto
As discussed above, satisfying this element involves a three-step inquiry 242
The initial step is a showing of knowledge of participation and intent to actively
participate, and this step can be inferred from nearly all of Kissinger's acts with
respect to the invasion of East Timor. First, it is clear Kissinger knew the context
within which he was acting.243 It appears equally clear that Kissinger intended to
actively aid Suharto, with moral support and weapons, in carrying out the
invasion. 244 For example, he participated by squelching attempts by lower ranking
State Department officials to halt arms transfers to Indonesia, 245 by failing to object
to Suharto's announced plans even though he knew his objection would have likely
scuttled the plans entirely 246 and by attempting to deceive Congress about the
matter in order to continue arms shipments to Indonesia.247
As for the second inquiry requiring a showing of direct contribution, the
above-mentioned facts fulfill it as well. More specific evidence of substantial
direct contribution is the fact that, rather than halting as they should have, U.S.
weapons sales doubled after the invasion in the face of Indonesia's known
weapons shortage. 248 Evidence of direct participation in the actual murder of the
East Timorese, while tenuous without the best evidence, can still be shown by the
fact that weapons sold to Indonesia after the invasion (and thus after the weapons
sales should have been halted) were likely used in the invasion of East Timor.249
As for the third inquiry asking whether the actor rendered the requisite
amount of assistance, several already cited facts appear to satisfy it. As the Trial
Chamber 11 concluded in the Tadic case, providing material support and failing to
prevent others from acting satisfies the threshold. 250 Kissinger not only provided
material support in the form of weapons, but he also failed to object to the invasion
when he knew doing so would have likely prevented it.
Thus, without great difficulty it seems clear that the body of facts
surrounding Kissinger's involvement in the invasion of East Timor can be mapped
onto the law defining crimes against humanity While some of the edges are rough
and the fit may not be precise, there is no doubt a colorable claim to be made, and
one that the remaining concealed evidence would no doubt shed great light upon.
242. See supra Section II.A.3.c.iv.
243. See supra note 23 1.
244. Remember, Kissinger described halt of weapons sales to Indonesia, which he was firmly
against, as "kick[ing] the Indonesians in the teeth. See supra notes 83-84, and accompanying text.
245. Compare supra notes 83-85, and accompanying text with supra notes 198-99, and
accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 79, 81.
247. See supra notes 83-84, and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 81; supra note 60, and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 74, and accompanying text; see also supra note 78, and accompanying text.
Remember that the Trial Chamber II in the Tadic case construed the "direct contribution" inquiry to not
require participation in the physical commission of the act or physical assistance in the act. See supra
notes 208-02; see also In re Tesch (Zyklon B Case), 13 Ann. Dig. 250, 252 (British Military Ct. 1946).
250. See supra notes 212-06, and accompanying text.
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Although this author holds no illusions about Kissinger actually standing trial for
crimes against humanity, the law and facts in many ways speak for themselves. It
is a hotly contested conclusion, as would be expected, and it engenders a debate
filled with unspoken assumptions and unconscious biases.
SECTION III: THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FAILURE TO HOLD KISSINGER
ACCOUNTABLE
[E]very society, including ours, manages to function with only the most
precarious purchase on the truth of its own past. Every society has a substantial
psychological investment in its heroes. To discover that its heroes were guilty of
war crimes is to admit that the identities they defended were themselves tarnished.
Which is why a society is often so reluctant to surrender its own to war crimes
tribunals, why it is so vehemently "in denial" about facts evident to everyone
outside the society. War crimes challenge collective moral identities, and when
these identities are threatened, denial is actually a defense of everything one holds
dear
Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior s Honor
251
A. Failing to Hold Kissinger Accountable Represents a Clear Double Standard
Despite the compelling evidence and precedent to the contrary, a sober review
of the current state of world affairs reveals that Henry Kissinger will never face
criminal prosecution for his alleged misdeeds, much less prosecution under
international law.252 Although the crimes of Kissinger and Pinochet are intimately
linked and the facts appear to support prosecutions of both,253 there is a major
difference between the crimes of the two men. One committed them under the
protection of the most powerful country in the world; the other did not. It is highly
unlikely any country or bloc of countries would attempt to prosecute Kissinger, or
any former U.S. official, for crimes against humanity "for fear of economic and
political reprisals" or worse.254 The basic lesson to be learned from these cold, hard
truths is that there is a blatant double standard in the prosecution of international
criminals, "where powerful states may judge the leaders and former leaders of less
251. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOR 184 (1997).
252. See generally Jaime Malamud Goti, The Moral Dilemmas About Trying Pinochet in Spain, 32
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV 1, 2-3 (2001) (discussing the remote possibility of trying United States
politicians like Kissinger because of the inequality of power in the nation-state system); see also BORK,
supra note 89, at 29-30 ("The degree of danger officials face will depend on the power and influence of
their countries.").
253. See Shahram Seyedin-Noor, The Spanish Prisoner" Understanding the Prosecution of Senator
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 6 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 41, 88-90 (2000); White, supra note 3 i, at
224-25; supra notes 31-32, and accompanying text.
254. Nicole Barrett, Holding Individual Leaders Responsible for Violations of International
Customary Law: The US. Bombardment of Laos and Cambodia, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV 429,
474-75 (2001).
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powerful states for crimes against humanity but not vice versa., 255 However,
while many commentators simply accept the double standard as a given, an
examination of the causes underlying the phenomenon is warranted. More
importantly, because the American public's acquiescence allows the double
standard to persist, any examination must ultimately probe the public conscience
on this matter.256
I The "Politics" of Holding Kissinger Accountable
For a prime example of the power of language manipulation, one need look
no further than the debate over whether to hold U.S. actors criminally liable for
their actions. Official U.S. denouncements of efforts to bring former U.S. leaders
to justice often take the form of turning the tables and accusing the investigation of
being "'political' rather than legal. 257 Of course this complaint is the exact same
complaint as critics of the failure to bring Kissinger and others to justice have
against the U.S.
258
As attorney Shahram Seyedin-Noor explains, "[t]he decision to prosecute
Pinochet over Kissinger or other officials in the West that at times helped
orchestrate his atrocities is even more 'political' than the decision to prosecute
Pinochet alone, since it manifests judgment on 'worthy' and 'unworthy'
criminals. '259 Seyedin-Noor concludes, "[t]he current liberal agenda of human
rights activists to prosecute 'dictators' must then be understood to function within
the restrictive framework of the politically 'acceptable.' 260 Thus, it is the decision
to decline to try Kissinger and those similarly situated that is "political" and
opposed to "legal.
Of course, this argument also flies in the face of the conclusions of fact and
law drawn above. A decision to prosecute Kissinger, given the weight of the
evidence heretofore gathered and the current state of customary international law,
255. White, supra note 31, at 225.
256. That the American public's support is a lynchpin for the continued vitality of the double
standard may be demonstrated by way of example. While it should be beyond dispute that majority of
the American public would never countenance a trial for Henry Kissinger under any circumstances, the
public has no such reservations when it comes to other ruthless leaders. In December 2003, following
the capture of Saddam Hussein by American forces, ninety-six percent of Americans said they believed
Hussein should be put on trial. Deborah L. Acomb, Poll Track, NAT'L J., Dec. 20, 2003. A full seventy-
two percent believed he should be tred by an international court or the U.S. military. Id Notably, it
does not appear that Robert Bork has publicly objected to such a trial.
257 Barrett, supra note 254, at 474. Typifying this sentiment, attorney Jamison G. White writes,
with respect to the prospect of establishing permanent International Criminal Court and prosecuting
U.S. officials in it, that such prosecutions would represent "vendetta-driven type ofjustice. Jamison
G. White, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Augusto Pinochet, Universal Jurisdiction, the ICC, and a
Wake-up Call for Former Heads of State, 50 CASE W RES. L. REV. 127, 175 (1999). Echoing that
sentiment, Robert Bork writes that "[i]ntemational law is not law but politics. BORK, supra note 89, at
21.
258. See Barrett, supra note 254, at 474; Goti, supra note 252.
259. See Seyedin-Noor, supra note 253, at 88-89.
260. Id. at 90-91.
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at least with regard to the law of crimes against humanity, appears far from
political. In fact, since such a decision would appear to be justified by an objective
review of the law and facts, it is the continued failure to bring Kissinger before a
tribunal that appears to be "political. A cursory review of the evidence with
respect to Kissinger's crimes in East Timor shows a total lack of contrary evidence
or alternate explanation. And it is again worth noting that the best evidence is still
under lock and key The United States may well continue to stonewall
investigations and prosecutions of its own officials; what is unacceptable, however,
is the claim that such prosecutions are merely "political" warfare.
2. Narcissistic Patriotism
The quotation opening this section addresses the dirty little secret of
international human rights law- that the "national objectivity" necessary to carry
out the system of international justice is quite possibly nothing more than illusory
Every society, like every individual within that society has a vested interest in
assuring that its "heroes" remain untarnished. The health of the collective psyche
of every society indeed depends heavily upon the continued myth of its country
and its leaders. 261 Because the stakes are so very high, the populations in most
nations, including the U.S., are reluctant to even consider the possibility that their
current and former leaders are international criminals.262
In The Warriors Honor professor Michael Ignatieff discusses the various
"forms of denial" that societies undertake to rationalize their failure to punish
international criminals in their midst.263 One such rationalization strategy and one
which appears to be actively at play in the case of Kissinger, is the "outright
refusal to accept facts as facts.,,264 As Ignatieff explains, "[r]esistance to historical
truth is a function of group identity" nations and peoples weave their sense of
themselves into narcissistic narratives that strenuously resist correction."2 65 While
such a rationalization process can quite clearly be seen in the case of Kissinger, the
irony of the phenomenon is inescapable. At the very moment a nation has an
opportunity to cathartically purge its past and identify and hold accountable those
few individuals responsible for its sins, it refuses to distance itself from the actors
and their atrocious acts and thus must take collective responsibility for them. 26
261. See DORFMAN, supra note 14, at 201-02.
262. Writing about trials of former leaders for massive human rights abuses, Rudi Teitel explained
that "what is at stake is contested national history. Ruti Teitel, From Dictatorship to Democracy: The
Role of Transitional Justice, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 272, 281 (Harold
Hongiu Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999).
263. IGNATIEFF, supra note 251 at 184-85 (addressing the International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and the ethnic strife which led to that conflict).
264. Id. at 184.
265. Id. at 185.
266. See supra note 89; see also supra note 109, and accompanying text. "in his savagery toward
the outside world, his heedlessness, his imperial mentality, [Kissinger] was quintessentially reflective of
very powerful strains in American life, and we must not forget that. He was not apart from the main.
And though we now single him out for responsibility, the responsibility, of course, ultimately is ours.
Morris, supra note 69.
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This argument is buttressed by the fact that Kissinger admittedly broke U.S.
law while committing his crimes, at least with regard to East Timor. American law
clearly did not sanction his actions; responsibility for the crimes committed should
therefore be pinned on Kissinger and his cohorts exclusively Although the better
course seems to be admitting the wrongdoings and placing responsibility upon the
individuals to whom it belongs, the American public has decided that it, like the
ostrich, will bury its head in the sand and refuse to believe the wrongdoings
occurred in the first place.
Other forms of denial and rationalization identified by Ignatieff include
"complex strategies of relativization. 267 These strategies occur when "one accepts
the facts but argues that the enemy was equally culpable or that the accusing party
is also to blame or that such 'excesses' are regrettable necessities in the time of
war." 268 Thus, "[t]o relativize is to have it both ways: to admit the facts while
denying full responsibility for them., 269 A species of this form of denial was
previously addressed under the auspices of the "fighting communism" defense.
270
The basic thrust of the denial is that the crimes were in some way justified, either
by the circumstances of the situation, as in self-defense, or by the geopolitical
context, e.g. the Cold War.
Although these denial mechanisms do not substantiate the conclusions they
generate, a review of the law and facts in many situations would reveal the
conclusions to be specious. This is not to say that many people actually engage in
this moment of reflection, most do not. It is this unflinching, reflexive, and
unapologetic patriotism that breathes life into the denial mechanisms and allows
the average American to foreclose the possibility that former leaders were not
pristine. The fundamental force behind this narcissistic patriotism is that "truth is
related to identity" or rather "[w]hat you believe to be true depends, in some
measure, on who you believe yourself to be.",27' At the same time, "[a]ll nations
depend on forgetting: on forging myths of unity and identity that allow society to
forget its founding crimes. 272 Thus, there is literally a systematic purge of all
adverse history from the collective consciousness which in anyway conflicts with
the society's collective self-perception. Unfortunately, this portends a rather bleak
future for the international legal system and the international human rights
movement.
267 IGNATIEFF supra note 251, at 184.
268. Id. at 185.
269. Id.
270. See supra Section I.C.3. Ignatieff explains the persuasive power of the defense: "[pleoples
who believe themselves to be victims of aggression have an understandable incapacity to believe that
they too have committed atrocities. IGNATIEFF, supra note 251, at 176. Indeed, "[mlyths of innocence
and victimhood are powerful obstacle in the way of confronting responsibility. Id
27 1. IGNATIEFF, supra note 25 1, at 174.
272. Id. at 170.
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B. The Implications of Failing to Evenhandedly Bring Transgressors of
International Law to Justice
While there is a litany of problems associated with the identified double
standard in the application of international law, three are highlighted here. And
although three discrete problems are identified, it will become clear that the issues
spill over onto each other and defy tidy compartmentalization.
I Unsatisfied Expectations and Promotion of Instability
The first set of problems associated with the failure to dispense justice
evenhandedly is its effects on the fulfillment of traditional notions of justice.
Author T.M. Scanlon asserts that fairness and retributivist notions of justice are
closely conjoined.273 Fairness, in fact, "may seem to presuppose retributivism
insofar as the idea of fairness appealed to is that punishment should go equally to
those who are equally deserving of it."' 274 Thus, the fundamental concepts ofjustice
and punishment are undermined by unequal application of the law.
Closely related to this concept is the idea that trials and hearings "[reinforce]
individual dignity rights." 275 The failure to prosecute criminals must therefore
necessarily undermine victims' individual dignity Individuals who witnessed their
families massacred deserve the opportunity to air their grievances and to have them
adjudicated by an impartial and competent tribunal. Denial of this right subverts
the logic of any system of justice, threatening its very existence.
A logical consequence of this failure to do justice is the infusion of instability
into the nation-state system. "Where the world shirks its responsibility to judge
crimes against humanity and where lawful punishments for irreparable wrongs are
not available, a lawless response is a possible or even probable consequence.,
276
Essentially, systematic disparate application of international law fosters unrest for
understandable reasons. Those who are wronged expect the perpetrator to be held
responsible and to be punished; this expectation is what the international system of
human rights law and the numerous conventions on the subject promise. When the
promise is broken, vigilante justice is the only avenue left. As professor Aryeh
Neier observes, "[jiustice provides closure; its absence not only leaves wounds
open, but its very denial rubs salt in them. 277 Moreover, "peace without justice is a
recipe for further conflict" '278 it produces a smoldering tinderbox of emotions that
awaits an appropriate moment to exact its own version ofjustice. While individual
denials ofjustice may produce individual responses, it is an inescapable conclusion
273. T.M. Scanlon, Punishment and the Rule of Lam, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 257, 262 (Harold Honglu Koh & Ronald C. Syle eds., 1999).
274. Id. (emphasis in original).
275. Ruti Teitel. From Dictatorship to Democracy: The Role of Transitional Justice, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTs 272, 280 (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye
eds., 1999).
276. NEIER, supra note 1, at 213.
277. Id. This observation is made with reservations on Neier s part. See id. at 213-14.
278. Id. at 213.
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that repeated failures to enforce international human rights law sends the message
that the entire system of international law is nothing but an empty promise and an
unattainable ideal.
2. The Breakdown of the International System of Law
While critics of the conclusion drawn above might argue it is overdrawn-
that it suffers from Chicken Little syndrome-the conclusion seems
unavoidable. 279 First, one of the basic principles of law is the "observance of some
minimal evenhandedness. '280 Second, an international legal system by definition
requires international participation, but repeated failures of the system to fulfill its
promise deter active and meaningful participation. The system then becomes
stagnant and open to further abuse by powerful states, resembling the Hobbesian
state of nature: the international legal order is imposed by sheer force of power.28
As Dr. Jaime Malamud Goti well concludes, "[w]hat negatively hurts the rule of
law is the discrete prosecution of just one segment of the world's state criminals,
however vicious, when disregard for other equally vicious abusers is grounded in
reasons as alien to our notion of retributive justice as the disparity of power in
international relations.
282
Moreover, the failure to punish the most notorious violators of international
law has equally devastating effects; it "vitiates the authority of law itself. '28 3 In
this vein, professor Diane Orentlicher argues that "[t]he fulcrum of the case for
criminal punishment is that it is the most effective insurance against future
repression.,, 28 Echoing this sentiment, professor Aryeh Neier observes that "when
the community of nations shies away from responsibility for bringing to justice the
authors of crimes against humanity, it subverts the rule of law.",28 5 Of course not
every case of justice denied threatens to topple the system, nor does even a single
279. It is necessary to clarify the discussion at this point. This Article is not addressing a
Realpolitik view of the international legal system in which international law is enforced by "a few
powerful or hegemonic states. Makau wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An
Argument for De-Marginalizing Enforcement, 4 BUFF HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 213 (1998). Instead, this
Section addresses, for lack of a better term, a "pure" notion of the international legal system in which
states collectively create and enforce an international system of justice. The justification for this
narrowed conception of the international legal system is the fact that a system that encourages
"individual states to unilaterally sanction weaker ones outside the international framework harm[s] the
human rights project. Id., see also infra Section III.B.2-111.B.3.
280. Goti, supra note 252, at 3.
28 1. See wa Mutua, supra note 279, at 213.
282. Goti, supra note 252, at 3. Commentator Nicole Barrett argues that "political and military
muscle are not sufficient grounds to ignore legal and historical realities. Barrett, supra note 254, at
476.
283. Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2542.
284. Id. (emphasis added).
285. NEIER. supra note 1, at 213. Author Emesto Garz6n Valdds clarifies, "[w]hen people see that
criminals go unpunished, this does anything but strengthen the population s internal point of view
toward, or 'dispositional subjection to, the norms of the system. Ernesto Garz6n Vaidds, Dictatorship
and Punishment: A Reply to Scanlon and Teitel, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
291, 295 (Harold Honglu Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999) (internal citation omitted).
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outrageous case, but every case does chip away at the system's ability to deter
future abuses 86 The problem creates a tradeoff: the more the iternational legal
system allows, the less potential human rights abusers are deterred. In other words,
"the stability of the international system [of law] can only be enhanced by the
increased enforcement of international norms.
287
3. Use of International Law as a Tool of Oppression by Powerful Nations
Perhaps the most egregious implication of the double standard in international
law application is the potential for powerful nations to manipulate the law for their
own purposes.2 8 Professor Makau wa Mutua argues that "[t]he current status quo
in which powerful states exploit the international vacuum of enforcement left by
impotent [international] bodies is unacceptable., 289 The objection is that the
current system "gives a handful of powerful states yet one more weapon to use
against poor peoples and their states." 29 When "the prosecution of government
officials from weaker states can be used to politically manipulate and control
weaker nations, international law acts to "perpetuate inequality between states.' '29i
If international law is nothing but an empty shell by which powerful countries
further their domination of the less powerful, rather than the international legal
system being merely impotent, it is being used as a tool of oppression.
This prospect is hard to swallow, but if true, presents a damning indictment of
international criminal and human rights law. It also calls into question all
prosecutions under these laws, including those at Nuremberg. It renders all
"justice" heretofore achieved in the field of human rights law utterly suspect, and
opens it to charges of "victors' justice.
More widely, "use [of] human rights as a pretext for achieving other foreign
policy objectives" may very well stain the entire human rights project. 92 When
"Western states employ the logic of human rights in foreign policy to advance
other goals, such as opening up markets, the human rights project risks becoming
yet another tool for powerful countries to dominate the weaker.293 This prospect
has led professor Michael Ignatieff to compare today's "aid workers, reporters,
lawyers for war crimes tribunals, [and] human rights observers" to yesterday's
"diplomats, missionaries, and commanders of imperial hill stations." 294 Although it
is an unfortunate comparison, it appears to be an accurate one.
286. "Whereas one could claim that justice is served every time human rights abuser is convicted,
it is no less true that the rule of law is dubiously compatible with extremely sporadic and selective
enforcement. Goti, supra note 252, at 3.
287 Seyedin-Noor, supra note 253, at 92 (though Seyedin-Noor disagrees with what he terms
Orentlicher's "absolutist" approach to international law enforcement).
288. See, e.g., PARENTI, supra note 45, at 1-5.
289. wa Mutua, supra note 279, at 251.
290. Id.
291. White, supra note 31, at 224.
292. wa Mutua, supra note 279, at 250.
293. Id.
294. IGNATIEFF, supra note 25 1, at 5.
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Thus, the inequitable application of international law represents a failure of
the highest magnitude. It not only implies a breakdown of the international legal
system itself, but it also reveals the abuse of the law by powerful nations who
exploit it to perpetuate and benefit from power differentials that exist in the nation-
state system, and it portends unyielding international strife. While these
conclusions represent extremes, they are asymptotes that international law and the
nation-state system appear to be approaching.
SECTION IV- CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to serve as a counter-narrative to the ubiquitous
innocence myth that pervades domestic public opinion about U.S. foreign policy
and policy-makers. Whether or not the evidence (and the evidence that could be
uncovered) is sufficient to prosecute Henry Kissinger for his deeds with respect to
East Timor is clearly a question open to debate. And this reluctant admission- that
the question is open to debate- is the crux of the purpose of this Article.
If the proposition that there is an arguable basis for holding Henry Kissinger
legally responsible for his actions in East Timor is acceptable, the overwhelming
uniformity of the innocence myth is disturbed. The question remains whether the
general public, that large segment of the polity that is exclusively informed by
network television news, will find such a proposition palatable. The question is
pressing because it resolves the broader problem of whether the double standard in
public opinion that currently plagues the international system of law is intractable.
If it is, there appear to be several less-than-pleasant implications, first and foremost
being the slow destruction of the international legal order. As that order is slowly
and increasingly flouted and disrespected by an ever-growing number of countries
and leaders, the benefits engendered by that order will begin to dissipate. Among
the list of terribles is greater instability as aggrieved nations and peoples resort to
vigilante justice (a large proportion of which is now popularly dubbed "terrorism")
to salve the wounds the international community has refused to recognize.
Additionally, because the international system of law increasingly appears to have
been co-opted by a few powerful nation-states, it is in danger of becoming
cynically manipulated as a tool of oppression, merely another weapon in the
neocolonialist arsenal.
With the dawn of the ICC,295 the international community faces a clear
crossroads. One path is that of real international participation in, and deference to,
the newly created court by fostering a genuine belief that the court will succeed in
dispensing justice without regard to nationality and other such irrelevant factors.
The alternative is the further erosion of the international system of law and the
grim prognostication described above. With the United States working tirelessly to
exempt itself and its citizens from the ICC's jurisdiction,9 the hopes are already
slim the court will achieve much. Nevertheless, not all hopes are lost. With the
establishment of the new court, the international community sans the U.S. has the
295. See supra note 2, and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 4, and accompanying text.
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opportunity to establish a system of international justice acceptable to a majority of
the world community If the court is successful in this endeavor, U.S. leaders will
face greater pressure to join as the U.S. increasingly looks out of step with the rest
of the world. However, if such an event does transpire, the crucial issue would be
whether U.S. domestic public opinion would ever countenance the trial of an
American soldier, much less a leader. The answer to this hypothetical touches at
the very nerve center of the American self-perception and is arguably
determinative of the future of the international legal system.

WHISTLEBLOWING IN A FOREIGN KEY THE
CONSISTENCY OF ETHICS REGULATION UNDER
SARBANES-OXLEY WITH THE WTO GATS PROVISIONS
Stewart M Young
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two years, the United States has been hit hard by a number of
scandals involving public companies, including mismanagement and ethical
violations by company management and lawyers alike. Certain company names
are now synonymous with ethical issues and inept management, including such
giants as Enron, Tyco, WorldCom and Adelphia.' Due to the problems created by
the bankruptcy and the scandal-plagued management of these companies, the
public is calling for greater transparency and reporting, a better system of director
oversight, and a higher degree of separation between compensation given to
managers and the board, on the one hand, and actual performance of the company,
on the other.2 There is a sense within the general community that the balance
sheets of companies need to reflect fairly and accurately the actual state of the
companies' financial situation. The public is simply tired of managers ruining
public companies while they profit at the expense of the shareholders. Elected
J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, 2004; M.A., Waseda University, 2002; B.A., Princeton
University, 2000. I would like to thank Professor Richard Momingstar for providing the impetus for this
Article (as well as inspiring thoughts and ideas), Professor William Simon for providing insightful
comments (and the vehicle for which I came up with this Article topic-smack dab in the middle of
taking his Professional Ethics final exam), and Michael Young for editorial suggestions, input and
excellent advice. This Article is dedicated to my family, and especially to my mother, Suzan Young for
all of her support and love.
1. See, e.g., David Henry & Mike McNamee, Bloodied and Bowed, Bus. WK., Jan. 20, 2003, at
56 (talking about the accounting failures that damaged the profession; specifically naming Enron and
WorldCom as two of those audit failures); See also Special Report, The Enron Scandal, BUS. WK. (Jan.
28, 2002) at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/toc/02_04/B3767enron.htm (discussing the Enron
scandal in great detail with numerous articles); Harry Berkowitz, Scandal Bad News for Cable Industry,
NEWSDAY (July 25, 2002), at http://www.newsday.com/technology/nybzcab252798410
jul25,0,4951853.story?coll=ny-technology-print (discussing the Adelphia Scandal); Robert Reno, There
were plenty of Warning Signs in Tyco Scandal, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jun. II, 2002), at
http://www.sltrib.com/2002/Jun/06112002/commenta/74441 i.htm (discussing the Tyco scandal) (all
visited on Jan. 2, 2003).
2. See Business with CNBC, Corporate Scandals, MSNBC (September II, 2003), at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/corpscandal front.asp?Odm=N2AJB&cpl=l (for brief view of the
public reactions to these many scandals, news websites have created "scandal pages" for the public to
see the latest news on each scandal).
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officials are responding to this public outcry with a number of different reform
proposals, emphasizing the responsibilities management of public companies owe,
both to shareholders and the public at large. Included in these reforms are ethical
standards for attorneys who have public companies as clients.3 These new ethical
standards will apply to any lawyer representing companies listed on the American
stock exchanges and will be imposed on domestic and foreign lawyers alike.4
Additionally, foreign firms giving advice to foreign companies attempting to be
listed on American stock exchanges would also be subject to the same ethical
standards.
5
The principal legal manifestation of these heightened concerns is found in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.6 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to assuage
the public's concern over the recent management and accounting scandals, hoping
that the reforms in the Act would create a better atmosphere for transparency and
ethical reporting.7 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act bestows the SEC with the authority to
impose ethical standards on attorneys practicing before it, while the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act itself spells out the minimum standards that would be acceptable to
Congress. s The details of those standards are to be elaborated by the SEC and then
enforced by that agency 9 Thus, a dichotomy exists between the standards stated in
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the proposed rules offered by the SEC for comment.
The overall purpose of this Article will be to examine the consistency of the
legal regime established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the ethical regulations
proposed by the SEC, in relation to the legal services portion of the World Trade
Organization s (WTO) General Agreement on Trades in Services (GATS). Part I
will discuss the GATS and its effect on the legal services market in general. Part 11
will then examine an overview of how the ethics requirements stated in the United
States Schedule of Commitments to GATS are treated and how those ethics
requirements are locked in by GATS and the WTO. Part Ill will examine the new
ethical responsibility requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
and the subsequent rules proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) regarding ethical reporting and "noisy withdrawal."'  Part IV will
3. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.4, 205.5 (2003) [hereinafter Standards
of Professional Conduct for Attorneys].
4. Id. at § 205.1
5. id. at §§ 205.2, 205.3.
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Jan. 23, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley072302.pdf [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley
Act].
7 One of the goals of the Act, "according to the co-sponsors, was to prevent lawyers from sitting
idly by while, with their knowledge, their clients committed fraud. In their view, such inaction, or
worse, made it possible for corporate managers to perpetrate the Enron and WorldCom scandals.
David Becker and Melissa Johns, Professional Responsibility: New Ethical Duties for Lawyers under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 16 Insights: The Corp. & Sec. L. Advisor I1, Nov. 2002, at 2.
8. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 6, at § 307
9. See Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, supra note 3.
10. Tamara Loomis, Lawyer Rules Proposed by SEC, N.Y Law Journal, Nov. 7, 2002, WL
11/7/2002 N.Y L.J. I ("Noisy withdrawal" is known as the action that "lawyer not only.. inform the
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demonstrate that the new ethical requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and the SEC are not consistent with the United States' obligations under GATS
regarding legal services. This Article will also discuss possible approaches to
reconciling the proposed rules with GATS and action that might be taken by WTO
member countries, including under the dispute resolution provisions of the WTO
agreements. The ultimate conclusion of this Article is that the SEC proposed
standards as applied to non-domestic law firms are potentially irreconcilable with
GATS, and likely to create friction between the United States and a number of our
trading partners. The most important purposes of this Article are to analyze the
inconsistency of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the proposed SEC rules with GATS.
Second, this Article can be read as a case study for the domestic imposition of
ethical standards on the trade in services and legal services field in general. Third,
this Article will potentially add fuel to the fire for implementing international
ethical standards in certain global service industries, including the legal services
field in particular.
1. GATS AND THE LEGAL SERVICES MARKET IN GENERAL
A. The WTO Overview
The WTO was created in 1995 as the only global organization dealing with
trade among nations.' It includes in its membership 146 countries (as of April 4,
2003) and addresses trade issues in a number of different areas.12 The WTO acts
as a forum for negotiating trade agreements, administers WTO trade agreements,
monitors national trade policies and handles trade disputes between member
nations.3 Over the past years the WTO has gained prominence and importance as
the organization continues to shape the law of international trade and reshapes the
notion of citizen participation in international organization through its sometimes
raucous membership meetings.' 4  The recent accession of China to the WTO
certainly enhances the influence of the WTO, extending its reach even beyond
solely capitalistic economies.' 5 As many other nations, including Russia, Belarus
and the Maldives seek to enter the WTO, its influence upon the international
community and trade matters, as well as its capacity to guide and control
board of directors of evidence of misconduct, but also to quit and disaffirm documents submitted to the
SEC.").
11. World Trade Organization, What is the WTO, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
whatis_e/whatis e.htm (last visited on Sept. 13, 2003) (all of this basic information on the WTO can be
found on the WTO website).
12. Id.
13. 1d.
14. A number of different appellate body decisions have appeared in the news media, but the
Seattle Riots in 1999 drew the most attention to the WTO in recent memory.
15. World Trade Organization, WTO News: 2001 Press Release, WTO Successfully Concludes
Negotiations on China's Entry (Sept. 17, 2001), at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/
pres01_e/pr243_e.htm (last visited on Dec. 10, 2002).
2003
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
international and economic relations, will grow even greater. 16
In the wake of World War 11, the term "international community" was not
invested with quite the same meaning that it has assumed today At that time, the
leaders of a small handful of nations drew up blueprints for a number of
international organizations, around which the international community would
coalesce and through which it would develop. 17 These leaders initially proposed
the creation of three international economic organizations: The World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Trade Organization, all
part of the "Bretton Woods" international economic cooperative movement.
18
Prior to the ratification of the International Trade Organization, portions of the
Protocol of Provisional Application from the International Trade Organization
Charter were taken and ratified by a number of countries.' 9 However, the Charter
implementing the International Trade Organization was never ratified, and the
initial ratified portions became known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). 20 The WTO was created in 1995 through the action of a majority
of the GATT party countries, resulting in the termination of GATT 21
B. The Creation of GA TS
In addition to creating the WTO, the Uruguay Round22 accomplished two
other very important things. First, it brought under one umbrella all previously
existing multilateral global agreements and codes-bringing all of these under one
umbrella organization and structure.23 Second, it significantly expanded the areas
in which the countries reached agreements regarding trade related matters.24
Among these expansions included the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 25  the Agreement on Trade-Related
16. See e.g., World Trade Organization, Press Release, Continued Structural Reforms Could
Improve Economy Efficiency (Jan. 17 2003), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_
/tpre/tp209_e.htm (commenting on the Maldives economy) (last visited Jan. 23, 2003); See also,
World Trade Organization, W7TO News: 2002 News Items, Working Party on the Accession of the
Russian Federation (Dec. 18, 2002), at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news02_e/
accessionrussian_18dec02_e.htm (last visited on Jan. 7, 2003).
17 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO 21 (2001).
18. World Trade Organization, GA7T A Brief History, at http://www.wio.org/english/thewto e
/whatis_e/eol/e/wto0l/wtol_6.htm (offering brief historical insights into the predecessor agreement of
the WTO) (last visited on Dec. 5, 2002) [hereinafter GATT History].
19. Id.
20. See JACKSON, supra note 17, at 20.
21. GA TT History, supra note 18. See also JACKSON, supra note 17, at 399.
22. The Uruguay Round was a series of negotiations undertaken to review the text of GATT, and
develop improvements through understandings on GATT Articles. See World Trade Organization, UR:
Some Key Facts, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/eol/e/wto01/wto1_32.htm#note1.
23. This is referred to as the "single package" negotiation approach, in which the Uruguay Round
resulted in one entire package for members to accept or reject, as well as establishing an entirely new
treaty that nations would join. JACKSON, supra note 17, at 375. It also established the "new twenty-
seven-Article Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Id. at 376
24. Id. at 375-76.
25. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
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Investment Measures (TRIMS)26 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS). 27 GATS would be the official trade agreement governing international
trade in services among WTO members. Since the service industry accounts for
over eighty percent of GDP and employment in the United States, industries
subject to GATS have a unique position in the economy 28 Additionally cross-
border transactions of trade in services accounts for more than twenty-two percent
of worldwide trade, illustrating the large arena in which GATS could potentially
affect in international trade. 29 Because of the increasing importance that trade in
services plays within international trade and the large monetary value of such
services, GATS can have potential impact on the restrictions and regulations that
member countries place upon its service industries.
The world is changing, and according to Sheldon Novick, the great American
legal scholar Oliver Wendell Holmes felt that "change should be made
consciously even scientifically to accommodate new purposes. 3 °  Historically
speaking, the GATT did not deal with trade in services, but only dealt with trade in
goods.3i It did that in part because trade in goods was more straightforward and
easier to regulate than international trade in services. 32  Additionally trade
restrictions in goods generally took the form of tariffs and quotas, both of which
are much more straightforward and simple to deal with than the various domestic
rules and regulations related to the provision of services. In addition, as trade in
goods between countries increased under the GATT regime, so did trade in
services. 33 The importance of trade in services became more apparent, as did the
need to introduce some order to domestic regulation of services. Accordingly,
GATT member countries began to call for limitations on new restrictions and the
liberalization of current restrictions on trade in services.34 By 1995, the Uruguay
negotiations concluded an agreement governing international trade in services,
thereby cementing the importance of GATS among WTO members.35
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement],
ANNEX IC, available at http://www.wto.orgenglish/docs e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf (last visited Jan. 23,
2003) [hereinafter TRIPS].
26. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Jan. I, 1995, WTO Agreement, ANNEX I,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/18-trims.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2003)
[hereinafter TRIMS].
27 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Jan. I, 1995, WTO Agreement, ANNEX I B, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/does-e/legal-e/26-gats.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2003) [hereinafter
GATS].
28. Office of the United States Trade Representative, WTO Services Trade Negotiations, at
http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/services/gat.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).
29. Id.
30. SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 156
(Dell Publishing 1990) (1989).
31. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969), chapter 20




35. JACKSON, supra note 17, at 402 (GATS was included in Annex IB, part of Annex I
"Multilateral Trade Agreements" that were the results of the Uruguay Round).
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The GATS includes the regulation of a number of different services,
especially including trade in legal services for cross-border transactions of WTO
member countries.36 This agreement explains the general terms for trade in
services, including such services as accounting, financial services, air transport,
maritime transport and legal services, and it specifically spells out the goal that
countries are to liberalize their regulations of those services.37 The GATS
document is a multilateral framework of principles regarding these specific
services that cross the borders of member nations of the WTO, and it also sets out
guidelines for liberalizing the regulation and licensing of foreign-based service
professionals seeking the opportunity to practice in other countries. 38 As such, the
Uruguay Round negotiations set up a framework that could be expanded, dealing
with the trade in services occurring on an international level with an eye towards
ensuring that member countries follow certain principles.39
There is a fundamental difference between goods and services. For trade in
goods, one does not recognize any legitimate quota or tariff. But, with trade in
services, one does recognize the legitimate need for regulations. There is a
legitimate purpose to restricting trade in services to maintain proper quality for
those services domestically while there is also a legitimate need to liberalize the
trade of these services as well. GATS is a mesh of these two legitimate needs;
allowing countries on the one hand to keep their legitimate restrictions and
regulations on certain industries, while also creating an atmosphere of
liberalization of trade in those industries through an international agreement. For
the purposes of this Article, the most important aspect of the GATS is the
standards it sets for the trade in legal services. But, a corollary to the imposition of
those standards is the acknowledgement that member countries may legitimately
impose ethical standards or reporting rules for any service provider that does
business in their country Of course these two concepts can come into conflict, if
those ethical standards or reporting requirements create an unfair burden to
international trade in services. But precisely what is unfair is the question. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 presents a very good prism to address that precise
question.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, passed by the United States Congress,
creates affirmative duties for legal service providers domestically, as well as
imposing those duties on legal service firms that are not based within the United
States. 40 Accordingly the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the proposed SEC ethics rules
are potentially adverse to both GATS and the reasons behind its implementation.
As such, member countries with domestic legal service providers who will be
affected by the new law would arguably have a valid claim against the United
States and could bring such a claim to the WTO dispute resolution body
The GATS began by urging member states to liberalize trade in legal services
36. See GATS, supra note 27 at 297
37. See generally GATS, supra note 27.
38. Id.
39. See generally GA 7T History, supra note 18.
40. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 6, at § 307
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in accordance with the treaty, as well as to liberalize the restrictions and
regulations surrounding licensing of services more generally. 4' For purposes of
this Article, perhaps the most important goal of GATS is to reduce restrictions that
might unfairly disadvantage foreign service providers who offer services
domestically An example would be a reduction in restrictions and licensing
requirements for foreign-trained lawyers who would like to offer services to clients
in the United States. At the same time, the WTO recognizes through GATS that,
in important respects, services differ from goods in fundamental ways. Most
crucially, some degree of regulation is necessary to ensure service providers have
some minimal degree of professional competence and provide services at some
minimum level of acceptable quality In addition, regulations may be necessary to
reduce the possibility of undisclosed or inappropriate bias or self-interest in the
provision of these services. Accordingly, the preamble of the GATS states that the
WTO "recognizeles] the right of Members to regulate, and introduce new
regulations, on the supply of services within their territories in order to meet
national policy objectives ,42 One of the key features of the WTO is that the
organization does not strive to force member countries to implement WTO policies
that clash with the legitimate goals of those member countries.
At the same time, however, member countries must possess legitimate and
genuine national policy objectives if such a country desires to implement
procedures or regulations that are adverse to the WTO's overall trade liberalization
objective. WTO members are not allowed to institute harmful regulations or
restrictions unless there are legitimate purposes to those restrictions. 43 The WTO's
goal is to liberalize and effectuate greater trade among member nations, which
means that WTO members that pass restrictions on international trade are in direct
conflict with WTO goals." As such, the WTO seeks to ensure that member
nations do not attempt to hinder international trade unless the WTO member has
legitimate and genuine objectives (known as a national policy objective within the
wording of GATS).45
Additionally, GATS expressly places "developing countries" in a special
category that will entitle them to special treatment in the implementation of their
national policy objectives.46 The WTO's accommodation of developing countries
is important to note within GATS and the WTO's activities in general. The nature
and degree of preferential treatment that developing countries should receive in
international organizations remains the subject of raging debate within the WTO.
It is clear that the drafters of GATS recognized developing countries should
receive some accommodation.4 7  At the same time, the fact that special
4 1. See GATS, supra note 27 at 285.
42. Id.
43. See generally GATS, supra note 27.
44. World Trade Organization, The World Trade Organization, at http://www.wto.org
/english/res e/doload_e/inbr e.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2003) ("[WTO Agreements] bind governments
to keep their trade policies within agreed limits to everybody's benefit.").
45. GATS, supra note 27 at 298.
46. Id.
47 Id. at 285 ("Recognizing the right of Members to regulate, and to introduce new
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accommodations were expressly made for developing countries arguably means
that, in the absence of such language for developed countries like the United
States, such countries should be subject to more rigorous discipline. 8 The United
States will be the principle focus of this Article.
C. The GA TS Framework and Schedule of Commitments
The GATS is comprised of six parts and eight annexes and has been signed by
146 countries (as of April 4, 2003).49 The definitions spelled out in GATS cover a
broad spectrum of trade in services. It states that "'services' includes any service
in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority ,50
The WTO Secretariat explains that the objective of GATS includes "progressive
liberalization of trade in services, promoting economic growth and development,
and increasing participation of developing countries.' One of the key aspects of
GATS is that it seeks to create a "new definition of trade" covering "not only the
supply of services across national borders but also transactions that involve the
cross-border movement of factors of production (capital and labour). ' 2
GATS covers all services that involve cross-border transactions, including
services like telecommunications, distribution, energy services, financial services,
legal services and accounting services industries, to name just a few 53 GATS does
not require all WTO members to cover all services because member countries are
able to opt certain service industries into GATS or opt them out.5 4 Therefore,
member countries can choose which services they want to be subject to GATS,
rather than having all service industries of that WTO member subject to GATS.
Although GATS is supposed to regulate WTO member countries so that they
refrain from placing barriers to trade in services, it does not provide such
protections to all services.5 5 According to the Schedule of Commitments, WTO
member countries are able to determine which services in their country will be
covered by GATS.56 Although there are a number of recognized services that
many WTO members have included within their Schedule of Commitments, any
regulations. given asymmetries with respect to the degree of development of services regulations in
different countries, [and recognizing] the particular need of developing countries to exercise this
right.").
48. See generally GATS, supra note 27.
49. World Trade Organization, supra note iI.
50. GATS, supra note 27 at 286. Examples of services supplied in exercise of government
authority would be the military, police, civil and criminal justice systems, etc.
51. The World Trade Organization: A Training Package, WTO WEBSITE, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis_e/eol/e/default.htm (Following under the subtitle GATS
Objectives) (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).
52. See World Trade Organization, GATS. Main Characteristics, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto__e/whatis_e/eol/e/wtoO6_9.htm#note2 (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
53. See generally GATS, supra note 27
54. See generally id.
55. See generally id.
56. See generally World Trade Organization, WTO Legal Texts: Countries Schedules of
Commitments, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/legai-e.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
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country is allowed to omit services that it does not want covered by GATS.
57
Thus, it is often the case that GATS does not apply across the board to the same
services for all WTO members because some members have decided not to subject
some of their service industries to GATS.
Under GATS, there are seven key provisions that greatly affect trade in legal
services and the regulation of legal services within WTO members. "These seven
provisions include: (I) the requirements of transparency, (2) most favored-nation
(MFN) treatment, (3) domestic regulation, (4) recognition, (5) progressive
liberalization, all of which are generally-applicable, and (6) the market access; and
(7) national treatment provisions, which apply only to 'scheduled' services. 58
These seven provisions apply to the United States under its Schedule of
Commitments, and this Schedule also lists legal services as one of the service
industries applied to GATS. The "recognition" provision of GATS provides that
members are required to increasingly liberalize their regulations governing the
ability of foreign legal service providers to practice within that member country 59
GATS' regulation of trade in services, and specific regulation of the legal
services industry, relies on the actions of WTO members. All twenty-nine articles
of GATS apply to the regulation of cross-border legal services for a WTO member
only if that member lists that category of service on their Schedule.60 The twenty-
nine articles include; Most-Favored Nation Treatment, Business Practices,
Subsidies, Recognition, Labour Markets Integration Agreements, National
Treatment, Market Access, Negotiations and Schedules of Specific Commitments,
Modification and Dispute Settlement and Enforcement, among others.6' Thus, the
Agreement spells out a number of different terms and obligations regarding the
regulation of a listed services industry Once a WTO member lists a service
industry in its Schedule of Commitments (governed by Article XX) then that
service industry becomes subject to the provisions in GATS.62 The member nation
will then have to follow its GATS commitments for those service industries that it
has listed on its Schedule.63
To satisfy the need of member governments for legitimate domestic
regulation on its service industry, the member is allowed to list the current
regulations on that particular industry in its Schedule. During the process of
implementing GATS, most countries listed legal services as a covered service
under their schedules, meaning that GATS applies to the legal services industry of
that country In those same schedules, however, "most countries listed their
current regulations in their Schedules" and the "consequence of listing a current
law is that the current law need not comply with those aspects of the GATS that
57. See generally id.
58. Laurel S. Terry, GATS' Applicability to Transnational Lawyermng and its Potential Impact on
U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 989, 1006 (2001).
59. See GATS, supra note 27 at art. VII.
60. See Terry, supra note 58, at 1000.
61. See GATS, supra note 27, at Table of Contents.
62. See id at art. XX.
63. See d.
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apply to 'scheduled' services." 64 Listing a category of service within one's
Schedule will mean that future laws and regulations that are implemented by that
WTO member must comply with GATS.65 However, once a member lists its
current regulations in its Schedule to GATS, those listed regulations become the
standard by which future regulations are judged. If future regulations proposed by
a party country are more restrictive than the regulations listed in the member's
Schedule, then the member's future regulations are directly adverse to GATS.
However, if any future regulations are not more restrictive than the regulations
listed in the member's Schedule, then the member's regulations are reconcilable
with GATS. Additionally even if the current regulations are more restrictive and
strike against the principles of GATS, these regulations are "grandfathered in" as
the existing set of regulations as long as these regulations are initially listed on the
member's Schedule of Commitments.6 6 One could call these "status quo"
provisions on legal services, because the member's Schedule of Commitments
usually lists the current regulations of legal services at the time the member signed
GATS. As such, any subsequent regulations that are more restrictive or introduce
greater regulation of legal services than those listed on the member's initial
Schedule are in direct conflict with GATS.
D. GA TS Regulation of Legal Services
Looking at one problem for the regulating language within GATS is that the
definitions of certain professions in service industries often vary around the world.
An example of this is that the definition of "legal services" and "attorney" in each
of the WTO member countries can differ greatly 67 Any attempt to liberalize
regulations governmg cross-border legal services and attorney licensing would
come into conflict with those different definitions.
Another worry would be that liberalizing regulations governing cross-border
legal service transactions might also have an affect on the ethical regulations of
legal services in respective WTO member countries. For example, in Japan the
definition and licensing of an "attorney, as well as the legal services that are often
provided by people other than licensed lawyers in Japan, differs markedly from the
same definitions in the United States. 68 Thus, because each WTO member does
have its own licensing system and standards, including its own ethical standards
and regulations, a treaty such as GATS might be an ineffective instrument to
promote liberalization of cross-border trade of legal services. If the WTO
64. Terry, supra note 58, at 1004.
65. Id. at 1005.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Michael K. Young & Constance Hamilton, The Legal Profession of Japan, in
JAPANESE LAW IN CONTEXT: READINGS IN SOCIETY, THE ECONOMY, AND POLITICS (Curtis J. Milhaupt
et al. eds., 2001).
68. For a detailed analysis of the Japanese legal industry, see id. Some of these differences
include the provision of legal services in Japan by certain occupations who have not passed the bar or
are certified as "lawyers (bengoshi)" while still providing services that would only be provided by
licensed lawyers in the United States. Id. at 44, 48-50.
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rigorously follows GATS and enforces member conduct, one result might be
slowly reformed (and potentially soft) ethics regulations in all of the countries
subject to GATS regulations. Such a thing could be disastrous for the legal
industry in general. On the other hand, if the WTO rigorously enforced GATS
then it might slowly standardize professional responsibility rules with stricter
standards, thereby affecting a higher degree of ethical rules and responsibilities for
the legal industry
II. LEGAL ETHICS REQUIREMENTS IN THE US SCHEDULE OF COMMITMENTS TO
GATS
A. U.S. Schedule of Commitments in Brief
The United States Schedule of Commitments under the GATS describes the
specific licensing and ethical requirements for legal services that are applicable to
GATS.69  Within that document, numerous U.S. states have specified the
requirements for foreign lawyers to engage in legal services in their respective
jurisdiction. A number of U.S. states also specify their existing professional ethics
rules in the Schedule of Commitments and require foreign lawyers to follow those
rules if they practice law in that state.70 However, thirty-five U.S. states do not list
their specific rules, simply making passing reference to their professional
responsibility rules or other regulations under the Schedule of Commitments.7i
For those U.S. states that do specify their professional ethics requirements and
licensing rules (the "bound states"), the Schedule sets forth that each foreign
licensed supplier is subject to the Professional Rules of Conduct for that respective
state.72 Although a majority of the fifteen "bound states" in the Schedule
(including New York, Texas, California and the District of Columbia) 73 each have
different rules of professional conduct for their licensed lawyers to follow, the
general scope of the professional ethics rules are very similar from state to state.
Thus, while each state might adhere to a different set of rules, the overall theme of
the rules of professional conduct are strikingly similar.
As stated earlier, the Schedule of Commitments submitted by each WTO
member lists the status quo restrictions allowed for each member, and, therefore,
69. U.S. Schedule of Commitments Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION (May 1997) available at ftp://ftp.usitc.gov/pub/reports
/studies/GATS97.pdf (last visited on Oct. 4, 2003) [hereinafter US. Schedule of Commitments].
70. See id. at 35.
71. Id.
72. Each statement for the U.S. states that do have specific commitments posits that the foreign
licensed supplier is to be subject to whatever state rules or code of conduct that all lawyers licensed in
the respective state are subject. Thus, ifa state follows the ABA Rules of Conduct in that state, then the
foreign licensed lawyer is to be subject to those Rules of Conduct. The states that are specifically cited
in the Schedule of Commitments with specific binding commitments are: Alaska, California,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Texas and Washington. Id. at 17-33.
73. Id.
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new regulations implemented by members that more strictly regulate or restrict the
international trade of legal services come into conflict with GATS. To ensure that
member countries are aware of the respective regulations, GATS requires
transparency in the Schedule of Commitments that requires member countries to
publish all regulations that affect trade in Schedule services.74 This action alone
eliminates secret rules or regulations by WTO members, because all licensing
regulations and professional responsibility rules governing the legal services
industry (and other industries) are placed in the open for all to see. 75 Thus, even if
GATS does not necessarily affect a massive liberalization of the cross-border legal
service industry, it does ensure that WTO member regulations on legal services are
published and available to the public and to other countries.
One theme discussed above is the argument that the GATS ability to regulate
trade in services with enforcement through the WTO might have the effect of
standardizing certain practices and standards for services industries. GATS
enforcement by the WTO and WTO members could alter the ethical conduct rules
or ethical standards for certain services such as the legal service industry For the
United States, this is especially important because the legal profession is not
governed by a national board, but by each respective state (and that state's bar
association). 76 This legal services regulation occurs in fifty-four jurisdictions in
the United States, each jurisdiction with its own rules and regulations regarding the
licensing, practice and disciplining of lawyers.77 These different jurisdictions,
while receiving some input from associations such as the American Bar
Association, all have their own disciplinary rules and ethical standards by which
lawyers admitted within the that state are required to practice.78 Thus, when the
United States submitted its Schedule of Commitments, it listed state-by-state (for
fifteen states) which professional rules foreign-licensed attorneys needed to follow
in order to practice in those states. 79 Following these specific professional rules
would ensure that foreign-licensed lawyers would not be sanctioned by the
requisite state's bar association and would ensure that the lawyer would be allowed
to practice law in that state.
B. State Licensing of Attorneys in the United States
Since one of the goals of GATS is to effect liberalization in trade in services,
the structure of the United States attorney licensing system will be implicitly
contrary to such liberalization. State bar associations and the state Supreme
Courts, rather than the federal government, controls attorney licensing.80 Unlike
74. See Mara M. Burr, Will the General Agreement on Trade in Services Result in International
Standards for Lawyers and Access to the World Market? 20 HAMLINE L. REV 667 673 (1997).
75. Id.
76. See id. at 677
77. Id.
78. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P KONIAK, & ROGER C. CRAMTON, THE LAW AND ETHICS
OF LAWYERING 13-18 (3d ed. 1999).
79. See U.S. Schedule of Commitments, supra note 69-73.
80. See Burr, supra note 74, at 677.
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other WTO member countries, each state bar controls the licensing qualifications
and professional responsibility rules for each lawyer practicing in that state. If the
lawyer is to be subject to ethics rules or is in violation of certain practices, then the
state bar association has authority to take actions against such a lawyer.8'
Harmonization of U.S. regulation of the legal profession would be difficult to
achieve because of the fifty-four jurisdictions that have fifty-four different codes
and rules governing the conduct of attorneys. Granted, many of these rules and
codes are strikingly similar, but the United States incorporated those rules and
codes into its Schedule of Commitments. Since GATS is an agreement between
the United States and other member nations, those other member nations would
expect that the United States would conform with its commitments under GATS
and move towards gradual liberalization of the legal services industry But it is not
even clear that the United States would be able to control the actions of all fifty-
four jurisdictions, and also not entirely clear that the federal government has the
authority to impose less restrictive regulations on attorneys than the state bar
associations and state Supreme Courts. This complicates the liberalization process
of legal services in the United States because the federal government has
historically not had the power and authority to effect such changes.8 2 Ironically, in
the case that is being analyzed it is not that the federal government is trying to
liberalize professional responsibility rules for attorneys practicing in the United
States, it is that the federal government is trying to impose greater restrictions on
attorneys which conflicts with the U.S. Schedule of Commitments.
As stated previously, the multi-jurisdictional bar association approach to
regulating the conduct of lawyers in the United States differs from most other
WTO members. Because there is no central authority in charge of licensing and
regulating the legal profession within the United States, the status quo regulations
of the states apply through the Schedule of Commitments submitted by the United
States Trade Representative (USTR). 83  With a number of state professional
responsibility codes listed on the Schedule of Commitments, one could argue that
allowing such a convoluted system of legal services regulation appears adverse to
the liberalization of trade in services on an international level. One scholar notes
"the United States, the leader in pushing for open legal services markets, has one
of the most complicated and difficult systems for foreign lawyers. While the
United States seeks to establish international standards applicable to the practice of
law, internally it has fifty-four jurisdictions with fifty-four sets of requirements to
practice law.",8 4 This means that the United States itself has fifty-four sets of
ethical regulations depending on what professional responsibility rules each state
bar association utilizes.
To practice law anywhere, it is crucially important for a lawyer to understand
the local rules of conduct and professional responsibility Given increasing
81. See id.
82. See id. at 677-78.
83. See 1999 USTR Annual Report March 2000: Committee on Specific Commitments, available
at http://www.ustr.gov/wto/99ustrrpt/ustr99_speccomm.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
84. Burr, supra note 74, at 678.
2003
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
internationalization of legal practice, some advocate an international licensing
board for lawyers or an international legal code of conduct.8 5 For instance, some
suggest using the CCBE Code of Conduct in the European Community as a
common code of conduct for legal professionals in order to create an international
professional responsibility code.8 6 But the United States has yet to adopt a uniform
standard among the fifty-four separate jurisdictions that govern attorney licensing
and professional responsibility codes, much less an international code of conduct.
Even practice before the federal courts is generally governed by state credentials
and the state's reprimands and decisions apply equally to federal practice (except
with respect to practice with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, which
has a separate credential system).
8 7
Because the GATS Schedule of Commitments submitted by the United States
explicitly states that the state codes of conduct that a foreign licensed legal
professional must follow in each state, any changes to the code or regulations that
currently exist in each state (or in the United States) must be in the direction of less
restriction or regulation. 8 If any jurisdiction imposes more rigorous standards or
regulations, including a heightened professional responsibility code, then those
rules and standards presumably come into direct conflict with GATS. But that is
exactly what the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has done, hence creating the conflict with the
GATS.
Ill. NEW ETHICS REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND
PROPOSED SEC RULES
A. Introducing Structural Changes for Ethics Rules in the U.S. Legal Field
The conflict between the GATS and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act most clearly
manifests itself in regards to the duty of confidentiality most attorneys owe
generally to their clients. In virtually all professional responsibility codes, the duty
of confidentiality is centrally important to the ethics of the legal services
profession. Even in the United States, most professional responsibility classes in
law school spend a great deal of time grappling with the subtle issues of client
confidentiality and the attorney-client relationship.8 9
In light of recent events surrounding public companies and associated ethical
problems, including those who provided accounting and legal services for troubled
companies, the U.S. Congress saw fit to implement new policies and regulations
for public companies. Both the SEC and Congress took steps to increase the
85. Id. at 686-88.
86. Id. at 687.
87. See generally http://www.uspto.gov (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
88. See GATS, supra note 27, at art. VI.
89. Having just finished class on Professional Responsibility, our section spent couple of
weeks out of 12-week semester dealing with confidentiality issues. In other sections of professional
responsibility not centered on confidentiality duties, those duties would still tend to come up in certain
unrelated cases as well.
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transparency of companies listed on any of the stock exchanges in the United
States. 9°  Additionally, Congress charged the SEC with introducing new
regulations and rules in order to alleviate the public's concern that public
companies would continue to take advantage of accounting and reporting
loopholes without adequate oversight and disclosure.9i In addition to charging the
SEC with reporting and management reforms, Congress gave broad power to the
SEC to install professional responsibilities rules.92 This includes the authority to
impose "federal regulation over portions of the legal profession that had
traditionally been the domain of State courts and bar associations." 93  One
argument for implementing rules governing both managers and attorneys that work
with public companies is that many of the transactions and deals resulting in
fraudulent activity could not take place without attorney complicity 94 An
additional argument is that even if attorneys do not help in the structuring of
fraudulent deals, they will still be aware of potentially fraudulent deals when
structuring the legal parts of the transactions. 95 Therefore, creating deterrence
rules for managers and strengthening the responsibility codes for attorneys will
create an atmosphere of awareness to potential SEC violations.
Congress allowed the SEC to go even further than just implementing new
transparency rules and a heightened professional responsibility code for attorneys.
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that laid out certain minimum standards
of attorney conduct, including "up the ladder" structural reporting by lawyers.
96
However, the act did not specifically spell out the powers of the SEC to implement
regulations, thereby allowing for broad interpretation of the SEC's mandate to
implement regulations on attorneys. Most professional responsibility codes have
some disclosure requirements in the event of certain kinds of violations of the
law 97 But, these new SEC proposals would go much further in scope and duty
than any previous professional responsibility code, thus arguably becoming more
restrictive and, in the bargain, a potential of the U.S. commitment to GATS. In
addition, rather than leaving the creation of professional responsibility standards to
the states, Congress and the SEC mandate the standards of responsibility and the
actions that are to be taken once an attorney notices these conduct violations.
98
The federal government has not generally regulated the practice of attorneys, but
allowing the federal government to engage in such a practice now would be a
structural change to traditional practices in the United States. If the federal
government were merely imposing a structural change in regard to the regulation
of lawyers (moving from state bar association restrictions to restrictions also
90. See generally, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 6.
91. See id.
92. Id. at § 307.
93. Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities
Regulation, 8 STAN. J. L., Bus. & FIN. 1, 2(2002).
94. See id. at 4-5.
95. See generally id.
96. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note.6.
97. See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 78.
98. See generally id.
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imposed by the federal government), then such a change might not be such a large
issue according to U.S. commitments to GATS. 99 However, in this case, the
federal government is attempting to change the structure that restricts practicing
attorneys (by allowing the federal government to impose new professional
responsibility rules) and attempting to change the substance of those former
professional responsibility codes. Since the federal government is trying to impose
an entirely new set of burdens on attorneys through new regulations and a new
structural system, it would seem that the U.S. legal services industry is not being
liberalized, especially for foreign lawyers. And this is precisely what the United
States agreed not to attempt when it submitted its Schedule of Commitments under
GATS.
B. Requirements Imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley and the Proposed SEC Rules on ALL
Lawyers
By its terms, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act extends to all lawyers practicing in the
United States.i °° It goes even further, regulating the conduct of any lawyer-
foreign or domestic-who advises a company that lists itself on a U.S. stock
exchange, wherever that lawyer is located when he gives that advice.'0 1 The
potential for restricting legal practice is clear. According to one source, "many
have voiced concern that the newly enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act would inhibit
counsel's ability to adequately advise and represent their corporate clients in the
event of real or suspected securities violations."
0 2
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act governs lawyers. Entitled "Rules of
Professional Responsibility for Attorneys, that section sets out the method
whereby rules are to be created that require attorneys to report potential violations
of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty 103 The Act stipulates that:
[t]he Commission [SEC] shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the
protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct
for attorneys appeanng and practicing before the Commission in any way in the
representation of issuers, including a rule-
(I) requiring an attorney to report evidence of matenal violation of securities law
or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or an agent
thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or
the equivalent thereof); and
99. While this change may not pose problem with GATS this Article does not address any
potential Constitutional implications or other complications of such a change.
100. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 6.
101. The wording of the Act does not state whether it would only be for U.S. attorneys or not,
because it merely uses the word "attorney" in the Act. See id.
102. Leslie Wharton, Hazards for Attorney-Client Relationship, N.Y LAW JOURNAL. CORPORATE
COUNSEL, Nov. 18, 2002, at SI, WL I I/18/2002 NYLJ S1.
103. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 6, at § 307
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(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect
to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit
committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the
board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly or




Thus, the SEC is invested with power to implement professional
responsibility standards for attorneys who offer legal services to public companies.
The term "appearing and practicing before ' °5 the SEC is not clear, which means
that the Act could apply to foreign lawyers that deal with publicly listed companies
in the United States. It could also apply to foreign lawyers that are giving advice
to local companies desiring to be listed on American stock exchanges. The term is
ambiguous and has the potential to apply to a wide variety of attorneys both
domestically and internationally
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also vests enforcement power in the SEC. Section 3
states:
In general, a violation by any person of this Act, any rule or regulation of the
Commission issued under this Act, or any rule of the Board [Public Accounting
Oversight Board established in section 101 of the Act] shall be treated for all
purposes in the same manner as a violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934. .or the rules and regulations issued thereunder. 106
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act thereby sets out broad powers to the SEC and the
newly established Public Accounting Oversight Board to implement and enforce
standards. The enforcement of standards includes newly minted SEC professional
responsibility standards which have the potential to encroach on perhaps the most
important professional responsibility- the attorney-client privilege.
The threat to the attorney client privilege is clear. The Act requires attorneys
to disclose certain attorney-client communications to the auditing board or the
board of directors if proper action is not taken. 107 Many argue that those
disclosures would normally be an express violation of the state codes of
professional responsibility '0' "Unless the SEC expressly provides in its
rulemaking that the attorney-client privilege applies to communications made
pursuant to [Sarbanes-Oxley Act] §307 it is conceivable that courts will deny that
the privilege applies to §307 communications on policy grounds. ' ' 1i 9 One
argument that can be made is that this is not a violation of the attorney-client
104. Id. The Act states that this rule to be enacted by the SEC must be done not later than 180
days after the date of enactment of this Act, which is by January 26, 2003. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at § 3. The Act goes on to state the enforcement mechanism, including investigations,
injunctions and prosecution of offenses and also states that nothing in the Act will limit or impair the
Commission authority. Id.
107. Id. at § 307
108. See generally Wharton, supra note 102.
109. Id.
2003
DENY J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
privilege because the client is the corporation. Since the privilege attaches only to
the corporation, then forced communications to the CEO, the CLO or the auditing
board would only be an extension of the privilege to the corporation.iO However,
SEC-proposed rule 205 expands or eliminates that duty of confidentiality when it
requires attorneys to continue "up-the-ladder" and report suspected violations to
the SEC."'
Of course, some degree of regulation by the SEC is entirely permissible under
the GATS because such regulation pre-dates the GATS and is thus grandfathered
in the US listing of the Schedule of Commitments. Before the SEC announced
proposed rules on November 6, 2002 to implement Sarbanes-Oxley Act §307 1 12
the SEC already possessed rules that called for the enforcement of ethical
standards for attorneys dealing with stock exchange-listed clients.ii 3 Originally the
SEC adopted Rule 102(e) as a "rule that permits the Commission to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys who lack integrity or competence,
engage in improper conduct, or who are determined to have violated provisions of
the federal securities laws."' 14 The implementation of this rule has not been
without controversy. Legal challenges to Rule 102(e) abound, and the SEC itself
recognizes that such use of the rule has been greatly debated over the past years.' 15
Rule 102(e) does permit the SEC to bring disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
who have violated certain standards, but its application has been inconsistent and
ultimately difficult to apply evenly 116 Prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, the SEC's success in using Rule 102(e) varied in decisions of federal courts,
and has proven controversial among commentators as well."
17
Interestingly the legal rules required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself may
not violate most state's concept of attorney-client privilege. The Sarbanes-Oxley
rules only require public company counsel to report potential wrongdoing to the
Chief Legal Officer (CLO) or the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and then to the
auditing board if the reported wrongdoing is not remedied by the CEO or CLO. 1' 8
110 . By inhibiting the application of the attorney-client privilege for communications pursuant to
§307, the SEC might not effectively accomplish the transparency that it will seek. Because lawyers and
their clients will know that their communications will not be privileged, one worry is that some lawyers
will not seek out the requisite information and potential violations that must be reported under §307
111. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Proposed Rule
Release Nos. 33-8150; 34-46868; IC-258929, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 71670 (Dec. 2, 2002),
available at 2002 WL 31676577 [hereinafter Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct].
112. Wharton, supra note 102.
113. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct, supra note 11I, at 71,671.
114. Id.
115. Id. ("The Commission's use of Rule 102(e) has proven to be controversial, and until
enactment of the [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act, the Commission has never had express statutory authority to
promulgate rule establishing standards of conduct for attorneys representing issuers.").
116. Id. at 71,671 fi. 13. ("Rule 102(e) does not establish professional standards. Rather, the
rule enables the Commission to discipline professionals who have engaged in improper conduct by
failing to satisfy the rules, regulations or standards to which they to which they are already subject,
including state ethical rules governing attorney conduct. ").
117. See e.g., Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Davy v. SEC, 792 F.2d 1418 (9th
Cir. 1986); Touche Ross v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
1I 8.Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 6, at § 307
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Since the attorney's "client" might be considered the corporation, but not the
individuals within it, such reporting may not be a violation of any attorney-client
confidence. After all, the attorney is merely reporting to higher-ups within the
corporation-the corporation being the client.
However, the proposed rules by the SEC go much further, requiring public
company counsel to report suspected wrongdoing outside the corporation-to the
SEC-if the wrongdoing is not rectified by the CLO, the CEO, or the audit
board." 19 "[T]he proposed rule [by the SEC] extends beyond the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act by requiring counsel, under some circumstances, to act as whistleblowers
through the 'noisy withdrawal' of a submission to the SEC tainted by 'material
violations."",120  In proposed Rule 205, the SEC is attempting to respond "to
Congress' mandate that the Commission adopt an effective 'up the ladder'
reporting system. .[and] the proposed rule would adopt an expansive view of who
is appearing and practicing before the Commission."' 121 In fact, however, proposed
Rule 205 "incorporates several corollary provisions that are not explicitly required
by [Sarbanes-Oxley Act] Section 307 including provisions that permit or require
attorneys to effect "noisy withdrawal, to notify the SEC when that "noisy
withdrawal" is effected, and "to permit attorneys to report evidence of material
violations to the Commission."' 22 Thus the SEC's own proposed Rule 205 extends
well beyond the minimum standards that are contained in the text of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.
C. Reaction from Attorneys and Bar Associations to the Proposed Rules
Many attorneys, as well as bar associations, including the American Bar
Association, have expressed their dissatisfaction with the proposed SEC rules,
especially proposed Rule 205 .123 Even before passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
the American Bar Association (ABA) attempted to derail the legislation with its
own proposals for state-level disclosure rules. 24 However, this attempt failed and
the proposal by the ABA had little impact on the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.
Ironically, however, the ABA suggestions were not without effect. The SEC
stated that its proposed rules incorporate some additional provisions derived from
legal commentators and from the ABA proposals themselves. 125  Besides the
119. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct, supra note I I, at 71688-89
("Notice to the Commission where this is no appropriate response within a reasonable time.").
120. Wharton, supra note 102. This article also describes the crime-fraud exception as potentially
being stifled by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act when dealing with reporting between counsel and the CEO,
CLO or auditing board of the company.
121. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct, supra note 11, at 71,673.
122. Wharton, supra note 102. The commentary on the proposed rule 205 states that the
"Commission does not intend to supplant state ethics laws unnecessarily, and that "[a]t the same time
the Commission does not want the rule to impair zealous advocacy, which is essential to the
Commission's processes. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct, supra note I ll, at
71,673.
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"noisy withdrawal" rule, another proposal by the SEC "would expand a lawyer's
disclosure obligations to encompass not just those instances in which he 'knows'
wrongdoing has occurred, but also when he [or she] reasonably believes' it has or
is about to occur."' 126 This moves away from a requirement of actual knowledge of
the violation to a more objective standard of "reasonable belief."'127 The extension
of the SEC proposal from actual knowledge of a violation to "reasonable belief' of
a violation is an even greater extension of attorney reporting than previously
anticipated by the ABA and many legal commentators. In addition, the ABA has
repeatedly rejected the "noisy withdrawal" rule because it would compromise in
the most fundamental way the attorney-client privilege and client relationship in
general. 
28
From a GATS perspective, the most crucial point is that the SEC proposed
rule of "noisy withdrawal" would place greater restrictions and duties on attorneys
than current state ethics rules and regulations. "While attorneys are generally
prohibited from assisting a client' s fraudulent conduct, current ethical rules rarely
require or even permit a lawyer to disclose a client's past or present conduct to a
third party, let alone a federal enforcement agency ,,129 Commentators worry that
"the proposed rules appear quite expansive and may impose these new ethical
requirements on any legal professional whose services contribute to the Securities
Act or Exchange Act reports of a public company ,,130 Thus, not only would an
attorney dealing with SEC-related issues be required to play the role of watchdog,
but in that role the attorney would also be subject an SEC enforcement action. The
SEC's proposed regulations would force attorneys giving any advice or counsel to
publicly-listed companies to abide by the SEC ethics rules, pre-empting state bar
association rules and greatly expanding ethical duties, often in direct violation of
those state rules. Additionally, the SEC itself states that "Part 205 would cover
lawyers who are licensed in foreign jurisdictions, although only to the extent they
'appear and practice' before the Commission in the representation of issuers."''
The overall result of the SEC's proposed rules is that state bar association ethics
rules will not carry the same weight for lawyers who are involved with publicly
listed companies, and therefore there will be a defacto expansion of regulation of
lawyers and the legal services industry in general.
IV SARBANES-OXLEY AND SEC RULE INCONSISTENCY WITH US GATS
COMMITMENTS




129. Dan A. Bailey, J. David Washburn & Quentin Collin Faust, Navigating the Minefield of the
SEC' Ethics Reform Measures, 6 WALL ST. LAWYER I (Nov. 2000), WL 6 No. 6 GLWSLAW i. It
continues about this ethics concern, stating that "[tihis principle derives from and is firmly embedded
within the attorney/client privilege and the important justifications for that privilege. Id.
130. Id.
13 1. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct, supra note I II, at 71677
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transactions, as well as to increase the flexibility for providers of services that
cross international borders. 3 2  The affect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
proposed SEC rules on foreign legal services has the potential to disrupt those
services and to introduce higher regulatory measures than previously imposed on
foreign lawyers. The SEC has received numerous comments from law firms, legal
services personnel and bar associations to that effect during its public comment
period that ended on December 18, 2002.133 Included among these are many
comments from foreign law firms and from United States citizens practicing law in
foreign countries. 3 4 Although the state bar association and domestic law firm
comments generally complain that the proposed SEC rules that include "noisy
withdrawal" are too strict for attorneys to follow in good conscience, the
comments from the foreign law firms are even more forceful against the prospect
of SEC enforcement of ethical rules on foreign attorneys. The SEC proposed rules
that seek to have attorneys engage in reporting to the SEC for "noisy withdrawal"
potentially impinges on the legal ethical norms of other countries, and the
comments specifically state that SEC enforcement of such ethical norms would be
adverse to the norms of certain countries.1
3 5
A. Problems with Implementing the SEC Proposed Rules
With respect to implementation and enforcement of attorney ethical
regulations by the SEC, two problems are particularly worth highlighting. The
first problem is that the SEC will impose these ethics rules on both domestic and
foreign attorneys who advise listed companies. Foreign lawyers will be subject
both to their own ethical regulations in their own country and to the SEC
regulations, and these two sets of regulations might well conflict with each other.
The second problem is that the heightened SEC regulations will implicitly
conflict with the U.S. Schedule of Commitments under GATS. Once the Schedule
of Commitments is published by the United States, then the United States is under
an obligation to the WTO and WTO member countries to abide by its published
regulations and not to impose more restrictive regulations or rules. 136 There are
some exceptions to this, including exceptions for national policy objectives, but
generally the United States and all other member countries that are parties to the
GATS are obligated to adhere to their licensing rules and regulations for trade in
services. As such, they will be obligated to adhere to their listing on their
132. See GATS, supra note 27, at Preamble.
133. See Comments on Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional
Responsibility, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, No. 33-8150, at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
134. For example, the managing partners from the Tokyo offices of Sullivan & Cromwell,
Simpson & Thatcher and Davis, Polk wrote combined letter to the SEC. There are also number
from recognized Japanese firms (Nagashima Ohno, Anderson Mori, etc) and from other parts of the
globe, including New Zealand, Venezuela and China. Id.
135. Letter from 77 Law Firms to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 18, 2002), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/77iawfirmsi.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
136. See generally GATS, supra note 27
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respective Schedule of Commitments. Thus, proposed SEC Rule 205 calls for both
"noisy withdrawal" and a "reasonable belief' requirement for reporting violations,
these two additions to the professional responsibility rules of lawyers in the United
States will exceed the parameters of current ethics rules. More importantly the
expansion of such. rules will exceed the professional responsibility requirements
that are listed in the U.S. Schedule of Commitments. It is therefore difficult to
reconcile proposed SEC Rule 205 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act under the United
States commitment to GATS, and it becomes likely that the United States' actions
are irreconcilable according to the GATS.
Foreign lawyers will encounter potentially very serious problems when trying
to comply with both the SEC's proposed rules and the regulations governing their
respective countries. The number of attorneys that will be affected will be large.
For instance, "[a]t December 31, 2001, 1,344 companies from 59 countries were
reporting issuers under the Exchange Act."' 137 Given the sheer size and dynamism
of U.S. capital markets, the number of foreign companies issuing securities under
the SEC guidelines continues to increase. While most of these listed foreign
companies have U.S. counsel, most also utilize local lawyers to receive advice and
to act as local counsel. This is because local advice is generally much cheaper.
Moreover, foreign company officials have a higher level of comfort when dealing
with attorneys from their country Under the SEC guidelines and the proposed
rules, even though local foreign lawyers may only be offering scant legal advice or
only facilitating introductions to other American law firms, these local foreign
lawyers would still appear to be subject to the proposed SEC rules. At the same
time, these local foreign lawyers will be subject to the professional regulatory
regimes in their own countries, including certain regimes that differ widely than
those in the United States. 138  Requiring foreign local lawyers to follow SEC
regulations that are adverse to domestic professional regulatory licensing rules may
create serious conflict with U.S. representations and commitments under the
GATS. The SEC seeks to protect the investing public from faulty disclosure, but
requiring greater professional responsibility restrictions that conflict with foreign
local regulations also may create disincentives for foreign countries to register
their securities. 139
An example of local foreign lawyers being subject to two conflicting
professional responsibility regulations comes from the comments of several
different Japanese law firms. A number of Japanese firms (Mori Sogo, Anderson
Mori, Nagashima Ohno, etc.) advise Japanese companies on securities listings and
137 Letter from 77 Law Firms to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 135, at sec. i.
138. Id. ("Non-U.S. issuers and their external and internal local lawyers usually rely on U.S.
counsel as to the interpretation and application of U.S. securities law matters.").
139. Id. The argument is that foreign companies would rather not subject themselves or their
lawyers to even greater professional responsibility duties than already subject to in their own country,
and therefore would not register the securities of those companies, which would not be benefit to
investors in the long run. Since market forces are important in determining whether investors will buy
securities, one of the goals of the SEC should be to increase the options that are available to investors.
This should be within reason, however, and the Sarbanes-Oxley proposal on its face appears to be
enough to deter serious violations.
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securities practices within the United States. 140 Many of the lawyers in such firms
have been trained professionally in Japan and the United States. A large number
of licensed attorneys in Japan have received some legal training in the United
States, usually through the L.L.M. program of a major law school, and are often
members in good standing in state bars, usually New York, California, or
Illinois.14' But they are also registered by the Japanese Bar Association to practice
in Japan, subject to the same rules and regulations governing the practice of law in
that country 142 According to several Japanese law firms, the proposed SEC rules
would be a direct violation of the duty of confidentiality under Japan Bar
Association rules. The comments from the law firm of Nagashima Ohno, one of
Japan's largest and most respected law firms, state:
The obligation to report to the Commission would, in most instances, result in a
breach of Article 23 of Chapter IV of the Practicing Attorney Law of Japan.
Article 23 provides that: A practicing attorney or a person who was previously a
practicing attorney shall have the right and duty to maintain the secrecy of any
facts which he came to know in the performance of his profession; provided,
however, that this shall not apply when otherwise provided for by any statute.
Article 23 imposes a duty of confidentiality on all Japanese Attorneys requiring
them to maintain the confidentiality of information obtained in the course of their
duties unless otherwise required under a Japanese statute.. The Proposed Rule, if
adopted in the proposed form, would require the Japanese Attorneys to disaffirm
to the Commission any opinion, document, affirmation, representation,
charactenzation. .such disaffirmation is tantamount as a practical matter to the
specific disclosure of a violation. .m which case the Japanese Attorneys who so
disaffirmed will be construed to commit a violation of the confidentiality
obligation imposed under Article 23 of Chapter IV of the Practicing Attorney Law
of Japan. 143
That law firm's letter to the SEC also states that "noisy withdrawal" to the
SEC would also breach Japan's Article 23 because it would be tantamount to a
disclosure of a violation without the specific disclosure of that violation. 44 Other
public comments from Japanese law firms echo these same concerns about the
140. See Letter from Tokyo Branch Offices of Three U.S. Law Firms to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, SEC (Dec. 20, 2002) available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/tokyo-
offcs.htm; Letter from Nishimura and Partners to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 18, 2002)
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/mshimura.htm; Letter from to Isao Shndo,
Anderson Mor to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 18, 2002) available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/ishindoI.htm; Letterfrom Tomotsune & Kimura to Jonathan
G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 18, 2002) available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s74502/tomotsunel.htm; Letter from Tohru Motobayashi, President, Japan Federation of Bar
Associations to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 14, 2002) available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/tmotobayashil.htm (all links last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
141. Id.
142. See generally supra note 140
143. Letter from Nagashima, Ohno & Tsuneshima to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 18,
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SEC regulations impinging directly on Japanese bar association ethics
requirements. i45
B. Conflicts Between SEC Rule 205 and U.S. Commitments to GA TS
Looking at the SEC's proposed Rule 205 in the context of the U.S. Schedule
of Commitments and its obligations under GATS, an inherent conflict arises. The
Schedule of Commitments explains the professional responsibility codes that are to
be followed by foreign lawyers that practice in each respective state.' 46 Once these
professional responsibility codes are offered in the Schedule of Commitments, then
any provision that is more restrictive than the current one is in direct conflict with
GATS itself. No professional responsibility code approves of "noisy withdrawal"
or the "reasonable belief' standard that the SEC currently advocates in proposed
rule 2 0 5 .147 Therefore, if the SEC actually includes the "noisy withdrawal" and the
"reasonable belief' requirements in Rule 205, it would be enacting regulations and
rules that are stricter than those included in the U.S. Schedule of Commitments to
GATS. 48 Such a scenario conflicts inherently with GATS, and the United States
would be in direct violation of GATS if it allows the SEC to install stricter
professional responsibility rules on all lawyers that practice with public companies.
Additionally Congress' passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its bestowing
of authority on the SEC to regulate attorneys and pass professional responsibility
rules conflicts with GATS in another way State bar associations and the state
Supreme Courts have generally been the institutions that traditionally regulate
practicing attorneys in the United States.i 49 By giving the SEC the power to
introduce professional responsibility rules for practicing attorneys, Congress
shifted the power to regulate attorneys from the states (through the state bar
associations and state Supreme Courts) to the federal government (and into the
hands of the SEC). This clashes with GATS because it shifts the actual entity
making the regulations and restrictions on attorneys and thereby alters the system
that the United States submitted in its Schedule of Commitments. By altering a
portion of the professional responsibility structure for attorneys practicing in the
United States with the introduction of more restrictive regulations, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act Section 307 conflicts with the principles of GATS and the Schedule of
Commitments submitted by the United States a number of years ago.'
50
C. Remedies to the Inherent Conflicts between SEC Proposed Rules and GA TS
There are provisions that would allow the United States to still pass the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and allow the SEC to implement stricter professional
145. See supra notes 140-144 and accompanying text.
146. U.S. Schedule of Commitments, supra note 69 and accompanying text.
147 Id.
148. Id.
149. See HAZARD, KONIAK, CRAMTON, supra note 78, at 13-18; see also Grundfest, supra note 93,
150. d.
VOL. 32:1I
WHISTLEBLOWING IN A FOREIGN KEY
responsibility standards. GATS recognizes the importance of national policy
objectives, stating that "[tihe process of liberalization [of service industries] shall
take place with due respect for national policy objectives."' 5' Understandably, the
United States could claim that restricting and regulating the professional
responsibilities of attorneys practicing with listed companies is a legitimate
national policy objective. Additionally, to reconcile the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the SEC proposals with GATS, the United States is able to modify its Schedule of
Commitments under Article XXI of GATS. 52 The United States would need to
follow the procedures laid out in Article XXI of GATS by- (1) notifying its intent
to modify or withdraw the Commitment to the legal services industry three months
before it intends to modify or withdraw its Schedule and (2) undergoing
negotiations with other WTO members to agree to a compensatory arrangement at
the request of any affected WTO member.' 53
If an agreement is reached by the United States and any affected WTO
member, then that would be the end of the matter and the United States would then
modify its Schedule of Commitments to reflect the proposed SEC rules. If an
agreement is not reached, however, then the affected country would be able to
request arbitration on the matter according to Article XXI section 3(a).' 54 Once the
arbitration is completed, or if the affected member does not request arbitration,
then the United States would be free to modify and alter its Schedule of
Commitments by including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC proposed rules in
its Schedule. Thus, to ensure that the SEC-proposed professional responsibility
rules are in compliance with GATS, the United States will have to use the
modification procedures listed in GATS and will have to negotiate with any
affected WTO member or undergo arbitration proceedings with that affected
member.
One might argue that applying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC
professional responsibility rules solely to U.S.-practicing lawyers would thereby
not conflict with GATS or foreign professional responsibility rules; however, the
act of applying enhanced professional responsibility rules only to U.S. lawyers
would still violate the spirit of GATS. The goal of GATS is to achieve
"progressively higher levels of liberalization of trade in services" for all WTO
members. 55 Expanding the professional responsibility rules to apply only to U.S.
lawyers would not liberalize trade in services in general. 56 Applying the SEC
rules only to U.S. lawyers would create a large foreign constituency of legal
services personnel who are not subject to the same disclosure and reporting
requirements as lawyers in the United States. Requiring stricter professional
responsibility standards on U.S. lawyers, while not subjecting foreign lawyers to
such a requirement, would be unfair to U.S. lawyers who would be subject to the
151. GATS, supra note 27, at art. XIX, sec. 2.
152. Id. at art. XXI.
153. Id. at art. XXI, secs. I(b) and 2(a).
154. Id., at art. XXI, secs. 3(a) and (b).
155. See GATS, supra note 26, at Preamble.
156. Id.
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higher standards. This would place U.S. lawyers at a potential disadvantage vis-4-
vis foreign attorneys because companies might hire foreign attorneys for their
transactions in order to avoid the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed
by the SEC. By mandating that the proposed SEC rules only apply to U.S.
attorneys, the SEC would create an unfair system for those lawyers and likely
would not be able to impose such a system against intense lobbying efforts by U.S.
attorneys and bar associations.
CONCLUSION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the proposed SEC rules directly conflict with the
U.S. Schedule of Commitments and the U.S. commitment to GATS. To get
around this conflict, the United States could follow the procedures for modification
of its Schedule, but it has failed to do so within the requisite time period. As of
this completion of this Article, the SEC is still in the midst of deciding which
proposed rules it will implement. If it does decide to apply SEC proposed Rule
205 requiring "noisy withdrawal" and a "reasonable belief' standard, then the
actions by the United States will be in direct conflict with its commitment to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services. Although the GATS does not preempt
WTO member's sovereignty to pass regulations on service industries, proposed
Rule 205 would conflict with the United States' own Schedule of Commitments,
which would be a violation of GATS. Therefore, unless the United States takes
proper actions to rectify proposed Rule 205's conflict with GATS, it will
ultimately be vulnerable to complaints by adversely affected WTO member
nations. Such complaints could ultimately lead to dispute resolution action taken
by those WTO member countries, potentially exposing the United States to adverse
liability through an unfavorable ruling. Thus, prior to reforming the professional
responsibility code of attorneys that appear or practice before the SEC, the United
States must observe its commitment to GATS by following the procedures for
modifying its current Schedule. Action in this manner would add more legitimacy
to the GATS and the WTO in general, while still allowing the United States to
implement greater reforms for its overall purposes.
ADDENDUM
After the completion of this Article, the SEC adopted its proposed rules on
January 23, 2003. These adopted rules "would require lawyers to take concerns
about violations of securities laws to top executives at the companies they advise
and, if necessary to corporate boards."' 157 Additionally, the SEC stopped short of
adopting the full version of proposed Rule 205, which required lawyers to report
their concerns directly to the SEC if top executives and the board did not respond
to warning by a lawyer. The final version of the SEC rules also "adopted a
157 Jonathan D. Glater, S.E.C. Adopts New Rules for Lawyers and Funds, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 24,
2002, at Ci, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/24/business/24SEC.html (last visited Jan.
23, 2003).
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complex definition explaining when a lawyer must report evidence of fraud to
management."' 58 Additionally the SEC "approved an extension of the comment
period on the 'noisy withdrawal' provisions of the original proposed rule and
publication for comment of an alternative proposal. 'i 59 Along with the extension
of this period for public comment, the SEC proposed an altered version of "noisy
withdrawal" that would require the listed company to notify the SEC when a
lawyer withdraws from representation of that company Lastly, the SEC rules
provided "that foreign attorneys who are not admitted in the United States, and
who do not advise clients regarding U.S. law, would not be covered by the rule,
while foreign attorneys who provide legal advice regarding U.S. law would be
covered to the extent they are appearing and practicing before the Commission."1
60
The ideas expressed in this Article are still pertinent (despite the fact that the
newly adopted SEC rules are less restrictive than its proposed rules) and offer a
unique view on how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and certain SEC proposals potentially
conflict with U.S. commitments under GATS. Since the "noisy withdrawal"
requirement is still in its public comment period, then it will still be in conflict with
the U.S. commitment to GATS if such restrictive regulations are adopted by the
SEC. A corollary to this is that if the United States exhibits a commitment to
GATS by following the procedures for modifications to its submitted Schedule,
such a move will strengthen the legitimacy of GATS and the WTO as well.
Ultimately, this will also strengthen the U.S. commitment to the WTO and to the
liberalization of international trade and exchange of services between WTO
member countries. By following the rules set out to modify GATS, the United
States would exhibit its commitment to the development of international
institutions and a developing international legal regime.
158. Id.
159. SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rule Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SEC PRESS RELEASE 2003-




IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION PURSUANT TO
THREATS TO US NATIONAL SECURITY
Ruchir Patel*
This article will examine the United States' immigration legislation in the
face of threats to national security Throughout history foreign enemies have
threatened the American way of life, from the Germans in World War I, to the
spread of Communism, to the current threat of terrorism. As history has
demonstrated, the U.S. has taken drastic measures to protect its citizens. This
paper will consider those actions and evaluate the PATRIOT Act's adequacy in
resolving the present threat to national security Further, this paper will propose
reforms to certain immigration provisions of the PATRIOT Act.
BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to "establish a
uniform Rule of Naturalization"' and grants the Executive Branch the inherent
sovereign authority to regulate immigration.2 Aliens seeking entrance into the
United States have no claim of right;3 rather admission is a privilege granted by the
sovereign nation upon such terms as it prescribes.
The United States relies upon immigration policies to protect itself against
subversives.5 U.S. history includes spies, saboteurs, anarchists, and terrorists as
parts of this subversive class. It has feared immigrants who seek to destroy the
government rather than strive for the shelter of its freedoms.
6
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1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
2. Excludable Aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27)(2001) (Grants the Attorney General the power to
exclude any alien seeking admission into the United States "to engage in activities which would be
prejudicial to the public interest or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States.")
3. U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); Accord Landon v. Plasencia,
459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
4. Id.
5. See generally Alexander Wohl, Comment, Free Speech and the Right of Entry Into the United
States: Legislation to Remedy the Ideological Exclusion Provisions of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y. 443, 447-459 (1989) (Increasing numbers of
immigrants coupled with international unrest during the World War I, World War 11, and Cold War
Eras, led the United States government to enact stringent immigration policies in an attempt to ward off
perceived threats to national security).
6. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The protective immigration policies that the United States has legislated and
implemented have been in response to fear, whether it is in response to a physical
attack on the country, or an attack on its culture, political beliefs, or freedoms.
When immigrants threaten the American way of life, Americans respond by
uniting and displaying a strong sense of nativism.8 Nativism is a concept deeply
rooted in American history, dating as far back as the late 1830's. 9 Nativism is
defined as an intense opposition to a specific minority on the ground of its foreign
("un-American") connections. I° Nativism was the energizing force behind the
modem day theory of nationalism."i Nativistic activities were evidenced
throughout U.S. history resulting in immigration reform during World War I,




During World War I, there was an increased concern over subversives and
radical aliens, and legislation against those persons was strengthened.13 Dissident
immigrants were imprisoned for their anti-war campaigns. 14  Under wartime
conditions, Congress passed the so-called Anarchists Act of October 16, 1918,
which ordered the deportation of alien anarchists residing within the United States
and made it a felony punishable by imprisonment for those deported to reenter or
attempt to reenter the country '5 This Act was amended by the June 5, 1920 Act
which included in the anarchist class aliens who advocate "the unlawful damage,
injury or destruction of property, or sabotage."' 16 As an effect of the war and the
wartime legislation, there was anti-German sentiment pervading throughout the
United States. 17 The Justice Department gathered German aliens into internment
camps under the President's summary powers.Is The total number of arrested
aliens rose from 1200 to 6300 by the end of 1918.19 Further, the regulations
governing the remaining Germans were tightened, requiring them to register and
NATIVISM 1860-1925, (Atheneum 1963).
7. See David Cole, Terrorizing Immigrants in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 29 HUM. RTS. I I
(Winter 2002).
8. See Wohl, supra note 5.




12. See Cole, supra note 7, at 1I.
13. See Wohl, supra note 5, at 449.
14. Cole, supra note 7, at 11.
15. E.P HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 424, 1798-
1965 (U. Penn. Press 1981).
16. Id. at 424 (quoting Act of June 5, 1920, 41 Stat. 1008).
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"forbidding them to move without official permission."
20
The climate of repression established during World War I continued against
Communists even after the conclusion of the war.2' In 1919 the U.S. government
responded to a politically motivated bombing of Attorney General Palmer's home
by rounding up alien members of the two communist parties.22 Approximately




Another example of the U.S. government taking action against potentially
threatening immigrants occurred during World War 11.24 The approach of the war
gave a strong impetus to establish a system for alien registration .2 The Alien
Registration Act of 1940 dealt with subversion and deportation for numerous
offenses as well as registration requirements, including fingerprinting of an alien in
advance of issuance of a U.S. visa.26
In addition to the Alien Registration Act of 1940, the federal government
27interned over 110,000 persons, mostly Japanese immigrants. In an executive
order delivered on February 19 1942, President Roosevelt authorized the
internment of persons who may have posed a threat to national security or the war
effort.28 This order came as part of a response following an attack on the U.S. by
Japanese forces.29
Communism
Following World War I1, the continued fight against Communism reached its
peak in the McCarthy Era.30 This anti-communist sentiment led to the passage of
the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which introduced an ideological criterion for
admission: immigrants and visitors to the U.S. could be denied entry on the basis
of their political ideology (e.g., if they were communists). 3 1 This Act expanded the
definition of the subversive classes that were subject to exclusion and
20. Id.
21. See Wohl, supra note 5, at 450.
22. Id. at 230; See also Cole, supra note 7.
23. HIGHAM, supra note 9, at 231.
24. See Cole, supra note 7; See Wohl, supra, note 5, at 45 1.
25. HUTCHINSON, supra note 165, at 541.
26. Id., See also Alien Registration Act, 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, tit. III repealed by Pub. L.
No. 414, § 403, 66 Stat. 279, 280.
27 Cole, supra note 7
28. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) [hereinafter Executive Order].
29. The order came following the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which resulted in the
death of over 1,000 U.S. soldiers.
30. See Wohl, supra note 5, at 451.
31. See Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 184-186
(1952) [hereinafter McCarran-Walter Act] (regulating the exclusion and deportation of non-citizens
who advocated communism or other proscribed beliefs).
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deportation.32 In essence, it became against national policy to be a member of the
Communist Party and to advocate proscribed beliefs.
33
Present Day Threat: Terrorism
Such examples demonstrate that U.S. historical immigration actions were
often in response to a perceived or actual threat by immigrants.34 Present day
immigration legislation stems not from war, or fear of Communism, but from
terrorism, one of the threats included in the class of subversives.35 Terrorism is
defined as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof,
in furtherance of political or social objectives. On September 1I, 2001, terrorists
attacked the United States and killed over 6000 people. Nineteen terrorists
hijacked four commercial airlines in the U.S., and used them as bombs by flying
two planes into the World Trade Centers, one into the Pentagon, and the fourth
crashing into Pennsylvania.36 All nineteen hijackers were foreigners, and at least
sixteen entered the U.S. through ports of entry, with a tourist or student visa; some
of those visas having expired before September 11, 200 1.
September 11, 2001 highlighted the frightening reality of terrorist threats and
the gross inadequacy of the then current immigration system.38 Though September
11th was the most devastating attack on US soil by a terrorist attack, it was not the
first. 39 The U.S. government had prior knowledge and exposure to terrorist attacks
as evidenced during the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the nerve gas attack on
the Tokyo subway system.4 0 These events raised concern and placed increased
pressure for government action. Congress responded by legislating the 1996
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which provided for new definitions
and enhanced penalties for terrorist crimes.41 Congress further enacted the
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 to address threats of
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. 42 After these base programs were
established, the focus was on "refining terrorism preparedness. 43  Reports
32. HUTCHINSON, supra note 15, at 311.
33. See McCarran-Walter Act, supra note 31.
34. See Wohl, supra note 5, at 451.
35. Cole, supra note 7
36. Philip Martin & Susan Martin, Immigration and Terrorism: Policy Reform Challenges, 8
Migration News 10 1 (2001), at http://www.migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=2462_0 2_0.
37. Id. at 2.
38. Id. at 6.
39. See PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMON SENSE STRATEGY FOR A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 1-2 (MIT Press 2000).
40. Id.
41. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996); see generally H.R. CONF REP NO. 104-518 (1996).
42. See Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1401, 110 Stat. 2422, 2714 (1996); see generally H.R. CONF
REP NO. 104-724 at 824-29 (1996).
43. Michael T McCarthy, Recent Development: USA Patriot Act, 39 HARV J. ON LEGis. 435,
437 (Summer 2002).
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indicated that the federal agencies' approach to combating terrorism was
fragmented with very little coordination and cooperation." Further exacerbating
the problem was the fact that the intelligence community and law enforcement had
inadequate resources to gather intelligence, infiltrate terrorist groups, and prevent
attacks. 5 These reports led Congress to hold hearings on how to rectify the
situation, but increased concerns over civil liberties issues resulted in little action.46
Therefore, prior to September I VIh the problems with the immigration system
concerning terrorism were realized but there was no implementation to directly
address them. 7
The September I I th attacks became the catalyst in turning those abstract flaws
in "terrorism preparedness" into stringent regulations. The attacks highlighted a
major problem in the system of intelligence sharing between the intelligence
agencies and law enforcement. These problems ultimately led to the inability of
the Intelligence Community to prevent the September 1 Ith attacks. 48 Two of the
September I I1h terrorists were affiliated with AI-Qaeda, and were under
surveillance prior to 9/11 by the CIA.49  The NSA also independently had
knowledge of the terrorists' connections to AI-Qaeda.50  Despite this critical
information, the CIA did not report these findings to watch list databases, such as
TIPOFF51 nor did it directly notify the FBI or the INS in time to prevent their
entry into the United States. 2 Coupled with this was the FBI's inability to obtain a
search warrant for the computer of accused terrorist Habib Zacarius Massaoui
53
who was known to be a member of al-Qaeda.
54
44. Id.
45. See generally ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR
TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, First Annual Report to the President and
the Congress (Dec. 15, 1999) and Second Annual Report to the President and Congress (Dec. 14,
2000), available at http://www.rand.orglnsrd/terrpanel/; see also National Commission on Terrorism,
Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/
nct/index.htmi.




49. September I Ith and the Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence Community, (Dec. 10,
2002) (additional views of Senator Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/shelby.pdf [hereinafter Shelby].
50. Id. at 26.
51. Id. at 25. (The TIPOFF program was instituted for the purpose of using biographic
information drawn from intelligence products for watch-listing purposes. In August 2002, the entire
TIPOFF database was made available to authorized users from the Intelligence Community and law
enforcement agencies. TIPOFF contains names of suspected terrorists who are either members of
foreign terrorist organizations, known hijackers, car-bombers, assassins, or hostage-takers. Currently,
efforts are under way to transform the TIPOFF watch-list into National Watch-list Center).
52. McCarthy, supra note 43, at 438.
53. James V Grimaldi, With Perfect Hindsight, Some Question Decision Not to Seek Surveillance
of Curious Flight Student, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2001, at E13. [Moussaoui was detained by the FBI in
Aug. of 2001 after his enrollment in flight school and asking for lessons on a 747 simulator on how to
only fly horizontally, with no interest in takeoffs or landings].
54. World News Tonight: FBI missed significance of Habib Moussaoui askingfor flying lessons in
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The connection between these events is that both could have been prevented if




Current Problem of Information Sharing
The General Accounting Office (GAO) of the federal government recently
assessed the "information sharing within and between federal, state and local
agencies, and concluded that there existed tremendous communication
problems.5 5 The GAO reported that each agency (FBI, CIA, NSA, and the other
intelligence agencies) had a distinct organizational culture, and there have
56historically been walls separating their co-existence. Further, the GAO identified
three principal problems that the agencies must resolve if they are to succeed in
their war against terrorism: fragmentation, technological impediments, and
ineffective collaboration." All three of these are illustrated in one specific
example: the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had information on a reputed
terrorist, but due to the technological impediments and the inability to collaborate,
this information was not directly shared with the Intelligence Community 58
The U.S.'s primary response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks has been the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT).5 9 The Act was signed
into law on October 26, 2001, and substantive provisions of the Act focus on
intelligence gathering, intelligence sharing, and strengthening immigration
enforcement against suspected terrorists.60
Surveillance
As a result of this lack of investigative information collaboration, the USA
747flight simulator (ABC News broadcast, Sept. 15, 2001 ).
55. Counter Terrorism Information Sharing With Other Federal Agencies and With State and
Local Governments and the Private Sector 20 (Oct. I, 2002) (reported by Eleanor Hill, Staff Director,
Joint Inquiry Staff), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/202_hr/10102hill.html [hereinafter
Hill].
56. Id. (specifically identifies legal walls, classification walls, and bureaucratic walls existing
between the agencies).
57. Id. (Success is defined as national, state, and local governments working collaboratively with
each other and with the federal intelligence agencies).
58. Id. (Terrorist bomber Ahmed Ressam had been arrested while trying to enter the U.S. from
Canada with intentions of bombing Los Angeles International Airport).
59. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
60. Id. at 1005.
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PATRIOT Act included provisions to revise the law enforcement/Intelligence
Community coordination. 6' The first step was to expand the government's ability
to conduct surveillance 62 by authorizing wiretaps for surveillance. 63 It also granted
authority for the expansion of roving wiretaps" under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). 65 The PATRIOT Act made amendments to the
FSIA making it more effective in terrorist investigations by granting authority for
pen registers, trap and trace devices. 66 This permitted the government to employ
surveillance technology that could monitor email, and other types of Internet
communications. 67  Additionally, the PATRIOT Act amended the FSIA by
replacing "purpose" with "significant purpose" thereby allowing law enforcement
officers to obtain FISA warrants for gathering intelligence with the intent of using
it for criminal matters.68
Information Sharing
The second part of the intelligence provisions deal with the sharing of this
gathered information within the Intelligence Committee and with the Immigration
Enforcement Agencies.69  Sections 203 and 905 will aid the Intelligence
Community and law enforcement in their cooperative efforts to combat terrorism.70
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, a prosecutor was precluded from disclosing to law
enforcement, intelligence officers, or any other official any information from
federal grand jury proceedings, electronic, wire and oral communications that were
intercepted.7 The PATRIOT Act established guidelines permitting and even at
times requiring the sharing of this information with the Intelligence Community 
72
61. Shelby, supra note 49, at 53.
62. See USA Patriot Act, supra note 59.
63. Id. at § 201. (Congress limited these wiretaps under Title Ill to only antiterrorist activity).
64. Id. at § 206. (A roving wiretap enables government officers to monitor suspected terrorist's
communications regardless of his location at time of communication).
65. Id (FSIA was implemented in response to increasing national security threats from abroad, it
broadened the executive branch's Title III search and seizure powers to foreign enemies); see also Mike
Dowley, Note, Government Surveillance Powers Under the USA PATRIOT Act: Is It Possible to
Protect National Security and Privacy at the Same Time? A Constitutional Tug-of-War 36 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 165, 173 (2002).
66. USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 214; McCarthy, supra note 43, at 445. (Pen registers and
trap and trace devices can record the time, date, and telephone numbers of outgoing and incoming
calls).
67 USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 214; Dowley, supra note 65, at 178.
68. USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 218; McCarthy, supra note 43, at 444.
69. See USA Patriot Act, supra note 59
70. Id. at §§ 203, 905.
71. Press Release, Department of Justice, Attorney General Announces New Guidelines to Share
Information Between Federal Law Enforcement and the U.S. Intelligence Community (Sept. 23, 2002),
available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/September/02_ag_541 .htm (Prosecutors were not permitted to
disclose this information even if it indicated plan for future terrorist attack).
72. USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 203(b)(d) (modifies grand jury secrecy roles of the Fed.
R. Crim. P 6(e)(3)(c)). (These provisions enable the FBI, CIA, and other intelligence agencies to share
information related to terrorism freely, and without regard to where and how the information was
gathered); see also McCarthy, supra note 43, at 442. The required sharing of information is predicated
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This legislation has taken a leap towards dismantling the "walls" between the
intelligence agencies. Through communication and cooperation, information
sharing will lead to higher success rates of infiltrating terrorist organizations,
apprehending suspected terrorists, and preventing future attacks.
Civil Liberties Concerns
The Constitution provides the government with the necessary powers to
protect the country from significant threats to national security 73 In this quest,
legislation and executive orders have been passed which oppress civil liberties
without regard for Constitutional consequences.74 In the present fight against
terrorism, the government should compare the PATRIOT Act against historical
immigration legislation to ensure America's freedoms.75
During World War i, the government curtailed anti-war speech.76 While
entering into World War II, it suspended the Japanese citizens' liberties in the
name of national security 77 In Hirabayash v. U.S., 78 the Supreme Court "upheld
the constitutionality of a curfew imposed only upon Japanese-Americans" living in
or near military areas. 79 A year later, in Korematsu v. U.S., the Court further
undermined the Japanese citizens' civil liberties by upholding the forced relocation
of some Japanese-Americans to internment camps.80 The Court's justification
rested once again on national security and deference to certain military orders as a
wartime necessary evil."1
Following World War 11, America concentrated on its new enemy the
Communists. 8 2  Citizens who were organizing, teaching, or advocating the
overthrow of the United States government were convicted.83 The Supreme Court
upheld these convictions on the ground that free speech is not "unlimited and
unqualified" when it presents a sufficient threat to America. 4
The present day threat to national security is terrorism, and the government
has passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 to combat this danger.85 Some critics
have argued that this Act contains provisions that infringe on citizens' civil
in Title IX § 905 of the Act which includes such provision subject to the Attorney General's
establishment of standards and procedures for such sharing; see Shelby, supra note 49, at 59.
73. U.S. CONST., supra note 1.
74. See Dowley, supra note 65, at 174; see also Deborah Kristensen, Finding the Right Balance:
American Civil Liberties in Time of War ADVOC., Dec. 2001 at 20-21.
75. See Dowley, supra note 65, at 174.
76. HUTcHINSON, supra note 15, at 424-425.
77 Executive Order, supra note 28.
78. Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
79 Dowley, supra note 65, at 175.
80. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 218-219 (1944).
81. Id. at 220.
82. McCarran-Walter Act, supra note 31, at 184-185.
83. See Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
84. Id at 503; see also Dowley, supra note 65, at 176.
85. See USA Patriot Act, supra note 59.
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liberties.86 While the majority of the immigration legislation, from increased
border patrol, to broadening the definition of engaging terrorist activity to
expanding grounds for deportation and admissibility have been relatively
unscathed by controversy, the Act's surveillance provisions have been hotly
criticized. 7 Detractors of the PATRIOT Act argue a violation of the Fourth
Amendment regarding its search and seizure provisions.88 However, the Supreme
Court ruled in Warden v. Hayden that there are exceptions to the probable cause
and warrant requirements. 89  These exceptions include times of "exigent
circumstances" where following such procedures is impractical and inapposite to
policy 90
Another highly attacked provision of the Act is § 213 which authorizes "sneak
and peek" warrants. 91 This provision allows officials to conduct a search without
informing the suspect until after completion.92 This section further authorizes the
delayed notification of electronic or physical searches if the government can prove
that such notification may jeopardize the investigation.93
Though certain civil liberties may be compromised for the sake of national
security, steps can be taken to ensure that the government's expansive and
intrusive tools are not abused. 94 The foremost solution is to direct courts to
narrowly construe the provisions of the PATRIOT Act, while keeping in mind the
legislative intent and national security concerns.95
Immigration Enforcement Provisions
Title IV of the USA PATRIOT Act is targeted towards protecting the border.
Specifically- subtitle A of § 402 "authorizes a tripling of the number of Border
Patrol personnel, Customs personnel, and immigration inspectors" along the
Northern (Canadian) border.96  It also calls for increased funding for new
technology 97 These technological innovations include granting the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) and the State Department access to the FBI's
86. Emanuel Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in the United States: The
Aftermath of September I /, 2001, 28 N.C.J. INTL'L L. & CoM. REG. 1- 2 (2002).
87. Id. (The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argues that this legislation unnecessarily
sacrifices civil liberties by denying due process).
88. Id. at 8.
89. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
90. Id.
91. See USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 213; Dowley, supra note 65, at 181.
92. Dowley, supra note 65, at 181.
93. Id., USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 213.
94. Dowley, supra note 65, at 183.
95. Id. at 182; see also Edward P Ryan, Jr., Anti-Terror Bill Threatens Liberties, MASS. LAW
WKLY. (Nov. 13, 2001) at 25, available at http://www.masslaw.com/ryanvaew.htm.
96. Rosemary Jenks, The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001: A Summary of the Anti-Terrorism Law's
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NCIC files for checking the criminal history of visa applicants."
Additionally, the USA PATRIOT Act broadened the definition of "engage in
terrorist activity" and expanded the categories of non-citizens barred from entry
and increased their susceptibility to deportation for terrorist activities. 99 The
PATRIOT Act defines a terrorist organization as two or more persons engaged in a
terrorist activity 10o It further defines "engage in terrorist activity" to include
involvement in inciting to commit a terrorist activity, "to prepare or plan" any such
activity "to gather information on potential targets, to ask for financial support
for terrorist activities, to commit an act that is materially related to support
terrorists,1° 1 or to use or threaten to use weapons for violence against persons or
property 102 Once a person or group is designated as being involved with terrorist
activities, they are deportable for soliciting people to join it, fundraising for it, or
providing support for it. °3
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, only non-citizens engaging in or supporting
terrorist activities were deportable.1 4 The PATRIOT Act amends that definition to
make them deportable for any connection to a terrorist organization. 105
Section 411 deals with detaining suspected terrorists. i06 The PATRIOT Act
grants the Attorney General the authority to certify aliens as terrorists and detain
them if he has "reasonable grounds to believe" that they are involved in unlawful
terrorist activities.1 7 Detainment periods can now run up to six months if their
removal is unlikely in the near future and their release may threaten national
security or public safety 108 Prior to September 11, aliens who were perceived to
be a threat to national security were placed in removal proceedings and detained as
long as the proceedings lasted 0 9 However, the alien was allowed to present
evidence to the contrary to an immigration judge and seek his release. 110 Under the
new, more stringent provisions, INS prosecutors can file an appeal to a release
order and keep the alien detained."' In addition, the INS amended a regulation
98. USA Patriot Act tit. IV § 401-405, supra note 59; see also Memorandum from the
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to the Regional Directors and Regional
Counsel 2 (Oct. 31, 2001) (on file with the United States Dept. of Justice, Immigration and
Naturalization Service) [hereinafter Memo], available at http://www.bcis.gov/graphics.
99. Arthur C. Helton & Dessie Zagorcheva, Globalization, Terror, & the Movements of People, 36
INT'L LAW 91, 96 (Spnng 2002); see also Memo, supra note 98, at 2-3; USA Patriot Act, supra note
59, at § 411
100. Cole, supra note 7, at 12.
101. Helton & Zagorcheva, supra note 99, at 96.
102. Cole, supra note 7, at 11-12.
103. Helton & Zagorcheva, supra note 99 at 96.
104. Cole, supra note 7, at 11; see also USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 411.
105. Cole, supra note 7, at 11; see also USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 411 (a)( I )(G).
106. USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 411.
107 Helton & Zagorcheva, supra note 99, at 96.
108. Jenks, supra note 96, at 3.
109 Cole, supra note 7, at 12.
110. Id. at 12-13.
Ill. Id. at 13.
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governing the detention of aliens without formal charges. 1 2  While the prior
regulation required the INS to file charges within twenty-four hours of detainment,
the new regulation extends this detainment period to forty-eight hours, and for an
unspecified "reasonable" period beyond forty-eight hours in times of
emergency 13 This new legislation was passed to protect the country from those
who plan activities that could "endanger the welfare, safety, or security" of the
US.
114
Summary Effects ofAmendments on Inadmissibility and Removal Compared to
Prior Legislation
The PATRIOT ACT enhances the government's authority to deport or deny
admission to alien terrorists. 115 Under the prior law, members of terrorist
organizations were denied entry into the United States only if their organization
was designated as one of the twenty-eight terrorist organizations under § 219 of the
INA.' 16  Under the new provisions, any persons or organizations may be
inadmissible if the Secretary of State has determined them to be a political or
social group who publicly endorses terrorist acts which undermines the U.S.'s
efforts to thwart or eliminate terrorism.' 17 Further, previous legislation held
inadmissible only those aliens designated as members of § 219 who "knew or
should have known the organization was a terrorist organization."' 18 The new laws
expand inadmissibility to members of both § 219 designated organizations and to
"any terrorist organization that the alien knows or should know is a terrorist
organization."' 19
Under prior law aliens who engaged in terrorist activities were deportable and
inadmissible, and legislation limited the term "engaged in terrorist activity" to
soliciting funds or members for a terrorist organization. 120 However, it did not
include a working definition of a terrorist organization. 121 It did not clarify
whether an alien's solicitation of funds or members for a terrorist organization
constituted "engaging in a terrorist activity" if the alien lacked the intent to further
a terrorist activity and/or did not have knowledge he was involved in a terrorist
organization.
22
The new law amends these deficiencies. First, it defines that a terrorist
organization can be established by- (1) designation by the Secretary of State under
112. Id. atl2.
113. Id.
114. USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 411 (a)(i)(G).
115. Id. at § 411 (b)(2).
116. Memo, supra note 98, at 4. (The Immigration and Naturalization Act § 219 designates certain
organizations that are affiliated with terrorist activities).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 4-5.
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§ 219" (2) after a finding that the organization (a) commits or threatens to commit a
terrorist activity (b) plans or prepares for terrorist activity, (c) gathers information
on potential targets for terrorist activity, or (d) gathers material support to further
terrorist activities; or (3) by being a group of two or more people that (a) commits
or threatens to commit a terrorist activity (b) plans or prepares for terrorist
activity, (c) gathers information on potential targets for terrorist activity, or (d)
gathers material support to further a terrorist activity 123
Next, the law is broadened to include an alien's solicitation of funds or
members for a terrorist organization, even if not intending to further terrorist
activity and/or not having knowledge of the terrorist organization as constituting
"engaging in a terrorist activity ,124
Third, the law expands the grounds for deportation and inadmissibility Now
the government is not required to prove that an alien had a specific intent to
support a terrorist activity in order to deport him or to declare him inadmissible. 25
Regardless of intent, if an alien is found to have supported a designated or
identified terrorist organization, he is inadmissible and/or deportable.
126
Finally the new laws expand the definition of "engaged in terrorist activity"
and "terrorist organization. 127 This change results in an increase of the classes of
aliens who become ineligible for other forms of relief or protection under the
immigration laws. 28  The effected parties are those seeking an adjustment of
status, a release pending deportation, and withholding of removal.1
29
ADEQUACY OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
Though the USA PATRIOT Act implements legislation towards protecting
the United States from terrorism, the question remains whether it is adequate to
actually reduce or eliminate the threat. Comparing previous U.S. legislation
following a threat to the culture, freedoms, and political ideologies of this country,
the PATRIOT Act is not sweeping legislation. More aggressive reforms that the
PATRIOT Act did not address should have been considered.
The question raised must be whether this new legislation (the USA PATRIOT
Act) meets the immigration problems of today and adequately represents the
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IMMIGRATION REFORM
Beyond the USA PA TRIOT Act
A recent study conducted by the Center for Immigration Studies reported how
foreign terrorists entered the United States. 13  The research revealed that foreign
terrorists have employed nearly every possible means for admission. For example,
some have come as tourists, students, and business travelers. Others have entered
as legal permanent residents and become naturalized United States citizens, while
others have simply crossed the border illegally or used false documentation. i31
Further immigration enforcement problems were revealed by the fact that
terrorists have illegally crossed the border, used false documentation to enter the
U.S., and those who have entered legally have overstayed without any
consequences by the INS.'3 2 The INS's failure in fulfilling its duties was clearly
highlighted when they approved visa extensions for two of the September 1 1 h
hijackers six months following their deaths. 133 The attacks also revealed other
deficiencies in the INS system and together these brought about further support for
drastic changes.
The 2000 Census Bureau reported 114,818 illegal Middle Eastern men and
women in the US. 134 The Census also reported that there are approximately 8.7
million illegal immigrants, twice that of 1990. 35 Immigration officials, such as
Steven Camorata, are concerned not only with the high number of people who are
residing illegally but "also with the potential terrorist attack that could result from
a lax immigration policy ,,i36 The immigrant population now makes up I 1 1% of
the nation's population, an increase of 57% since 1990.137 The INS now conducts
more enforcement operations that result in greater arrests than any other law
enforcement agency in the world; this is done despite an undermanned staff and an
aging computer system. 38 September 1 1Ih brought all of these problems to the
130. Panel Discussion Transcript, How Have Terrorists Entered the U.S.? Center for Immigration
Studies 1 (2002), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/terrorpr.html [hereinafter Panel] (Port of
entry is a technical term where legal admission occurs through inspection).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Alex Johnson, INS Extends Visas for Sept. 11 Terrorist Pilots, MSNBC, Mar. 12, 2002,
available at http://www.usbc.org/info/everything2OO2/O302terrorextension.htm.
134. Christopher Marquis, Census Bureau Estimates 115,000 Middle Eastern Immigrants Are in
U.S. Illegally, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at AI0.
135. See id.
136. Catherine E. Otto, Comment, Tracking Immigrants in the United States: Proposed and
Perceived Needs to Protect the Borders of the United States, 28 N.C. J. INT' L L. & COM. REG. 477
479 (Winter 2002); see also Chitra Ragavan, Coming to America: An Already Burdened Immigration
System Faces the New Demands of Post 9/11 World, US NEWS & WORLD REP Feb. 18, 2002, at
16; see also Bill Gertz, 5,000 in US Suspected of Ties to al Qaeda, WASH. TIMES, July 1I, 2002, at
At.
137 Stephen Dinan, Immigration Growth of 1990's at Highest Rate in 150 Years, WASH. TIMES,
June 5, 2002, at A3.
138. Ragavan, supra note 136, at 16 (Yearly estimates are 50,000 criminal investigations, greater
2003
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
surface and the federal government acknowledged that in its current state, the INS
could not meet its demands. 
139
Subsequently, the PATRIOT Act concentrated some of its most important
immigration provisions on intelligence sharing which will ultimately enhance the
resources available to the Border Patrol and the Consulate officers to effectively
address these problems.
Border Patrol
One of the major areas identified as a port of entry for foreign terrorists is the
United States' border. 140 Controlling the border is an integral step in countering
terrorism; if terrorists cannot enter the country, they cannot commit an attack. The
Immigration Border Patrol is "the guardian of the frontier[,]" as it provides the first
line of defense against entry 141 The Border Patrol's primary responsibility is to
prevent the surreptitious entry of aliens through land or the coastal boundaries. i42
The Border Patrol is also responsible for preventing the smuggling of aliens into
the United States, and to apprehend those who have immigrated illegally 143
In 2000, the Border Patrol apprehended 1.6 million persons for unauthorized
entry, but a large, undetermined number of aliens eluded the Border Patrol and
entered the country '44 These enormous numbers detail the magnitude of the
problem. One possible solution is to increase the manpower and infrastructure at
the borders. 45  A 2000 report indicated a total of 9,000 agents, and only 1,700
agents on duty on any given shift at the southern border, which is an average of
less than one agent per one mile.i
46
Another striking example of the U.S.'s lax immigration enforcement
concerned the U.S.-Canadian border. Many terrorist cells operating in the U.S.
have bases in Canada. 147 Prior to September 1 1th Millennium bomber Ahmed
Ressam was arrested as he tried to cross the U.S.-Canadian border with ingredients
for a homemade bomb to attack Los Angeles International Airport. 48 This arrest
sparked discussion about possible solutions to the unguarded border, but no
than 1,000 arrests, 300,000 court cases, and 175, 000 deportation hearings resulting in 1,200
deportations weekly).
139. Otto, supra note 136, at 485.
140. Panel, supra note 130.
141. Maro T Noto, Travel & Domestic Control, 367 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCES (Sept. 1996).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Martin & Martin, supra note 36, at 4.
145. Mark Krikorian & Steven A. Camarota, Immigration and Terrorism: What Is To Be Done?
Center for Immigration Studies, 7 (Nov. 2001 ), at http://www.cis.org/articles/200I/back 160 i.html.
146. Steven A. Camarota, Immigration and Terrorism: Testimony Prepared for U.S. Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 9 (Oct. 2001), at http:www//cis.org/articles/2001/sactestimony1001.html.
147. See Scripps Howard News Service, Porous Border a Terror Concern, CINCINNATI POST,
Sept. 29, 2001, available at: http://www.cincypost.con/2001/sep/29/border092901 .html.
148. Jonathan Dube, et.al., Massive Manhunt Under Way, ABC NEWS, available at:
http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/canada99 1 220.html.
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decisive action was implemented. 149 After September 1 Ith investigators reported
that as many as five of the nineteen terrorists slipped across the Canadian border,
including the cell's ringleader, Mohammad Atta.' 50 September 1 1th sparked further
inquiry into the border problems, revealing staggering statistics. There are an
estimated 3 million foreigners who overstayed their visas, but there is a lack of
personnel to adequately patrol the border and track down these persons.i' This
prompted Congress and the President to take a closer look at how to secure the
border, which is addressed by the PATRIOT Act.
A straightforward solution to this problem would be to increase the number of
patrolling agents and inspection points. 152  The PATRIOT Act addresses this
concern by authorizing the tripling of Border Patrol Agents. 53  However, this
increase in the number of agents is only the first step. The Act should have gone
into further detail outlining improved training guidelines and timelines for
implementation.
In attempting to implement the increase in Border Personnel, the PATRIOT
Act led to the enactment of the Border Security Act of 2002, 54 effectively giving
"teeth" to the PATRIOT Act's provisions. Primary benefits of the Act are on the
Border Patrol, visa issuance, and foreign student and exchange programs.
First, there is an appropriation of $150 million to the INS and Customs
Service towards implementing an interagency electronic database, machine-
readable visas with biometric identifiers, and a computer system for monitoring
foreign students.iSS Currently there are three technological endeavors: (1) the
Enterprise Architecture, (2) the Student Exchange Architecture Information
System (SEVIS), and (3) the Data Management Improvement of 2000. 56 The
integration of these databases will provide federal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies with relevant information to deportation proceedings and visa
issues. 157 This will directly aid the increased Border Patrol agents and all other law
enforcement and intelligence personnel to identify and investigate suspected
149. Dean Patton, Along U.S. Border, Problems Rise, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept.
22, 2000, available at: http://www.search.csmontor.com/durable/2000/09/22/p3sl.htm.
150. See Scripps Howard News Service, supra note 147.
151. Cheryl N. Thompson, Reorganization, Anti-Terrorism Effort Keeping INS Chief Busy, WASH.
POST, Jan. 21, 2002, at A15.
152. Krikortan & Camarota, supra note 145, at 7.
153. See USA Patriot Act, supra note 59 at § 402.
154. See Border Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 102, 116 Stat. 543, 546 (2002)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. 1712).
155. Id.
156. See Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (formerly US Dept. of Justice Immig. &
Nat. Service), Oct. 2002, at 8, available at http://www.bcis.gov. (The Enterprise Architecture was
mandated in 2000 and it is "the long-term, strategically oriented approach to accomplishing the
information driven aspects of the INS mission. The SEVIS provides information on student visas.
The Data Management Improvement Act was enacted to develop an integrated, automated entry-exit
data collection system. Further, the immigration inspectors' now have access to the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) to identify criminal aliens prior to their arrival).
157 Otto, supra note 136, at 499.
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terrorists. 158
US Consulate and Visa Issues
Consular Affairs
All of the September I 1th 2001 hijackers presented apparently valid travel
documentation at U.S. ports of entry 159 Therefore, it is imperative to have closer
scrutiny of who is granted access to enter the country (in terms of visa issuance to
foreigners abroad, and inspection of foreign nationals at U.S. ports of entry).i 60
Inspection controls function to protect the national interest. 161 It involves the
examination of persons seeking entrance into the United States from foreign
territories through ports of entry 162 The United State's inspection policies are to
screen out undesirable aliens who may be involved in criminal or subversive
activities or other objectionable conduct.1
63
Entry into the United States is a privilege and not a right, and is granted at the
discretion of the members of the Consular Affairs.i64 Currently the Consular
Affairs lack the manpower and tools to meet the tremendous load of applications.
In 2000, almost 10 million foreigners applied for visas, for which there were only
some 1100 consular officers, many young professionals just beginning their
foreign services careers. 65 This results in consulate officers having very limited
time to review each application. 66 In a recent panel discussion on immigration
and terrorism, a former foreign services agent stated that approximately only one-
fifth of all non-immigrant visa applicants are interviewed. To further exacerbate
the problem, the State Department is moving towards "drop boxes, group
applications via travel agencies and other ways to avoid having to actually look at
people who are asking for permission to enter."'167 Adding to this challenge is the
defective evaluation system whereby visa officers are assessed by the number of
interviews they conduct daily 168
One solution is to implement a biometric identification system. The initial
need to include biometric identifiers in border security enforcement was realized as
a result of the September I Ith attacks, and a further push was spurred by the
confusion in identifying Richard Reid, a Briton attempting to smuggle a shoe-
158. Mark Bixier, War on Terrorism: Tracking Foreign Students Gains Renewed Interest Once
Stalled Project in Atlanta Being Developed by INS, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 7, 2002, at A5.
159. Martin & Martin, supra note 36, at I.
160. Id. at 3.
161. Noto, supra note 141,at 78.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Martin & Martin, supra note 36, at 2.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2-3.
167 Panel, supra note 130, at 4.
168. Camarota, supra note 146.
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bomb onto an airplane destined for Miami.
169
The first biometric identification system, named "IDENT was piloted in
1995 in California. 170  It contained a database with thousands of criminal
records.171 By 1996, IDENT was implemented at thirty-four sites along the U.S.
Mexican border. 7 2 The results were astounding; within the first few months over
3,000 criminal aliens who were attempting entry into the U.S. were identified.
73
Implementing a system similar to IDENT (one which compares the individual
features of a visa applicant to those who actually appear at ports of entry by using
unique technologies such as fingerprinting, retinal scans, or hand geometry 74)
could have a significant effect on stopping terrorists at U.S. borders. The Border
Security Act of 2002 requires biometric identifiers on all visas and passports that
American consulates issue to foreign travelers.
75
Such a system would create an electronic file on each issued visa applicant
that would be available to inspectors at the U.S. ports of entry prior to an alien's
arrival. This information and technology can then be employed by the INS to
develop and implement an entry/exit system to track aliens as they enter and exit
the country
Entry/Exit System
However, even with increased officers, the right tools are needed to keep the
terrorists out. The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) currently is
the primary tool in flagging terrorists. 176 CLASS is a "watch list" of suspicious
people who should be inadmissible. 177 However, this system is flawed since it is
based solely on names and not on a "biometric identifier" such as a fingerprint,
resulting in terrorists sneaking into the country 178
The PARTIOT Act addresses this issue by requiring the Department of
Justice and FBI to provide the INS and the State Department information from its
National Crime Information Center (NCIC). The Act also included a provision to
assess the possibility of enhancing the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint
169. See Jonathan Peterson, Digital Images Will Verify Identity of Visitors to US, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
2, 2002. (Reid attempted to smuggle a bomb onto a Miami-bound airplane).
170. See BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Inspector General Report
on Resendez-RamirezIlNDENT Mar. 20, 2000, available at: http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/
publicaffairs/statements/igstate.htm.
171. Id.
172. Bryan Paul Chnstian, Visa Policy, Inspection and Exit Controls: Transatlantic Perspectives
on Migration Management, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 215, 220 (1999).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, §
303(b)(I), 116 Stat. 543, 553 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.S. 1732); see also Otto, supra note 136,
at 501-02.
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Identification System. 179 This is a promising start, but to be effective, the process
should begin with the visa applicant's fingerprints being digitally scanned into an
integrated system which all other agencies have access. 180 There should be a
single file for each applicant that is checked against all "watch lists, and that file
should stay with them until they leave, when their fingerprints should be once
again scanned. 18 1 This would create an entry/exit system which would provide
adequate checks on when a person entered the country, exited the country, and
when they were supposed to leave. It would also serve other purposes: such as
providing an effective way of excluding aliens on the "watch list" it would
solidify the identification system, ensuring that the person who entered the country
was the same one issued the visa; it would further prevent fraud by making it
nearly impossible for a person to go from consulate to consulate using different
identities; and it would deter would be terrorists who would be reluctant to give
their fingerprints. 182
This entry/exit system could also be implemented for tracking foreigners in
the United States on student visas. In 2000, about 284,000 foreigners received
student visas. 8 3 The major concerns for consulate officers in determining whether
to issue a visa is the foreigner's financial status (whether the foreigner has
sufficient funds to live and study in the U.S.) and their likelihood of returning to
their native country. 8 4 Prior to September I th 2001, legislation had been passed
but not enforced regarding the tracking of foreign students.185 Universities were
supposed to cooperate with the State Department and the INS with details of a
foreign student's activities (such as registration of classes, attendance, grades,
etc.); however few schools complied and most blocked its implementation. i86
Foreign Student and Exchange Visitors
The need for improvement in the INS's tracking ability of foreign students
became apparent post September I Ith when evidence revealed that two of the
hijackers were living in the U.S. on student visas. One of the terrorists, Ham
Hamjour, had apparently entered the U.S. on an F-I student visa in December
2000.187 He however never attended school, nor did the school notify the INS of
his absence. 88 The other hijacker, Mommad Atta, who was believed to be the
leader, was granted permission to switch his visa status to that of a student because
he was taking flying lessons. 8 9  These examples illustrate the necessity for
179. USA Patriot Act, Pub. supra note 59, at §§ 403, 405, 15 Stat. 272, 343 (2001).
180. Krikorian & Camarota, supra note 145, at 12.
181. Id.
182. Id at4.




187 Federation for American Immigration Reform, Issue Brief: World Trade Center and Pentagon
Terrorists' Identity and Immigration Status, available at: http://www.fairus.org/htmi/04178i01 .htm.
188. See Ragavan, supra note 136.
189. See id.
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tracking foreigners on student visas. Another problem was the lack of cooperation
from schools to provide and report information of these students to the appropriate
authorities.19° Post September 1 1th has shown a strong willingness from these
institutions to comply with the reporting requirements. However, even with school
reports of a student's absence, the INS previously did not have a system in place to
effectively track these missing students.1 9'
Following September I 1h (since it was found that some of the terrorists
entered the U.S. on student visas), the Student and Exchange Visitor Program
tracking system is expected to be fully functional with the cooperation of all
universities. 1 2 A further, but more extreme approach could be to revive the 1940
Alien Registration Act, requiring all non-citizens living in the U.S. to annually
register their residential address with the State Department and INS.' 93 Such a
policy could be easily implemented if the foreigner's fingerprints and other
relevant information are already in an automated, integrated file, where they could
be tracked. These methods of an entry/exit system, fingerprinting, and the
registration requirements could serve as a deterrence for future terrorists from
another route of entry into U.S., and would help in the identification and
monitoring of current foreigners who may be suspected of terrorist activities.
Since the enactment of the PATRIOT Act, the INS has recently admitted that
it still does not know the number of foreign students who have overstayed their
visas, nor have they been successful in tracking these over-stayers.'94
Additionally, of the 547,000 student visas in the U.S., officials report that they do
not know if these people are actually attending school.' 95
These alarming statistics provide further support for the need to implement
the biometric identifiers with alacrity One criticism of the biometric identification
system is the fear that it will lead to a national identification (ID) cards that may
impinge on privacy rights.196 There have been scattered reactions on this issue,
and further research must be conducted through detailed surveys with legal experts
to determine its legality and its potential effects on U.S. citizens. Until then, the
government stands by its position that the "U.S. must make every effort to reduce
the possibility of terrorist attacks in the future[,] ' 'i 97 and implementing a biometric
identification system is a critical step in revamping the immigration system to
achieve this result.
190. Martin & Martin, supra note 36 at 5.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Krikorian & Camarota, supra note 145, at 9.
194. See Ragavan, supra note 136.
195. Kate Zermicke and Christopher Drew, Efforts to Track Foreign Students Are Said to Lag, N.Y
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at Al.
196. Robert O'Harrow, Jr. and Jonathan Knm, National ID Card Gaining Support, WASH. POST,
Dec. 17 2001 at Al.
197. See Otto, supra note 136, at 517 (quoting Commissioner Ziglar).
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Targeting Specific Countries
A review of U.S. immigration policy demonstrates evidence of racial
discrimination in certain times of U.S. history Clearly Immigration and
Naturalization has been unfairly denied to members of certain ethnic groups.' 98
The Chinese Exclusion Act barred Chinese peoples from 1882 until the Act
was repealed in 1943.'99 Similarly, the Asiatic Barred Zone clause of the 1917 Act
excluded southeastern Asians except the Japanese. 200 The Japanese suffered from
a limited immigration policy since the 1907 Gentleman's Agreement.20 1 These
were explicit legislative acts, but legislative history also shows exclusion of certain
immigrant groups without formal legislation, as was evidenced during World War
I and World War II against the Germans, Communists, and the Japanese.20 2
If one were to apply precedent to the current problem of terrorism, there is a
strong argument for more thorough screening for applicants from certain countries,
and an extreme argument to exclude all enemies of the United States. The USA
PATRIOT ACT now grants the INS the authority to "prohibit[] the admission of
an alien from a country designated to be a state sponsor of international terrorism
(as defined by [the PATRIOT] Act) unless the Secretary of State has determined
that such individual does not pose a risk or security threat to the U.S.
°203
However, it does not extend this restriction to those countries that are not
designated as state sponsors of terrorism; it only provides legislation to deny entry
to individuals from any state that may be associated with terrorism. 20 4 Further
steps should be taken to safeguard against the entry of terrorists on U.S. soil.
Increased Screening
The PATRIOT Act is not the first attempt to combat terrorism. In 1996, the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) was passed. 20 5 The
AEDPA resulted in the increased screening of certain groups suspected of
terrorism. 0 6 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) granted officers broad
power to interrogate suspected aliens as to their right to remain in the U.S.2°7 The
198. See Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 214 (1882), 47th Cong; Immigration Act of Feb.
5, 1917, ch. 29, Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 874; Alan M. Kraut, Records of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Nov. 1995, available at: http://www.lexisnexis.com/academic/guides
/immigrationlins/insal .asp.
199. See Chinese Exclusion Act, supra note 198.
200. See Immigration Act, supra note 198.
201. See Kraut, supra note 198.
202. Regarding the Palmer Raids, Japanese internment camps, and the stifling of speech of any
anti-American sentiment.
203. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-73, § 306,
116 Stat. 543 (2002) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. 1735).
204. See Memo, supra note 98, at 4-5.
205. Adrienne R. Bellino, Changing Immigration for Arabs With Anti-Terrorism Legislation:
September I1th Was Not the Catalyst, 16 TEMP INT'L & COMp L. J. 123-24 (Spring 2002).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 129.
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USA PATRIOT Act perpetuates this by granting visa officers, the Attorney
General, and other INS agents broad power to check suspected alien terrorist.
However, visa officers should be granted more responsibility and power as
they are the first step in keeping alien terrorists out of the U.S. They should be
empowered to deny admission to people who are enemies of America, but have not
yet engaged in terrorist activities. 20 8  There are citizens from countries whose
government do not sponsor terrorism, yet who have come here and engaged in
terrorist activities. 2 09 Applicants from such countries should be subject to much
stricter screening, including an exhaustive security clearance.210 In addition, visa
issuance should be restricted to U.S. consulates in their home country not
consulates outside of their home state.2 1 1 There is nothing unprecedented about
these actions of country specific temporary visa policies.212 Despite some
objections to this proposal, it is important to remember that immigration into the
United States is a privilege and not a right, subject to the provisions prescribed by
the country
CONCLUSION
The surveillance and information sharing provisions of the PATRIOT Act
provide a strong base to rectify the current problems of the system. However, the
immigration enforcement legislation lacks sufficient mandates to adequately
combat the threat of terrorism. To effectively reform immigration policy, changes
have to be flexible and broadly based with regards to a wide range of
considerations on both the national and international fronts, and in harmony with
other elements of national policy The current national threat of terrorism must be
dealt with immigration reform that significantly enhances national security
Though the reforms implemented during World War I, World War II, and against
the Communists (from internment, to registration, to stifling free speech) are
outdated, extreme, and egregious more aggressive measures (through increased
information gathering and sharing and implementing a biometric identification
system) may need to be considered to effectively combat terrorism.
One concern about the implementation of these modifications is their
potential effect on intelligence gathering. While legislative acts that expand the
government's ability to conduct surveillance from roving wiretaps to internet
communications, to expanding the immigration enforcement capabilities through
increased screening and biometric identification, may lead to short-term success in
capturing terrorists, they may have negative effects in the long-term. Some experts
believe that intelligence gathering is based on the "penetration of trust" between
208. Krikorian & Camarota, supra note 145, at 4.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. (This is because an American visa officer stationed in a particular country is more familiar
to identify and deal with problems concerning an applicant from that area than are other officers
stationed elsewhere).
212. Camarota, supra note 146.
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parties, and these provisions may lead to distrust, ultimately making penetration of
future attacks extremely difficult.21 3  The standard seems to be based on a
reasonable person argument, where it is logical that those who we need
information from will not be willing to cooperate if they are the same people we
are targeting. This raises the issue of proportionality and the government must
determine how stringently these provisions should be administered. There must be
a balance achieved between alleviating the current fear and threat of terrorism and
sustaining covert relations to prevent future attacks.
While it may be too soon to reach definitive conclusions as to the
effectiveness of the PATRIOT Act, preliminary results show improvement in the
immigration system as a whole. The intelligence gathering and sharing provisions
have led to the capture of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, believed to be one of the top
five leaders of al-Qaeda. Mohammed was captured in Pakistan, and has been
th 21identified as the "mastermind" behind the September I I attacks. 14 He has also
been linked to terrorist plots in Europe and Asia. In addition, over 400 a]-Qaeda
members have been detained worldwide, including an al-Qaeda field operations
commander and the head of a hijacker's cell in Germany 215
It is hopeful that similar results will be seen with the implementation of the
enhanced law enforcement provisions (the increase in Border Patrol personnel, the
implementation of the biometric identification system, and the entry/exit system),
but not at the expense of future intelligence gathering. With the changes in the
INS's function and its move into the Department of Homeland Security,
quantifiable results may not be seen for a few years, but the changes in place seem
to be a step in the right direction. As long as the fight against terrorism remains a
top priority, Congress is likely to legislate and implement the necessary resources
to achieve its goal of eliminating terrorism and protecting the American people.
213. Interview with Prof. Keely (quoting Vince Canistraro at the 26th Am. Legal Conf. at the
Center for Migration Studies in New York), 2003.
214. Bill Gertz, Bin Laden Aide Mastermind of Terror Plots, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, at A l.
215. See Muazzam Gill, Weighing Big Catch in War on Terrorism, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003.
at B4.
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In the modem global economy, U.S. export controls crafted during the height
of the Cold War' are failing to forestall the transfer of advanced dual-use
technology2 to potential adversaries: China secured the necessary equipment to
construct semiconductor manufacturing facilities capable of revolutionizing the
People's Liberation Army,3 Russia deployed an extensive fleet of intelligence
satellites using its own technology,4 and with sufficient financial resources,
countless other foreign militaries are capable of building competitive
communicants, remote sensing, and navigation satellites without U.S.
J.D. Candidate, Georgetown University Law Center. Received a B.A. in Economics, International
Affairs, and Management from Xavier University.
I. The U.S. continues to regulate exports of goods and technologies with military applications
under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) of The Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979
(50 U.S.C. app. § 2401). See generally R. Aylan Broadbent U.S. Exports Controls on Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies: Is the High-Tech Industry Suffering? 8 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 49 (1999).
See also infra Part ll(B).
2. Dual-use technology is technology that can be used for commercial or military purposes.
Examples include carbon fibers (used in skis, golf clubs, and ballistic missiles), maraging steel (used for
centrifuge rotors that enrich uranium for nuclear weapons), corrosion resistant valves (the essential
components in plants that enrich uranium to nuclear weapon grade, which are also widely used in oil
and gas industries), and semiconductors (computer chips used in virtually all commercial electronics
and military technologies). See Hearings on U.S.-China Commission Export Controls and China, 107th
Cong. 1071-77 (Jan. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Hearings on US-China] (prepared Statement of Gary
Milhollin, Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control), in COMPILATION OF HEARINGS HELD
BEFORE THE U.S. CHINA SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION (2002).
3. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF ANN. REP ON THE MILITARY POWER OF THE P.R.C. 39-42 (2003),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/2003073Ochinaex.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2003)
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]; Export Controls: Rapid Advances in China Semiconductor Industry
Underscore Need for Fundamental U.S. Policy Review, U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF ANN. REP TO THE
RANKING MINORITY LEADER MEMBER, COMMITrEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFF U.S. SENATE (2002),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02620.pdf (last visited July 30, 2003) [hereinafter Export
Controls]; Michael Klaus, Red Chips: Implications of the Semiconductor Industry Relocation to
China, 29 ASIAN AFF AN AM. REV. 237 (2003).
4. See JAMES A. LEWIS, PRESERVING AMERICA'S STRENGTH IN SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY: A
REPORT OF THE CSIS SATELLITE COMMISSION 5 (2002).
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components. 5 Since the U.S. no longer maintains a monopoly on the world's most
sophisticated technologies, 6 unilateral restrictions on high-tech exports are more
prone to impairing U.S. corporations than protecting national security.7 Despite
intense lobbying campaigns of industry representatives, 8 Congress has repeatedly
eschewed substantive revisions to U.S. export administration regulations, 9 thereby
prolonging the futile effort to impede the technological advancements of distrusted
foreign nations by restricting U.S. exports.
China's astonishing technological and military advancements lie at the center
of the export control debate as U.S. exporters demanding opportunities to sell
advanced technology to China's explosive high-tech industries clash with policy
analysts apprehensively forecasting strategic concerns in the Taiwan Strait.'0
Favoring the dynamic national security concerns, the U.S. restricts exports of dual-
use technology (technology that can be used for commercial or military purposes)
to China under U.S. Export Administration Regulations," although few other
governments impose such cumbersome rules.12 Consequently, foreign corporations
are securing lucrative high-tech contracts, U.S. exporters are losing billions in
sales,' 3 and China is rapidly acquiring the advanced technology that it desires to
build a formidable modem military 14
While export controls defy the fundamental tenets of the global marketplace,
ongoing negotiations for free trade agreements (FTAs)' 5 with Chile, Singapore,
and Latin America embrace the global competition that is rendering export
controls obsolete.i 6 The Bush administration's ambitious campaign to negotiate
5. Id. at 14.
6. See infra Part Ill(A).
7. See, e.g., Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1019-24 (Prepared Statement of James
Lewis, Director, Technology Policy, Center for Strategic and International Studies).
8. See AlA, EIA, NDIA Call on Bush to More Rapidly Reform Export System, DEF DAILY INT'L,
Feb. 8, 2002, at I.
9. See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera, Tech Leaders Vow to Push for Eased Export Controls, KNIGHT
RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, May 28, 2003, at 1. See also infra note 55 and accompanying text.
10. See generally ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 43-50.
11. See infra Part II(B).
12. See Christopher F Corr, The Wall Still Stands! Complying with Export Controls on
Technology Transfers in the Post Cold War, Post 9/11 Era, 25 Hous. J. INT'L L 441 (2003). See also
infra Part li1(A).
13. See infra Part Ill(B).
14. Enabled by modem technology, China has 450 short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan
and is adding seventy-five more each year. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
15. Under free trade agreements (FTAs), "member countries agree to eliminate tariffs and non-
tariff barriers on trade in goods within the FTA, but each country maintains its own trade policies,
including tariffs on trade outside the region. William H. Cooper, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on
U.S. Trade and Implications for US. Trade Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR
CONGRESS 2 (2002), available at http://www.usembassycanada.gov/content/canusa/
freetrade crs 040902.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2003).
16. The U.S. signed an FTA with Singapore in May 2003 and with Chile in June 2003.
Negotiations are ongoing with Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and
Costa Rica, among others. See, e.g., Daniel T. Griswold, Free Trade Agreements: Steppingstones to
More Open World, Center for Trade Policy Studies, Trade Briefing Paper no. 18, at 2 (July 10, 2003),
at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/briefs/tbp-018.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2003).
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FTAs hails the economic and political benefits for parties to the agreements, 7 but
on a global scale, the effects of U.S. free trade agreements on China's developing
high-tech sectors must also be considered. Judging by the aftermath of the U.S.
Jordan free trade agreement signed in 2001,'8 as an economic matter, budding
high-tech centers in countries with which the U.S. has a free trade agreement
attract immediate investments from U.S. companies and once U.S. investment
facilitates further development, foreign investment follows.' 9 Unlike existing
export controls, the secondary result of such a strategic free trade agreement is that
increased competition in technology markets siphons some dual-use technology
investments from China, thus mitigating the national security risks of burgeoning
technology bases in the control of a potential foe without undermining U.S.
economic interests.20
To establish a practical frame for the defense trade policy debate, this article
begins by presenting the extraordinary growth of China's semiconductor industry
and the military applications of China's emerging technologies. After evaluating
the relevant technology Part Two outlines the history of U.S. export controls
under the Export Administration Act and surveys the persisting fears concerning
China's unprecedented military advances. Finally, Part Two discusses attempts to
control dual-use technology exports on an international level during the Cold War
era via the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) and
during the post-Cold War era through the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Technologies.
Part Three provides anecdotal evidence of the failures of high-tech export
controls and analyzes the institutional weaknesses of international agreements
designed to impede dual-use technology transfers. Extending the case study of
China, the section illustrates the ease at which two of China's largest
semiconductor foundries procured the equipment necessary to produce sensitive
technology from foreign sources. Additionally, Part Three assesses the lack of
enforcement power of the Wassenaar Arrangement and evaluates the practices of
foreign governments in monitoring high-tech exports. Part Three concludes by
presenting the economic losses of obstructive dual-use export controls for U.S.
technology corporations seeking to capitalize on China's expanding business
opportunities.
Once the futility of export controls is delineated, Part Four considers the
strategic possibilities and implications of free trade agreements. The section
begins by reviewing the strategic trade theories underlying FTA negotiations; by
eliminating barriers to trade between contracting parties, FTAs divert investment
from the most efficient countries to less efficient countries. 2' In instances in which
17. Id.
18. See generally mnfra Part IV(D).
19. See Amjad Baker, Intel Plans Investments in Jordan IT Sector AL-BAWABA (Jordan), June
18, 2001, available at http://www.intaj.net/news/readnews.cfm?id = 136 (last visited Nov. 18, 2003). See
also infra Part IV(D)(I).
20. See infra Part IV(A).
21. Griswold, supra note 16, at 1.
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it is politically desirable, the U.S. can manipulate FTAs to support market reforms
22in developing countries and construct a template for broader trade agreements.
To broaden the strategic trade theories, the section cites evidence from the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade
Agreement to posit that when FTAs guide dual-use technology Investments, FTAs
also advance national security interests. Finally, in Part Five, a conclusion is
reached that an entirely new paradigm for defense trade policy must replace insular
appeals for export control reforms. By accommodating and leveraging the global
competition inherent in today's marketplace, FTAs protect U.S. corporate interests
and serve as a valuable tool for addressing the national security concerns of
China's technology-driven military modernization.
II. EXPORT CONTROLS ON DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY
A. China s Explosive High Tech Industry
The rapid growth in China's semiconductor (computer chip) industry 23 elicits
widespread trepidation and affords a practical basis for critiquing the role of export
controls in managing national security concerns. 24 As global economic integration
facilitates access to foreign markets, technology companies such as Motorola, Dell,
and Texas Instruments are increasingly outsourcing manufacturing of
semiconductors to foundries,25 which produce semiconductors on a contract basis
and allow their customers to concentrate on research and development.26 Offered
generous tax incentives and government-funded technology parks, 27 international
investors are flocking to China to establish semiconductor foundries that can serve
the needs of manufacturers of devices ranging from helpful hearing aids to
22. Id. at5.
23. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1028-34 (prepared statement of George
Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry Association) ("[Il]inevitably, China will be the center of
semiconductor manufacturing."). Bryan Lee, Chartered Eyes Stronger Presence in China, STRAIT
TIMES (Singapore), Feb. 22, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, Strait Times (Singapore) File (China's chip
production is expected to increase by 40% annually, while the industry annual growth rate is 10%.).
See generally Klaus, supra note 3, at 238-242.
24. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 955 (prepared statement of James J. Jochum,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration) ("China, itself, can be viewed as
microcosm of the challenges we face as export control officials.").
25. The foundry market is expected to grow at a 20% annual rate with sales growing from $7.5
billion in 2002 to $32 billion by 2010. Mark LaPedus & Brian Fuller, Fab Costs, Capacity Glut Seen
Pointing to Consolidation Shakeout Looms for Foundries, ELEC. ENG. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2003, at I,
LEXIS, News Library Electronic Engineering Times File. See also TI to Buy More Chinese Made
Products, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 5, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, All News File.
26. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1029-31 (prepared statement of George
Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry Association).
27. See JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, WHITE PAPER: NATIONAL SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE GLOBAL
MIGRATION OF THE U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 4 (June 2003), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-lieberman/semi.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2003). See also Export Controls,
supra note 3, at 3.
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alarming laser-guided missiles.28 In turn, the semiconductor foundries throughout
East Asia rely heavily upon U.S. semiconductor equipment to produce the chips, as
U.S. companies supply 55% of the world's semiconductor equipment and possess
the most advanced technologies.29
While foreign investment pours into their technology parks, Chinese leaders
tout the "importance of developing "independent, proprietary high-technology
capabilities as a means to boost China's economic and military prowess to counter
'hegemonic' actions of the United States." 30 Since semiconductors have direct
military applications, Roger Cliff from Rand Corporation speculates, "China's
grand strategy is to develop a world-class electronics industry and draw on it for
military applications if needed. ' '3i Indeed, the semiconductor industry is designated
as a "pillar industry" in China's Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005).32 Under the
Plan, the Chinese government pledges to invest US$18 billion in the sector and
aspires to attract $10 billion from foreign corporations in order to construct twenty-
five new semiconductor plants by 2005. 3 Additionally in the past decade, China's
State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) has granted $725 million to
eighty-four state-sponsored research centers 34 in an effort to expand Shanghai's
semiconductor output from $2 billion in 2000 to $24 billion in 2010.
3
5
Seeking electronic components capable of executing multiple functions, the
military established the foundation for today's advanced semiconductors in 1959
with the invention of the integrated circuit (IC). 36 Since that time, applications for
semiconductors have expanded far beyond the domain of the military
37
semiconductors are considered the 'crude oil' of the twenty-first century, fueling
28. Export Controls, supra note 3, at 9 ("[China's] improvements in semiconductor manufacturing
capability are the direct result of the involvement of European, Japanese, and U.S. integrated circuit
manufacturers in China, typically through joint ventures or wholly foreign owned manufacturing
facilities.").
29. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1119 (prepared statement of the
Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International).
30. The U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, Report to Congress of the US.
China Security Commission: The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship Between
the United States and China, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REv.COMMISS. ANN. REP ch. 2 (July 2002),
available at http://www.uscc.gov/anrp.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
31. George Leopold, New China, Old Worries, ELEC. ENG. TIMES, Apr. I, 2002, at I, LEXIS,
News Library, Electronic Engineering Times File.
32. See Shanghai Government Vows USD 9 Billion Investment in IC Sector over Next Five Years,
CHINA IT & TELECOM REP Mar. 29,2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, All News File.
33. Id.
34. China Implements Hi-tech Plans to Boost Industry, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 7,
2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, XINHUA File.
35. See, e.g., Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1026 (prepared statement of Daryl Hatano,
Vice President, Semiconductor Industry Association).
36. See Micron Technology, Inc., Semiconductor History, at http://www.micron.com/kl2/
semiconductors/history.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Micron Technologies, Inc.].
37 Thirty years ago, U.S. semiconductor companies were primarily defense contractors; military
systems and commercial IT products now rely on the same producers. See generally Hearings on US-
China, supra note 2, at 1029 (prepared statement of George Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry
Association).
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everything from cheap toys to military surveillance satellites.38 Before the U.S.
China Economic and Security Review Commission,39 an industry expert testified,
"the ability to produce integrated circuits is now a widespread commercial
prospect, with military meeting its needs through off-the-shelf procurement rather
than through designing chips for special military applications.
40
Although China (and other potentially hostile regimes) would be able to
produce adequate military technology with readily available, past-generation
semiconductors, 4 1 the cutting edge 0.1 3-micron semiconductors42 manufactured in
China's leading foundries are essential for critical defense technology such as
synthetic aperture radar, electronic warfare, and image compression and
processing.43 On a broader scale, policy analysts predict, "advantages will go to
states that have a strong commercial technology sector and develop effective ways
to link these capabilities to their national defense industrial base. 44 Observing
China's ominous military modernization,45 in the U.S. and Taiwan, anxiety
abounds46 as the tiny circuitry of 12-inch, sub-0.18-micron semiconductor chips
47
manufactured in China's foundries propels technology into the next generation and
38. Micron Technology, Inc., supra note 36.
39. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission was created in 2000 by the
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 § 1238, Pub. L. No. 106-398, 114 Stat.
1654A-334 (2000) (22 U.S.C. § 7002 (2001)) to "monitor, investigate, and to report to Congress an
annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship
between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where
appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administration action. U.S.-China Security Review
Commission, United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission Charter available at
http://www.uscc.gov/act.htm (last visited July 30, 2003).
40. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1121 (prepared statement of the Semiconductor
Equipment and Materials International).
41. For instance, the U.S. Air Force's new F-22 tactical fighters use 0.8-micron chips, technology
which is four generations behind current industry standards. Export Controls, supra note 3, at 16.
42. In 2002, the width of state-of-the-art semiconductors was 0.13 microns (the width of human
hair is about 100 microns). The industry plans to deliver 0.09 micron chips in 2004, and Intel already
produced such technology. The primary benefit of the decrease in width is the ability to add more
transistors to the chip, thus improving processing speed and overall performance. See SEMICONDUCTOR
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, THE INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP FOR SEMICONDUCTORS 31-32
(2001), available at http://public.itrs.net/ (last visited July 30, 2003). See also John Dodge, Let' Get
Small, Bio-IT WORLD, Aug. 13, 2002, available at http://www.bio-
itworld.com/archive/081302/horizons_small.html (last visited July 30, 2003). See also Export Controls,
supra note 3, at 13-20.
43. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 27, at I.
44. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, Computer Technology and National Security, in
COMPUTER EXPORTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN A GLOBAL ERA - NEW TOOLS FOR A NEW CENTURY
I (2001), available at http://www.csis.org/tech/pubs/0106bLewis.pdf (last visited July 2, 2003). In
China, the majority of its semiconductor foundries are partnerships between foreign investors and the
Chinese government. See Export Controls, supra note 3, at 12.
45. See generally ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3.
46. See, e.g., LIEBERMAN, supra note 27, at 10 ("We are being confronted by one of the greatest
transfers of critical defense technologies ever organized by another government.").
47 12-inch refers to the diameter of the computer chips, while 0.18 micron refers to the width of
the chip. In 2001, 0.18-micron was considered to be state-of-the-art, and three Chinese foundries are
now capable of meeting such specifications. See, e.g., Export Controls, supra note 3, at 10.
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transforms commercial and military capabilities.
48
B. U.S. Export Administration Regulations
Where there is real and credible evidence that the export of dual-use items
threatens our national security, we must act to combat that threat. No company
wants to see its name in the headlines of the Los Angeles Times or some other
newspaper as the source of some critical item or technology that facilitated an act
of terrorism.
-Kenneth Juster, U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration
49
To "minimize transfers of technology that could contribute to potentially
threatening modernization efforts, the U.S. requires licenses for exports of goods
with conceivable military applications.50 At the conclusion of World War i,
Congress enacted the Export Control Act (ECA) of 1949 which directed the
Commerce Department to impose export controls on goods in short supply or
goods affecting national security and foreign policy. After the ECA expired in
1969 the Export Administration Act of 1969 filled the void, and the act was
eventually updated and amended to become the Export Administration Act (EAA)
of 1979 52 The EAA expired on August 20, 1994 and without a permanent EAA,
President Clinton invoked his authority under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act 53 to reauthorize the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR)- of the EAA. 4 Since Clinton's initial Executive Order, there have been
seven failed attempts to enact a permanent EAA, obliging the President to annually
invoke emergency orders and reauthorize export administration regulations that are
based on statutory authority that "has not been comprehensively revised or
overhauled in [twenty-three] years."55
As stipulated in the statutory authority of the EAR, export control policies are
48. See generally Export Controls, supra note 3.
49. BIS Chief Juster Reveals Export Control and Security Priorities for 2003, MANAGING
EXPORTS, July 2002, available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/news/2002/
KJusterUWKeynoteCA04 16 02.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2003).
50. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 950 (prepared statement of Lisa Bronson, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counter proliferation).
51. U.S. Bureau of Industry and Secunty, History of Export Controls, at
http://bxa.fedworld.gov/mission.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2003).
52. The Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (50 U.S.C. app. § 2401).
53. 50 U.S.C. § 1702.
54. Exec. Order No. 12,924, 59 Fed. Reg. 162 (Aug. 19, 1994).
55. Most recently, the proposed Export Administration Act of 2003, H.R. 55, 108 1h Cong. (2003)
(the House version of S. 149, 107'h Cong. (2001)), which aimed to streamline the export control review
process and decontrol items readily available from foreign sources, was introduced on January 7, 2003.
Since being referred to the House Committee on International Relations, no action has been taken on
H.R. 55. See generally Kenneth I. Juster, Under Secretary of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and
Security, Keynote Address (Oct. 10, 2002), available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/news/
2002/ken2u@updateO2.htm (last visited July 30, 2003) [hereinafter Juster].
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intended to encourage free trade with all countries, "except those with which such
trade has been determined by the President to be against the national interest. 56
Exercising his power to delegate responsibilities for such determinations, 57 the
President entrusts the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security
(formerly known as the Bureau of Export Administration) to administer and
enforce export controls.5 s In accordance with Executive Order 12,981,59 the Bureau
of Industry and Security then consults with the Departments of State, Defense, and
Energy, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency upon receiving
applications for export licensesi 0 As a full partner in the interagency export license
review process, 61 the Department of Defense in particular is reputed to favor
national security interests over the commercial interests of U.S. exporters when
considering export licenses.62 According to Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation, as it relates to
China, export licenses are denied only if they make a "direct and significant" or
"material" contribution to China's military capabilities.63 Nonetheless, in the likely
scenario of a conflict between economic and national security interests, Vann H.
Van Diepen, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation,
affirms, "export controls must uphold U.S. national security and foreign policy "64
Acting without strict guidelines for permissible exports, the governmental
agencies approve or disapprove export licenses on a case-by-case basis. 65 Although
export controls regulate exports of dual-use technologies to every country in the
world, the level of control that is exerted depends, in part, on destination of the
export.66 Accordingly few licenses are required when exporting a dual-use good to
a NATO ally that is also a member of a nonproliferation regime, while a virtual
embargo is imposed on exports to Iraq, Libya, and Iran. 67 Meanwhile, most
56. 50 U.S.C. § 2402(1) (2003).
57 50 U.S.C. § 2403(e) (2003).
58. See U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, Policies and Regulations, at
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/
policiesandregulations/index.htm#ear (last visited July 10, 2003).
59. Exec. Order No. 12,981,60 Fed. Reg. 236 (Dec. 5, 1995).
60. See Corr, supra note 12, at 469-71.
61. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 949 (prepared statement of Lisa Bronson, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counter proliferation)..
62. See Corr, supra note 12, at 470 ("As may be expected, the Defense Department takes a
conservative, security-oriented posture, and is much less concerned with the effect of license denials on
U.S. exporters.").
63. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 950 (prepared statement of Lisa Bronson, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counter proliferation). See also 15
C.F.R. § 742.4(b)(2) (2003).
64. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1034 (prepared statement of Vann H. Van Diepen,
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation) ("[I]nevitably, China will be the center
of semiconductor manufactunng.").
65. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 949 (prepared statement of Lisa Bronson, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counter proliferation).
66. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 956 (prepared statement of James J. Jochum,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration).
67. Id.
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exports to China require licenses. 68 As mandated by the EAR, the Bureau of
Industry and Security also considers foreign availability of the relevant good when
reviewing applications for export licenses.6 9 However, even if the technology is
widely available from foreign competitors, the approval of an export license is still
not a guarantee. Following the ambiguous case-by-case policy, Lisa Bronson
maintains, "no single factor is going to be the only reason that we make a decision
on a license.",
70
As part of the interagency review process, when a U.S. corporation applies for
an export license to sell dual-use technology to a Chinese company Commerce
officials endeavor to determine whether sales to the particular Chinese importer
would endanger national security 7i As of 2001, nineteen entities in China were
considered national security threats and thus exports to those entities are
prohibited, 72 while licenses to export to non-banned entities are granted on the
aforementioned case-by-case basis. To gain greater insight into the risks posed by
specific Chinese importers, the Bureau of Industry and Security negotiated an end-
use visit arrangement with China in July 1998.73 With China's consent, the Bureau
of Industry and Security conducted forty-two end-use checks in China in 2001,74
but there are still over 700 outstanding checks. 75 The Chinese government
ultimately retains the authority to determine whether the Commerce Department is
permitted to conduct on-site end-use checks so it nearly impossible to accurately
determine whether an exported good will be applied to civilian or military use.76
To accommodate technological advances in the early 1990s, the U.S. relaxed
high-tech export controls in 1995, believing that it would boost the domestic
economy, which in turn would enhance national security 77 Since then, the
direction of export control polices has reversed course, and regulations on dual-use
exports have become more restrictive. 78 Beginning in October 1998, Congress
recognized that the military's role in the interagency export license review process
had been "significantly and improperly reduced over the years, and a new
Pentagon position was created to specifically monitor transfers of dual-use
68. Id.
69. 50 U.S.C. § 2403(c) (2003). See also 15 C.F.R. § 768.1 (2003).
70. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 981 (Panel I Discussion and Questions and
Answers).
71. See, e.g., Export Controls, supra note 3, at 23.
72. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 964 (Panel I Discussion and Questions and
Answers).
73. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 985 (prepared statement of Michael J. Garcia,
Assistant Secretary, Office of Export Enforcement, Department of Commerce).
74. Id.
75. Export Controls, supra note 3, at 28.
76. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 985-86 (prepared statement of Michael J. Garcia,
Assistant Secretary, Office of Export Enforcement, Department of Commerce).
77. See Jeff Gerth and Enc Schmitt, Chinese Said to Reap Gains of US. Export Policy Shift, N.Y
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at AI (stating that after amendments in 1995, more than $1.9 billion in annual
trade with China that was previously under government scrutiny was removed, and after the policy
change $3 billion in dual-use semiconductor technology was exported to China from 1995-1998).
78. See Corr, supra note 12. See also Leopold, supra note 31, at 92.
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technology into China.79 Startled by reports that exported technology was abetting
Chinese military modernization, former CIA director James Woolsey bemoaned,
"what's particularly troubling is that the massive decontrol in the last few years of
the export of dual-use technology in general, and specifically to China, has made it
almost impossible for the U.S. to monitor where such technology has gone much
less exercise control over it."80 Similar concerns resurfaced during the
government's Spring 2003 review of defense trade policy 81 Regarding China as a
potential future adversary with a military that is being strengthened by
sophisticated semiconductors and international investors, Rep. Dana Rohrabacher
(R-CA) argued, "we need to put heavy restrictions on those countries that could be
potential enemies, like communist China.,
8 2
In spite of Export Administration Regulations, between 1988 and 1998, the
Commerce Department approved over $15 billion in dual-use exports to China,
some of which "went directly to China's leading nuclear, missile, and military sites
- the main vertebrae in China's strategic backbone. 8 3 In 2001, the Bureau of
Industry and Security received over 1,300 applications from U.S. exporters seeking
to sell more dual-use technology to China; of those applications, 936 were
approved, thirty were denied, and 325 were returned to the applicants for more
information.8 4 Although over 70% of dual-use export license applications are
initially approved, the bureaucratic regulations inhibit the business plans of all
potential exporters of ephemeral technology- the average processing time for an
application to export a dual-use good to China was seventy-two days in 2002.85
Adding to the burdens for U.S. exporters, approved licenses ordinarily contain
numerous restrictions for the exporters, such as prohibiting re-exporting the item or
using the item in a manner not specified in the license application. 6
C. Multilateral Export Control Agreements
In addition to domestic dual-use export restrictions, throughout the Cold War,
the U.S. and its allies vigilantly enforced the rules of the Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), which blocked transfers of dual-use
technologies to the Communist Bloc.
8 7
Since all members encountered a common threat (the Warsaw Pact and
79. Gerth and Schmitt, supra note 77 at A14.
80. Id.
81. See Dennis Kennelly & Ben Stone, Bush Team Reviewing Defense Trade Policy, NAT'L DEF
Apr. 1, 2003, at 48.
82. Puzzanghera, supra note 9, at 1.
83. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1072 (prepared Statement of Gary Milhollin, Director,
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control).
84. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 957 (prepared statement of James J. Jochum,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration).
85. Juster, supra note 55.
86. See, e.g., Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 957 (prepared statement of James J. Jochum,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration).
87. See, e.g., Coff, supra note 12, at 450-455.
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China) and a common objective (undermining the Warsaw Pact and hindering
Chinese technological advancement) CoCom was relatively successful in
achieving its goals.8 s As the Cold War ended and the perceived security threats
subsided, however, the U.S. and Europe curtailed export controls, and CoCom was
officially disbanded in March 1994.89
After CoCom dissolved, the 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Technologies attempted to fill the
void and "contribute to regional and international security and stability by
promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms
and dual-use goods and technologies." 90 Signed by thirty-three countries including
Japan and most of Western Europe, parties to the Arrangement pledged to impose
strict export controls to limit transfers of sensitive dual-use goods and technologies
for military end-use. 91 However, unlike CoCom, the Wassenaar Arrangement is not
legally binding, so countries are permitted to devise independent export
administration policies without breaching international law 92
Using the Wassenaar Arrangement's open forum for coordinating
international exports of dual-use technology, members agree to report denials of
export licenses to other members within sixty days.93 Once countries are notified
that another country denied a certain export, under Wassenaar Arrangement
provisions, countries are still allowed to approve a license for an identical item and
thus 'undercut' the original country that denied the license.94 The only restriction
on 'undercutting' is that if a country approves an export that was prevented by
another country within three years, the country granting the export license must
inform all other members within sixty days of the issuance of the license.95 Rather
than promoting international security, the result of such reporting mechanisms can
be counterproductive; the country denying an export license essentially notifies all
other members of a sales opportunity 96
Contrary to CoCom, the Wassenaar Arrangement is also not specifically
88. See generally DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD (DSB) TASK FORCE ON GLOBALIZATION AND
SECURITY, FINAL REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON GLOBALIZATION AND
SECURITY 26 (1999), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/globalization.pdf (last visited June 10,
2003) [hereinafter DSB FINAL REPORT].
89. See, e.g., Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, History of the Wassenaar Arrangement, at
http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/History.html (last visited Aug. I, 2003).
90. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies, July 12, 1996, art. I(1), available at http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/IE96.html (last
visited Nov. 30, 2003) [hereinafter The Wassenaar Arrangement].
91. Id. at art. 1(3).
92. Id. at art. 11(4); See also Broadbent, supra note 1, at 50.
93. The Wassenaar Arrangement, supra note 90, at art. V(3); See also Hearings on US-China,
supra note 2, at 969-70 (Panel I Discussion and Questions and Answers).
94. The Wassenaar Arrangement, supra note 90, at art. 11(4) ("Notification of a denial will not
impose an obligation on other Participating States to deny similar transfers.").
95. Id.
96. Jamil Jaffer, Strengthening the Wassenaar Export Control Regime, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 519, 522
(2002).
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directed to prevent technology transfers to certain regimes, 97 and the Arrangement
is thus weakened by the "absence of a single large threat and lack of agreement
over the nature and seriousness of the smaller threats."98 Even if member countries
recognize the military value of certain dual-use technologies, those countries are
not obligated to acknowledge the international security threat posed by exporting
the item to a country such as China.99 According to the U.S. General Accounting
Office, "The U.S. is the only member that considers the relationship between
semiconductor manufacturing and military end uses sufficiently critical and
considers China's acquisition of this technology a potential threat to regional or
international security ,,ioo Furthermore, while the Bureau of Industry and Security
maintains a list of entities for which no dual-use exports are permitted,i °i the
Wassenaar Arrangement does not contain such lists and "it is the sovereign
decision of each country as to whether or not it makes a particular export." 
1
02
Ultimately, as the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security admits, the
Wassenaar Arrangement merely "provides a venue in which governments can
consider collectively the implications of various transfers on their international and
regional security interests." 103 Given its lack of enforceable provisions and flawed
reporting mechanisms, the Wassenaar Arrangement is at best a "chat society, 104
and at worst, it is a preposterous system by which countries apprise other members
of willing buyers to which they refused to sell.O5
111. THE MODERN PLIGHT OF EXPORT CONTROLS
A. International Undercutting
While the United States still has a large semiconductor production equipment
base, China can obtain all major types of semiconductor equipment from non-U.S.
sources in Japan and Europe.
-George Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry Association
1 6
97. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 968 (Panel I Discussion and Questions and
Answers).
98. DSB FINAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 26.
99. See Export Controls, supra note 3, at 19.
100. Id. at 17.
101. See supra text accompanying note 72.
102. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 970, 973 (Panel I Discussion and Questions and
Answers). See also The Wassenaar Arrangement, supra note 90, art. 11(3).
103. U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, Wassenaar FAQs, § 8, at
http://www.bis.doc.gov/wassenaar/WASSFAQs.
html (last visited Aug. 7, 2003).
104. Richard Read, U.S. Trade, Security Interests Clash over Technology Exports to China, THE
OREGON IAN, Feb. 3, 2003, at A7, available at LEXIS, News Library, OREGNN File.
105. See supra text accompanying note 96.
106. See generally Hearings on US-Chma, supra note 2, at 1032 (prepared statement of George
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Besides U.S. corporations, Japanese and European competitors produce and
sell the equipment, chemicals, gases, and films necessary for producing advanced
semiconductors. 10 7 Boosted by international investors and suppliers and an
accelerating demand from technology companies, °  six new semiconductor
foundries in China are expected to begin producing 0.18-micron chips in 2003 and
two others are progressing toward the production of 0.13-micron chips, 0 9 although
U.S. exporters report a ban on transfers to China of the equipment necessary for
producing those chips.1"° Two of China's leading foundries, SMIC and GSMC,'"
openly flaunt technology that is reportedly prohibited or delayed by U.S. export
controls epitomizing the ineffectiveness of restrictions on U.S. exporters.' i2
According to Shanghai's Semiconductor Manufacturing International
Corporation (SMIC), swiftly acquiring cutting-edge processing systems is not an
obstacle in the production of advanced chips. 13  SMIC CEO Richard Chang
reveals, "our solution is to import a lot of equipment from Europe. .the export
license usually takes from one week to two weeks for a European government. For
the USA, it's case by case. Sometimes it's three months, but the longest we have
experienced is six months."'i14 After its attempt to import equipment from Applied
Materials Inc. (Santa Clara, California) was thwarted by U.S. export controls in
2001, SMIC simply imported the identical technology from a company in Sweden
to construct its first plant.ii5 In 2002, to produce its next generation 0.13-micron
chips, SMIC imported equipment from ASML Co. of the Netherlands.' i6 Most
recently, German company Infineon Technologies reached an agreement with
SMIC to transfer its 0.1 -micron technology and expertise to SMIC in exchange
for an agreement from SMIC to only use the equipment to produce chips for
Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry Association).
107. See Id. at 1032-1033.
108. The China market for semiconductor equipment was $4 billion in 2001 and an estimated $7
billion in 2003. By 2010, China is expected to become the second largest market for semiconductors.
See, e.g., Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1121 (prepared statement of the Semiconductor
Equipment and Materials International).
109. See LaPedus and Fuller, supra note 25, at 4. See also SMIC to Complete 12" Silicon Wafer
Plants in Shanghai and Beying, SINOCAST, Apr. 9, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
I 10. See TI To Buy More Chinese-Made Products, supra note 25. See also Export Controls, supra
note 3, at 3 (discussing U.S. efforts to keep China two generations behind industry standards); See also
Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International, supra note 29, at 1121.
111. SMIC and GSMC are China's newest and most advanced semiconductor foundries, and both
are wholly foreign owned. See Export Controls, supra note 3, at 12.
112. Mike Clendeni, China Foundry Turns to Europe for Advanced Chip Gear ELEC. ENG.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at I, available at http://www.eetimes.com/semi/news/0EG20011206S0044 (last
visited Aug. 25, 2003).
113. Export Controls, supra note 3, at 12.
114. Mike Clendeni, supra note 112, at I.
I 15. See Read, supra note 104. See also Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1122 (prepared
statement of the Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International) (discussing SMIC's plans to
buy 50% of its equipment from U.S. sources, which were amended due to the bureaucratic delays
experienced by U.S. exporters).
116. SMIC Unveils 0. 13-Micron Chip Technology, TAIWAN ECON. NEWS, Dec. 17, 2002, available
at LEXIS, News Library, ALLASI File.
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lnfineon. 1 17 Monitoring the success of SMIC's initial facilities, the Chinese
government recently asked SMIC to construct a facility in Beijing and to complete
it within thirteen months.' 1
8
In addition to SMIC, Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation
(GSMC) is rapidly developing advanced semiconductor manufacturing
capabilities." 9 Overlooking U.S. suppliers encumbered by archaic export controls,
GSMC Vice Chairman Nasa Tsai divulges, "think how bad the Japanese economy
is they love to sell." 20 Facing domestic economic pressures, Japan amended its
export regulations in 2001 to ease constraints on shipments of 0.18-micron
technology to China. 21 Relying on semiconductor manufacturing equipment
imported from Oki Electric Industry of Japan, GSMC is currently capable of
producing for 0.15-micron chips and plans to begin producing 0.13-micron chips
in 2 0 0 4 .22
The unimpeded growth of SMIC and GSMC exemplifies the futility of
unilateral U.S. export controls; James Lewis of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) observes, "all other major suppliers - the Netherlands,
Germany and Japan - have told the U.S. that they will not block equipment sales
to China, and "they have repeatedly questioned the contribution of semiconductor
manufacturing equipment to military capabilities and proliferation and ask whether
there is still any strategic rationale for controlling these items. ' 'i 2s In addition to
their skepticism regarding the dangers posed by dual-use exports, European and
Asian governments harbor far less suspicion of China's military modernization
than U.S. officials. 124 Illustrating the irrelevance of U.S. export controls in the
twenty-first century, in the mid 1990s, Russia, China, India, and Israel routinely
complained to the State Department that U.S. export controls unfairly damaged
their economies; now such complaints are rare, implying that countries can easily
acquire computing power elsewhere. 125
B. U.S. Economic Losses
When U.S. companies such as Applied Materials Inc., the world's largest
117. Infineon to Transfer 0.1 I-Micron Technology to SMIC, SINOCAST, Apr. 2, 2003, available at
LEXIS, News Library, ALLASI File.
118. Loh Hui Yin, SMIC's Technology, Speed Impress China, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Feb. 10,
2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, ALLASI File.
119 Craig Smith, China Finds Ways to Beat Chip Limits, N.Y TIMES, May 6, 2002, at C4.
120. Id.
121. See Mike Clendenin, China's Fabs Eye A Rule Change, ELEC. ENG. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2001, at
96.
122. Jack Robertson, China Fab to Launch with Advanced Technology, ELEC. ENG. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2002, at !.
123. Lewis, supra note 7, at 1022.
124. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1042 (prepared statement of Kathleen
A. Walsh, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stinson Center).
125. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at i 117-18 (prepared statement of James
Lewis, Director, Technology Policy, Center for Strategic and International Studies).
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producer of semiconductor equipment, 12 are undercut by foreign suppliers, besides
failing to prevent China from developing advanced technologies, the policies
undermine U.S. economic interests.' 27  Mocking superannuated U.S. export
controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, SMIC executive Joseph Xie
explains, "we love to do business with the U.S., but we can't wait forever
Europe and Japan are getting the business."' 128 With Asia accounting for 60% of
sales from U.S. semiconductor equipment suppliers and China becoming Asia's
largest recipient of new semiconductor manufacturing investment, 129 U.S.
exporters of the equipment are disadvantaged relative to their foreign competitors.
When the U.S. vigorously scrutinized dual-use exports during the Cold War,
U.S. companies generally accepted the restrictions, since few developed countries
possessed advanced technologies,130 and the U.S. maintained a large commercial
and technological edge over the countries that did possess those technologies.
13'
Moreover, the military applicability of technology was generally unmistakable in
the 1970s, and therefore military goods could be differentiated from commercial
goods. 32 Now, almost all IT products can be considered dual-use goods. A
semiconductor equipment manufacturers association insists, "semiconductor
manufacturing equipment and materials are indistinguishable from other types of
generic manufacturing equipment whose export would be restricted only as part of
a comprehensive economic embargo, not for reasons of national security ,133
Since the U.S. Commerce Department operates on a more restrictive export
control system than foreign governments, 134 and China is thus able to acquire
advanced dual-use technology from foreign sources, high-tech executives argue
that the only effect of U.S. controls is that it "interferes with our companies' ability
to succeed internationally 035 Without substantial changes to streamline the
interagency process for reviewing dual-use export licenses, the Semiconductor
Industry Association worries, "U.S. companies will increasingly fall behind in this
crucial market, and, by extension, the global market."' 136 Forecasting similar dire
126. Export Controls, supra note 3, at 13.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
128. Smith, supra note 119, at C4.
129. See also Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1119, i 121-22 (prepared statement of the
Semiconductor Equipment and Matenals international).
130. See generally Export Controls, supra note 3, at 5-6 ("U.S. Companies created and dominated
the semiconductor equipment and materials industries until the early 1980s, when Japan increased
investment and Japanese companies gained a greater market share in several critical equipment and
materials industnes.").
131. Corr, supra note 12, at 452.
132. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1031 (prepared statement of George
Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry Association) ("Most IT products are purely civilian items,
which cannot, for these purposes, be distinguished from civilian applications such as automobiles.").
133. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1121 (prepared statement of
Semiconductor Equipment and Materials international).
134. See supra text accompanying note 120. See also Walsh, supra note 124.
135. Gerth and Schmitt, supra note 77, at A 14.
136. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1034 (prepared statement of George
Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry Association). See also Clendenin, supra note 121.
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long term consequences of export controls on dual-use technology, Denis Simon of
the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in New York reckons, "the last thing we want
to do is treat China as a technological adversary and have them get technology
from elsewhere, and then find we're locked out of that system. ' 'i37
In 2001, China accounted for 1,300 of the 11,000 export applications
submitted to the Commerce Department, i38 and virtually all of the applications
were for dual-use goods. 139 Since corporations are unlikely to apply for an export
license unless they are confident that their request will be approved, 40 between
1997 and 2000, the dollar value of denied export licenses was only 0.4-0.5% of the
total value of the semiconductor equipment exported to China. i41 Nonetheless,
economic losses from denied licenses represent only a fraction of the cost to U.S.
corporations, since processing delays also compel Chinese companies to import
technology from non-U.S. sources.i 42 According to studies conducted by the
Institute for International Economics and the U.S. Import-Export Bank, the total
annual cost of unnecessary domestic export controls for the U.S. economy is
somewhere between $10 billion and $40 billion.
4 3
IV PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
A. Trade and Investment Diversion Theory
Free-trade agreements deviate from the multilateral principle of
nondiscrimination, and they can divert trade from more efficient to less efficient
but favored import producers.
-Daniel Griswold, Cato Institute
144
Bilateral free trade agreements disregard the nondiscrimination principles of
the World Trade Organization (WTO),145 but provisions of the WTO Charter grant
exceptions for WTO members to negotiate bilateral agreements that explicitly
favor some countries over others. Establishing the "most favored nation"
137 Read, supra note 104.
138. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 965 (Panel I Discussions and Questions
and Answers).
139. See, e.g., Leopold, supra note 31, at 92.
140. See, e.g., Export Controls, supra note 3, at 27
141. Id. Between 1997 and 2000, the U.S. Government reviewed almost $1.6 billion in
semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials licenses.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21. See also Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at
1122 (prepared statement of Semiconductor Equipment and Materials international).
143. Broadbent, supra note i, at 51.
144. Griswold, supra note 16, at 1.
145. See UPALI Wickramasinghe, Preferential Trade Agreements and the WTO (Paper prepared for
the Conference on Follow up to UNCTAD X South Asian Perspective, August 1-4, 2000) available at
http://www.lawnet.lk/articlesl
pdf/article6.pdf (last visited July 10, 2003).
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(MFN) 146 principle, Article I of the WTO Charter (the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1947 as amended in 1994) stipulates, "any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating
in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of
all other contracting parties."'' 47 However, Article XXIV(5) contains an exception
for countries to form free trade agreements and thus violate the MFN principle
provided that the agreements a) do not raise barriers to trade for non-contracting
parties, b) barriers to trade between contracting parties do not become more
restrictive, and c) interim agreements for FTAs include a plan for forming FTAs
"within a reasonable length of time." 148 Between 1948 and the Uruguay Round of
1994, WTO members negotiated only 124 free trade agreements under the Article
XXIV exception. 149 Interest in FTAs sharply accelerated after the Uruguay Round,
however, as over 130 such agreements have been announced since 1995, an
average of over 15 per year. i50
Although FTAs are legally compatible with the WTO Charter, economists
challenge the WTO's sanguine assumption that FTAs promote global economic
welfare.ISi In his seminal analysis of customs unions in 1950,152 economist Jacob
Viner hypothesized that the global economic outcome of FTAs is dependent on
whether beneficial "trade creation" or inefficient "trade diversion" prevails.
153
First, Viner recognized the constructive possibilities of trade creation; by
eliminating trade barriers and thus removing market distortions, the agreements
promote a shift in the locus of production from high cost points to low cost points
within the trade area.154 At the same time, Viner warned of the negative, inefficient
effects of trade diversion that arise when the reduced trade barriers prompt one
party to the agreement to import from the other party rather than a more efficient
146. Id. Since GATT was designed as an economic arrangement, the Charter sought to de-politicize
trade by ensuring non-discriminatory trade policies among members.
147 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 art. [(I), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 50
U.N.T.S. 188, art. 1(I).
148. Id. art. XXIV(5). See also Sungloon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and
Multilateralism, 42 HARV INT'L L. J. 419 (2001).
149. Wickramasinghe, supra note 145, at 3. During the Uruguay Round (UR), the WTO recognized
the value of FTAs in advancing the free trade principles of the WTO and reaffirmed that FTAs must not
damage parties outside of the agreement.
150. Griswold, supra note 16, at 3.
151. Wickramasinghe, supra note 145, at 5. (Reaffirming the WTO's position, 1995 Secretariat
study contends, "Regional and multilateral integration initiatives are compliments rather than
altematives in the pursuit of more open trade.").
152. Customs unions are slightly different than free trade agreements in that members conduct free
trade between themselves and maintain common tariffs to parties outside of the agreement, while FTAs
allow parties to establish their own trade policies regarding tariffs for countries not included in the
agreement. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 15, at 2.
153. See generally JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNIONS ISSUE (1950), reprinted in TRADING
BLOCS: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ANALYZING PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 105 (Jagdish
Bhagwati et al. eds., 1999).
154. Id. at 107
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third party 155 Given the complexity of specific agreements, studies attempting to
determine whether trade creation or trade diversion dominates have generally
yielded inclusive results or groundless speculation. 56 Despite Viner's venerated
trade creation/trade diversion theory, which suggests that preferential free trade
agreements among WTO members are sometimes inefficient for the global
economy "from a political viewpoint, whether a regional trade bloc results in a net




Overlooking the potential negative global consequences of trade diversion,
countries eyeing the political and economic gains of trade creation are driving the
proliferation of FTAs.
Even if inefficient global trade diversion results, FTAs advance American
economic interests by creating a level playing field for U.S. exporters that are
disadvantaged by FTAs that do not include the United States. 15 8 For instance,
proponents of the U.S.-Chile FTA 9 argue that U.S. exporters are disadvantaged
relative to Canadian exporters that do not encounter tariffs under the Canada-Chile
FTA. 160 From a homeland security perspective, since September 11, the Bush
administration has regarded FTAs and the formation of open markets as the
optimal long-term strategy for combating international terrorism. 16t Adding to the
myriad potential domestic economic and political gains of trade creation, FTAs
spur market-based reforms in developing countries and thereby open markets for
U.S. firms, 162 establish a template for broader free trade negotiations, 163 and
provide a "safety valve" for the multilateral trade negotiations of the WTO that
often become "long, tortuous, and uncertain." 164
Although trade diversion is considered an inefficient outcome of free trade
agreements for the global economic system, for national security reasons, countries
accrue domestic benefits when FTAs divert trade from the most efficient
producers.1 65  Given the enormous construction costs of semiconductor
155. Id. See also Cooper, supra note 15, at 9
156. Richard H. Steinberg, Antidotes to Regionalism: Responses to Trade Diversion Effects of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 29 STAN. J INT'L L. 315, 321 (1993).
157. Id. at 322.
158. See Griswold, supra note 16, at 5.
159 The U.S.-Chile FTA was signed in June 2002 and, once implemented, will eliminate bilateral
trading barriers between the U.S. and Chile. See U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Chile
Sign Historic Free Trade Agreement (June 6, 2003), at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2003/06/03-37.pdf
(last visited July 30, 2003).
160. See Cooper, supra note 15, at 3. See also Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 5, 1996,
Can.-Chile, 36 I.L.M. 1067 (1997).
161. See, e.g., Security Issues Fuel U.S. Drive for Free Trade Agreements, AFR. NEWS, Apr. 2,
2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
162. See, e.g., Griswold, supra note 16, at 6.
163. See Id at 5. See also Cooper, supra note 15, at 6.
164. Griswold, supra note 16, at 4. See also Cooper, supra note 15, at 4.
165. According to David Ricardo's famous theory of comparative advantage, global economic
efficiency is maximized when each country produces the product in which it has comparative
advantage. With trade liberalization and free trade between all countries, all participants theoretically
improve economic efficiency and consumer welfare. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 156, at 319.
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manufacturing facilities and the industry's unpredictable market trends, U.S.
computer and electronics companies will likely continue outsourcing
manufacturing to foundries that mass-produce computer chips. 166 However, by
manipulating the flow of foreign direct investment and trade via FTAs,' 67 the U.S.
could theoretically influence China's attractiveness as a base for semiconductor
production. Insofar as developing countries "signal to the rest of the world that
they are serious about embracing global competition" when they sign an FTA with
the U.S., 168 FTAs cultivate stable economic policies and construct substitutes for
international investors seeking to build foundries that can support the world's
technology corporations. According to a survey conducted by the Bureau of
Business Research at American International College, "political stability is the
most important factor American companies consider when locating operations
abroad."' 169 Currently the political instability and economic uncertainty that
pervades much of the developing world discourages foreign investment,' 70 while
China's ambitious, state-based economic plans engender confidence in foreign
investors. 1
71
Besides diverting foreign investment by supporting market reforms and
stabilizing political agendas in developing countries, FTAs restructure U.S. tariff
schedules and consequently provide incentives for U.S. companies to import from
some countries over others. Since the U.S. accounts for approximately only 20%
of China's exports, 172 the effect of revamping tariffs on China's high-tech
exporting centers would likely not be as great as the effect of promoting political
stability elsewhere. 173 Nonetheless, when tariffs on high-tech goods imported from
FTA partners are eliminated, it enhances the attractiveness of importing from the
FTA partner relative to China, even if China is the world's most efficient producer
of the imported good. 174 In the long run, the political and economic effects of
166. Building a new foundry costs up to $2 billion (semiconductor equipment accounts for 80% of
the cost). U.S. technology companies reduce costs and thus become more competitive in the global
market by outsourcing, and U.S. equipment suppliers gain access to markets with reduced export
restrictions. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1121-22 (prepared statement of
Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International).
167. Cf Matthew W Barrier, Regionalization: The Choice of a New Millennium, 9 CURRENTS:
INT'L TRADE L.J. 25 (2000) (Free trade agreements have been "tolne of the principal factors that has
accelerated the globalization or transnational extension of FDI markets.").
168. Griswold, supra note 16, at 5.
169. In Locating Overseas, Stability Tops List, 87 CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 8 (1995).
170. See, e.g., Carlos Lozada, Latin America, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 18.
171. See, e.g., LIEBERMAN, supra note 27, at 3. See also Export Controls, supra note 3, at II.
172. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2002), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publicatons/factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ (last visited July 20, 2003).
173. Investors consider many factors besides tariffs, such as political stability, economic stability,
labor force, and environmental conditions. See generally Edward Crenshaw, Foreign Investment as
Dependent Variable: Determinants of Foreign Investment and Capital Penetration in Developing
Nations, 1967-1978, 69 SOC. FORCES 1169 (1991).
174. According to NAFTA rules of origin, for example, for an item to become duty-free, a
minimum percentage of the content must be produced in the FTA region, with the exact percentage
depending on the type of good. The alternative to meeting rules of origin requirements is for exporters
is to accept MFN provisions without meeting the rules of NAFTA. In 2000, the average tariff on
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FTAs with developing countries may induce foreign investors to establish high-
tech manufacturing bases in a country with which the U.S. has an FTA rather than
a potential adversary With high-tech investments reaching strategic FTA partners,
advanced technology would not be as accessible to militaries of countries targeted
by dual-use technology export controls, 7 5 and U.S. technology corporations would
not be hindered by unilateral export controls that favor their foreign competitors.176
B. Diversionary Effects of NAFTA
As an extension to the 1988 free trade agreement with Canada, 177 in 1993
Congress approved the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that will
eliminate tariffs on trade among the United States, Canada, and Mexico by 2 0 0 8 .178
As East Asian government officials express concern that trade and investment is
being diverted from Asia to Mexico, United States Trade Representative
(USTR) 179  Robert Zoellick proclaims, "We are creating competition in
liberalization with the United States at the center of a network of initiatives."'iS °
Bolstered by NAFTA, Mexico is indeed institutionalizing its market reforms, but
high-tech investment diversion is minimal, given Mexico's relatively unskilled
labor pool and underdeveloped infrastructure.iSi Nonetheless, Mexico's actions
since NAFTA s implementation on January 1, 1994 underscore the potential for
FTAs to generate the economic and political stability that foreign investors
demand. i82
By reinforcing Mexico's dedication to market reforms, NAFTA creates a
more predictable business environment, reduces investment risk, and ultimately
encourages foreign direct investment. i83 After decades of restricting foreign access
NAFTA goods was 0.28% compared to the U.S. average MFN tariff of 4.08%. See generally OLIVIER
CADOT, ET AL., WORLD BANK, ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF NAFTA's RULES OF ORIGIN 9-15 (2002).
175. China's modernization program, in particular, depends on attracting foreign investment to
develop "pockets of excellence, where advances in technology are leveraged for benefits in potential
military conflicts. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 949 (prepared statement of Lisa Bronson,
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counter proliferation).
176. See, e.g., Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1028 (prepared statement of George Scalise,
President, Semiconductor Industry Association). See also supra text accompanying note 120.
177 Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 (entered into force Jan. 1,
1989).
178. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993)
Annex 302.2.
179. The USTR is the principal trade negotiator and policy advisor of the United States and is
responsible for developing trade policy to benefit economic growth. U.S. Trade Representative, About
USTR, at http://www.ustr.gov/about-ustr/index.shtml (last visited Aug. 1I, 2003).
180. USTR Robert B. Zoellick, Speech on NAFTA Before the National Foreign Trade Council 8
(July 26, 2001), transcript available at http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/zoellick_7.PDF (last
visited July 10, 2003) [hereinafter Zoellick].
181. See generally Kathryn L. McCall, What is Asia Afraid Of? The Diversionary Effect of
NAFTA Rules of Origin on Trade Between the United States and Asia, 25 CAL. W INT'L L.J. 389,415
(1995).
182. See Griswold, supra note 16, at 5.
183. See Chlang-feng Lin, Investment in Mexico: A Springboard Toward the NAFTA Market An
Asian Perspective, 22 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 73, 118 (1996).
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to domestic markets, Mexico initiated a series of economic reforms between 1988
and 1994 during the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari.18 4 As a U.S. educated
economist, Salinas' central economic strategy involved attracting foreign
investment and, after failing to secure Japanese and European investment, he
recognized that the U.S. was the most promising source of such investment. 185 To
advance his free market ideology during his term, Salinas eliminated the budget
deficit, privatized Mexico's banks, eliminated trade barriers ahead of GATT
timelines, and signed NAFTA. 1
86
Only a few weeks after Ernesto Zedillo succeeded Salinas as president in
December 1994, an economic and political crisis erupted, challenging Mexico's
novel commitment to maintaining an open economy 187 With banks already
floundering due to dangerously low reserves, 8 8 the assassination of presidential
candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio extended the financial quagmire to the political
arena, and $10 billion gushed out of Mexico's economy within four weeks.
189
When Zedillo reacted by allowing the peso to devalue on December 20, 19 9 4 '90 an
additional $70 billion was transferred out of Mexico over the following twenty
months, triggenng alarm and panic among foreign investors and political
leaders.' 9 ' Investors recalled that when Mexico encountered an economic crisis in
19 8 1 ,92 the government reacted by imposing protectionist tariffs of 100% on
American goods and enforcing strict licensing regulations. 193 During the 1994-
1995 crisis, however, there was "every indication that the country would not help
itself by trying to reverse gears and return to the government-controlled economy
that [had] already failed in generating prosperity and healthy distribution of
income."' 19 4 Rather than resorting to the protectionist measures of the past, Mexico
negotiated a $51 billion support package from the U.S. and international financial
institutions, allowed its exchange rate to float to promote macroeconomic stability
and imposed strict reserve rate requirement on banks. 195 After eighteen months,
184. Mexico's 1917 constitution limited foreign ownership of Mexican resources, Mexico
nationalized U.S. owned railroads and oil wells in the 1930s, and along with most of the region in the
"lost decade" of the 1980s, Mexico futilely attempted to protect inefficient industries. PETER WINN,
AMERICAS: THE CHANGING FACE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 488 (2d ed. 1999).
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Sergio Sarrmento, Mexico Inevitable Transformation, 20 WASH. Q. Autumn 1997,
at 130.
187. Id. at 131.
188. See generally Francisco Gil-Diaz, The Origins of Mexico 1994 Financial Crisis, 17 CATO J.,
Winter 1998, at http://www.cato.org/pubs/joumal/cj 17n3-14.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2003).
189 Sarmiento, supra note 186, at 131.
190. After the peso was devalued, inflation and interest rates skyrocketed, thereby exacerbating the
economic mayhem. See Gil-Diaz, supra note 188.
191. Sarmiento, supra note 186, at 132.
192. After the oil boom ended in the 1980s, Mexico was left with one of the largest foreign debts in
the world. By 1982, Mexico could not pay its foreign debts, causing foreign loans to cease and the
economy to collapse. WINN, supra note 184, at 220.
193. U.S. Trade Representative, NA FTA Overview, 4, at
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/overview.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
194. Sarmiento, supra note 186, at 137. See also Griswold, supra note 16, at 5.
195. See World Bank, Crisis Management: Mexico 1994-1995 (2001), at
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Mexico resumed its pattern of economic growth, 196 and Ernesto Zedillo
recognized, "NAFTA has been crucial in transforming Mexico into one of the
world's biggest exporting powers."1
97
Aside from fostering economic stability and a more secure investment
environment, as a comparison between the 1981 and 1994 financial crises
illustrates, NAFTA's reductions in tariffs make Mexico a more attractive place
from which to export to the United States.' 98 When negotiations for NAFTA were
promulgated in 1991, East Asian leaders immediately recognized that that
agreement handicaps firms outside of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. 99 Since
NAFTA promotes diversion of trade and investment from East Asia, political
leaders forecasted decay for the export-driven East Asian economies; 200 most
notably, the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 20 1 estimated that NAFTA
202would induce a $2 billion drop in ASEAN exports to the United States. Since
investors would have an incentive to relocate factories to Mexico, Japan's Ministry
of International Trade and Industry projected an annual diversion of $10 billion in
foreign direct investment from East Asia to Mexico for 1995-2001.203
Given the complexity of NAFTA, as it addresses not only trade but also
technical standards, environmental issues, labor rights, and intellectual property, 04
economic studies of trade and investment diversion are imperfect and would
depend on untenable counterfactual theories. 20 5 For producers of sensitive
advanced technologies, however, Mexico's substandard technological
infrastructure may erode the incentive to transfer investment from East Asia to
Mexco. 20 6 Between 1998 and 2002, U.S. imports of semiconductors from Mexico
remained steady at around $900 million, while U.S. imports of semiconductors
from China rose from $486 million to $729 million.20 7 On a macro scale,
meanwhile, total imports from Mexico rose from $95 billion to $135 billion
between 1998 and 2002,208 and annual FDI inflows into Mexico averaged $11.7
http://wwwi.worldbank.org/finance/ assets/images/CrisisMan.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
196. Id.
197 Zoellick, supra note 180, at 5.
198. See, e.g., McCall, supra note 18 1, at 411.
199. See Jisu Kim, Impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on East Asia: A Korean
Perspective, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 681, 888 (1993).
200. McCall, supra note 181, at 390.
201. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a group of ten Asian countries that
aims to accelerate economic growth and promote regional peace and stability through political dialogue
and cooperation. ASEAN Secretariat, Overview: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, at
http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (last visited July 30,2003).
202. McCall, supra note 181, at 413.
203. Id. at413.
204. See Steinberg, supra note 156, at 321.
205. See Gary Hufbauer and Jacqueline McFadyn, Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law
Institute Conference: NAFTA Revisited: Judging NAFTA, 23 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 15, 14-15 (1997).
206. See McCall, supra note 181, at 415.
207. U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics: U.S. Imports from Mexico 1998-2002, available
at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/imports/c2lO.html (last visited Jan.
26, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. Imports from Mexico].
208. US. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics: U.S. Imports from China 1998-2002, available
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billion from 1994 to 2002, which is over three times the average annual amount of
Mexico's FDI during the seven years prior to the agreement. 2°
While it remains possible that Mexico would have tripled its annual FDi
inflows without NAFTA and that very little of that investment was diverted from
China's expanding economy, NAFTA is succeeding in bolstering Mexico's
evolving market oriented policies and supporting the efficient use of Mexico's
capital resources. 2 0 As USTR Robert Zoellick observes, NAFTA is effective in
"creating a more stable and predictable environment for investment and leading
foreign capital toward more productive and efficient uses."2 1' Over time, such
foreign investment is expected to upgrade Mexico's infrastructure and industries,
and, in turn, boost Mexico's educational system to equip the country's workforce
with the technological skills necessary for competing in the high-tech global
economy. 212
C. The U.S. Jordan Free Trade Agreement
With a commitment to free trade legislation and a competitive and open trading
environment, we have an unbeatable proposition for investors.
-Dr. Bassem Awadallah, Jordan Minister of Planning 213
While NAFTA, with its inclusion of Mexico, is likely diverting investment in
low-skilled manufacturing, 214 the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement promises to
also divert high tech investments.2i5 Signed on October 24, 2000 and enacted on
December 17 2001, the U.S.-Jordan FTA rewards Jordanian King Abdullah Il's
commitment to developing a high-tech economy and stimulates foreign investment
in Jordan's budding technology sectors by eliminating tariff and non-tariffs
barriers to bilateral trade in virtually all industrial goods and agricultural products
at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statstics/product/enduse/imports/c5700.html (last visited Jan.
26, 2004).
209. U.S. Imports from Mexico, supra note 208.
210. After NAFTA, Mexico was inspired to sign its own free trade agreements with Chile, the
European Union, Israel, Bolivia, Columbia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Costa Rica, and Uruguay. See generally Secretary of Economics, National Development Plan 2001-
2006, at http://www.economia.gov.mx/?P=-1317 (last visited Nov. 9, 2003). See also supra text
accompanying notes 207-9 (More efficient use of capital resources is illustrated by the reaction to the
1994-1995 economic crisis.).
2 f1. Zoellick, supra note 180, at 6.
212. Peter F Romero, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Remarks to Inter-
American Development Bank Santiago, Chile (Mar. 19, 2001) transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2001/1785.htm
213. Experts Assert 'Enormous Potential for Investment in Jordan, AME INFO - ME COMPANY
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 20, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
214. See, e.g., McCall, supra note 181, at 415.
215. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on
the Establishment of Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, U.S.-Jordan, 2000 U.S.T. LEXIS 160
[hereinafter U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement].
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within 10 years. 2 16 As it draws investment into Jordan, the FTA supports Jordanian
King Abdullah 11's fundamental strategic goal to "shift Jordan's economy from
one of dependence on foreign aid to one of self-reliance. ' '2i 7
Building on the economic reforms of his father King Hussein, since assuming
the throne in 1999, King Abdullah II has aggressively trumpeted an economic
strategy that focuses on "integration of the private sector into the industrial
policymaking framework, export expansion through increased competitiveness,
and the facilitation of private sector driven growth, which [ensures] that Jordan's
legal and regulatory policies [match] requirements for global economic
participation., 2 18 By opening most sectors to 100% foreign ownership, reducing
inflation from 25.6% in 1989 to 1.8% in 2001, and implementing strategies to
support Jordan's nascent technology sectors, Jordan is creating "the necessary
environment to allow [Jordan's] businesses and citizens to utilize [the]
international agreements in the new knowledge-based global economy ,,219 At a
January 2003 economic conference, Director of the Economic and Development
Division of Jordan's Royal Hashemite Court Dr. Khaled Al Wazani assured
investors, "today's message is clear Jordan is open for business.
220
Since opening markets to U.S. investors, Jordan has attracted capital and
technological expertise from powerful U.S. high-tech corporations. Recognizing
the enormous potential in Jordan, Intel CEO Craig Barrett sponsored an Internet
laboratory at the University of Jordan in October 2002221 and urged the Kingdom
to become "the model for the whole region in the IT sector. 222 Similarly, Cisco
announced a $1 million investment in Jordan's High Tech Fund to expand the
"Connecting Jordanians" program, which aims to connect every Jordanian school,
college, university, and IT community center on a high-speed broadband network
by 2005.223 Additionally Oracle donated $2 million in software to Jordanian
universities.224 Finally, Sun Microsystems unveiled plans to establish a "business
incubator" with Cisco, Oracle, and local investors to educate and support emerging
216. Id at Annex 2. 1.
217 King Abdullah II, Heir Jordan: One State Story of Economic Transformation, 24 HARV
INT'L REV Winter 2003, at 17
218. Id. at 15. See also EMBASSY OF JORDAN, POLITICAL AND SocIo-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
BUILDING A NEW MODEL, at http://wwwjordanembassyus.org/new/aboutjordan/er2.shtm (last visited
July 30, 2003).
219 Abdullah I1, supra note 217, at 15-17 (for example, in 1999 Jordan launched the REACT
Initiative: Regulatory Framework, Enabling Environment, Advancement Programs, Capital and
Finance, Human Resource Development).
220. Experts Assert 'Enormous Potentialfor Investment in Jordan, supra note 213.
221. John Mason, Intel Brings its Cool Silicon to the Hot Sands of Jordan, ELECTRONIC
ENGINEERING TIMES, Oct. 7, 2002, at 26.
222. Baker, supra note 19 See also Intel Says Jordan IT Sector Holds Promise, REUTERS, June 17,
2001, available at http://www.intaj.net/news/readnews.cfm?id=137 (last visited July 8, 2003).
223. Francesca Cinaci, Jordan's First IT Forum Ends with Challenging 'to do List, JORDAN
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Jordanian technology companies.225
As U.S. corporations eagerly contribute to Jordan's high-tech aspirations,
Jordan's high-tech sectors are also enticing non-U.S. international investors. In
February 2003, Jordan and Switzerland launched the Swiss-Jordanian Business-to-
Business platform "Trado, a platform that facilitates trade between the IT sectors
of Jordan and Switzerland by creating a website for business contacts.
226
Additionally, in January 2003 King Abdullah II welcomed Volker Jung, President
of the Board of Directors of German technology company Seimens, to explore
investment opportunities in telecommunications, information technology, and
energy 227 During his visit, Jung praised King Abdullah 1l's dedication to the IT
sector and his innovative educational reforms.
228
With Jordan's bold economic reforms and the incentive of a free trade
agreement, total U.S. imports from Jordan skyrocketed from $16 million in 1998 to
$412 million in 2002 and imports of semiconductors crept from $0 in 2001 to
$39,000 in 2002.229 Underscoring the success of Jordan's investment initiatives,
after attracting $60 million in foreign direct investment in 2001, the Kingdom is
now projecting FDI inflows of $150 million in 2004.230 Summarizing Jordan's
extraordinary growth in trade and investment, in June 2003, USTR Robert Zoellick
declared, "Jordan is an excellent example of how trade can drive economic reforms
and growth, creating jobs, prosperity, and hope.
' 231
D. Prospects ofAdditional Free Trade Agreements
I The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
On January 15, 2003, the USTR concluded negotiations on a free trade
agreement with Singapore, 232 a city-state that is precipitously losing high-tech
investors to China's explosive markets. Typifying the abrupt decline of
Singapore's semiconductor sector, after importing $3.31 billion in semiconductors
225. Id. The consulting services are available for companies fewer than four years old with fewer
than 50 employees. Services are free for the first year with an annual fee thereafter.
226. Information Technology Association of Jordan, Trado Launch Culminates the Jordan-Swiss
IT Partnership (Feb. 2, 2003), at http://www.intaj.netlnewslreadnews.cfm?id=633 (last visited July 8,
2003).
227. Jordan's King Holds Talks with Siemens Chief BBC MONITORING MID. E. POL., Jan. 5,
2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, BBCMIR File.
228. Id.
229. U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics: U.S. Imports from Jordan 1998-2002, available
at http://www.census.govlforeign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/imports/c51i0.html (last visited Jan.
26, 2004).
230. Mason, supra note 222, at 26.
23 I. Jeffrey Sparshott, Free Trade Seen as Boon to MidEast, WASH. TIMES, June 21, 2003, at C I1.
232. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 6; 2003, U.S.-Sing., available at
http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/PDF/CMT/FTA USSFTAAgreementFinal.pdf (last visited July 2,
2003);
See e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, QUICK FACTS: THE U.S.-SINGAPORE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
(2003), at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Singapore/final/factsheet.pdf (last visited July 2, 2003).
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from Singapore in 2000, the U.S. only imported $1.27 billion in semiconductors in
2002.233 By eliminating most tariffs immediately upon entry into force, phasing out
the remaining tariffs over three to ten years, and committing Singapore to enact a
law regulating anti-competitive business practices, 234 the USTR expects the FTA
to fortify Singapore's faltering high-tech sectors and "provide a secure, predictable
legal framework for U.S. investors operating in Singapore. '235
While Hong Kong is allowing its high-tech production facilities to migrate to
Mainland China, Singapore is battling valiantly to avoid a "manufacturing
exodus." 236 In an attempt to retain its fourteen semiconductor manufacturing plants
and facilitate the construction of new factories, in 2001 the government began
implementing a proactive economic strategy that includes setting aside sixty
hectares of land in northern Singapore for semiconductor factories and
constructing a new facility to produce high-grade purified water for the plants.
237
The allure of China's market continues to threaten such ambitions, however in
March 2003, Singapore's Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation
announced that it is closing its oldest plant in Singapore and exploring investment
opportunities in China to produce cutting-edge chips.
238
For a government and economy that is highly dependent on foreign investors
for capital and technology the economic tide could be disastrous; Singapore's
post-independence political-economic strategy has relied on the state's ability to
leverage its full-service industrial parks to attract export processing plants of
foreign high-tech corporations. 239 The prospect of exporting goods from those
industrial parks to the United States tariff-free would invariably enhance the
attractiveness of investing in Singapore. Already, Barry Sim of Singapore's
Economic Development Board (EDB), a government agency that promotes foreign
investment, maintains, "we have all the elements of a global semiconductor
industry in place in Singapore. .chip-making is suitable for Singapore because it
isn't labor intensive, and it requires highly skilled and educated workers. 240 The
FTA with the United States will add one more attractive element to Singapore'
semiconductor industry and support the small city-state that "not only practices
free trade but ardently promotes its within every audience of its economic
233. U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics: U.S. Imports from Singapore 1998-2002,
available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/imports/c5590.htmi (last
visited Jan. 26, 2004).
234. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, supra note 232, art. 2.2, art. 12.1(1), art.
12.2(I).
235. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FREE TRADE WITH SINGAPORE: AMERICA'S FIRST FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT WITH ASIA 4 (2002), at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/asia-pacific/2002-12-13-
singapore facts.pdf (last visited July 18, 2003).
236. See Bruce Einhom, Singapore Sticks With its Chip Program, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 5, 2001,
LEXIS, News Library, BWONL File.
237. Id.
238. See Lee, supra note 23.
239. See Christopher M. Dent, Singapore Foreign Economic Policy: The Pursuit of Economic
Security, 23 CONTEMPORARY SE. ASIA. J. INT'L & STRATEGIC AFF 8 (2001), at Academic Search
Premier.
240. Einhom, supra note 236.
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diplomacy ,,24i
2. The U.S.-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)
While the U.S.-Singapore FTA could revitalize Singapore's fleeing
semiconductor manufacturing industry negotiations for a trade agreement with
Central America could boost nascent high-tech sectors in a manner paralleling the
U.S.-Jordan FTA. On January 8, 2003, USTR Robert Zoellick announced the
commencement of negotiations on a free trade agreement with five Central
American countries: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
242Nicaragua. At a press conference, Zoellick pronounced, "This FTA will
reinforce free-market reforms in the region. The growth stimulated by trade and
the openness of an agreement will help deepen democracy, the rule of law, and
sustainable development."
243
The five Central American countries in the envisaged U.S.-Central American
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) have been liberalizing their economies over the
past ten years, and now none of those countries imposes a tariff higher than
10%. 244 After the region was devastated by civil wars and economic mayhem in
the 1980s, the five Central American members are all embryonic democracies that
are rapidly expanding their economic freedoms.245 An FTA would reward the
region's political and economic progress, 46 advance further reforms, and allay the
region's escalating skepticism of the market economy and the non-interventive
state. 47
Among the Central American high-tech industries included in the proposed
U.S.-CAFTA, Costa Rica's developing industries exhibit the most potential for
attracting high-tech foreign investment. After imposing tariffs on computers of
133%, Costa Rica's government slashed tariffs on high-tech products to 10% in the
mid 1980s.248 Since then, Intel Corporation opened a $370 million semiconductor
manufacturing facility in San Jose, Costa Rica, and Intel's Pentium computer chips
have passed coffee and bananas as Costa Rica's leading export. 249 Following
241. Dent, supra note 239.
242. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED STATES AND CENTRAL AMERICAN NATIONS LAUNCH
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS (Jan. 8, 2003), at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2003/Oi/03-
0l.htm (last visited July 24, 2003).
243. Id.
244. How to Trade Up, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2003, at 36.
245. Griswold, supra note 16, at 12. See also U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FREE TRADE WITH
CENTRAL AMERICA 1 (2003), at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/camerica/2003-01-08-cafta-
facts.PDF (last visited July 31, 2003) ("Oppression, violence, and dictators on both the left and right
have given way to commitment to democracy in Latin America.").
246. Griswold, supra note 16, at 12.
247. Cf WINN, supra note 184, at 603 (In Latin America, "there are growing doubts that the
neoliberal market economy and non-interventive state are capable of redressing fundamental problems
of inequality and environmental degradation.").
248. See Geri Smith, Who Says the Chips Are Down?" Despite A Slump, Costa Rica Sees a Bright
Future in Technology, Bus. WK. INT'L EDITIONS: LATIN AMERICA, Sept. 3, 2001, at 26.
249. Id. Intel's investment is so substantial that national income accounts in Costa Rica are
2003
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Intel's leadership, over 140 locally owned software development companies have
arisen in Costa Rica, and those companies now export $50 million in high-tech
goods. 250 Validating the advancements in Costa Rica's high-tech industries, in
2002 the U.S. imported $448 million in semiconductors from Costa Rica, up from
a mere $41 million in 1998.251 Reiterating his country's commitment to supporting
international investors and upholding a dedication to global trade, after an
economic downturn in 2001, General Director of the Costa Rican Investment
Board Anabel Gonzalez conceded, "the only way for a small economy like ours to
advance is to integrate with the world economy for better or worse."25 2 An FTA
with the United States would foster Costa Rica's integration with the world
economy and present incentives for more international investors to employ Costa
Rica high-tech industries.
V CONCLUSION: DUAL USE FTAs
Nations are deeply interested in the use of information technologies to gain
asymmetric advantage over the U.S. Export controls do nothing to help manage
this risk, as they cannot catch the technologies involved.
-Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Panel Report
253
China's state-sponsored technological ascendancy continues to vex defense
officials in the twenty-first century 254 but U.S. export controls are incapable of
counteracting the investment incentives proffered by China's government.
255
Fundamentally the unilateral policy framework underlying export controls
established during the Cold War is inappropriate for an economy that demands a
global perspective, and China is easily overcoming the burden of U.S. export
controls to develop a thriving semiconductor production base upon which it can
modernize the People's Liberation Army and attain an asymmetric edge in military
conflict.256 In today's global economy, there are few, if any dual-use technologies
sometimes calculated with and without Intel. See also Lozada, supra note 170, at 20.
250. Smith, supra note 248.
25 1. U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics: US. Imports from Costa Rica from 1998-2002,
available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/imports/2230.htmi (last
visited Jan. 26, 2004).
252. Smith, supra note 248.
253. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, supra note 44, at 5.
254. See supra text accompanying note 44; see also Leopold, supra note 31.
255. See LIEBERMAN supra note 27" see also Export Controls, supra note 3, at 15 (discussing
China's manufacturing capabilities, including the ability to produce custom-made integrated circuits
that are not subject to foreign export controls).
256. See generally Export Controls, supra note 3 (describing how development of advanced semi-
conductor facilities improves China's military industrial base by enabling China, for example, to
enhance current and future weapons systems); see also CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, supra
note 44, at 5 (stating that export controls fail to manage the risk presented to United States national
security by other nations interested in using information technology to gain an advantage over the
United States).
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in which the U.S. is the sole possessor, necessitating an entirely new paradigm for
defense trade policy 257 Whereas global competition defeats myopic attempts to
mitigate national security risks through dual-use export controls, FTAs afford the
opportunity to leverage that competition to nourish viable substitutes for
international high-tech investors in strategically chosen regions.
By undercutting U.S. export controls and sanctioning sales of advanced
semiconductor manufactunng equipment to China, the policies of foreign
governments have "rendered many U.S. controls on exports to China essentially
unilateral, thus neutralizing their utility as constraints on Chinese acquisition of
dual-use technology ,258 Since those archaic export controls are essentially
unilateral, besides failing to moderate national security concerns, they provide
competitive advantages for non-U.S. companies that are not subject to draconian
high-tech export controls. Ultimately, the dual-use export control system that once
succeeded during the Cold War, is now not only detrimental to U.S. technological
corporate interests, but it is also ineffective for addressing national security
concerns.
While U.S. export controls fail to deter foreign investors from establishing
sophisticated semiconductor production facilities in China,259 free trade agreements
foster the growth of alternate destinations for their investment. After NAFTA,
Mexico tripled its annual FDI inflows,260 and after the U.S.-Jordan FTA, Jordan
tripled its projected inflows of FD1.26i Whether the foreign investment flowing into
Mexico and Jordan would have otherwise reached China to augment the Chinese
government's modernization efforts is impossible to prove through economic
analysis, 262 but the existence of an FTA undoubtedly engenders investor
confidence in those countries.263 The negotiated U.S.-Singapore FTA could deliver
similar results and resuscitate Singapore's semiconductor industry by offering
investors an incentive for constructing export centers in Singapore rather than
China.26 Similarly the proposed FTA with Costa Rica would buttress Costa
Rica's nascent high-tech industry and thereby nourish another alternate for
265international high-tech investors.
In contrast to the defunct unilateral perspective of export controls, by
negotiating and implementing FTAs with strategically chosen partners, the U.S.
operates on the now relevant global perspective to elevate competition for China's
257. See supra Part Ill(A) (discussing various Japanese and European companies that have supplied
China with materials necessary to produce advanced semiconductors); see also supra text
accompanying notes 129.
258. See supra Part IV(A).
259. DSB FINAL REPORT, supra note 88 at 26.
260. See Export Controls, supra note 3 at 12. (Providing statistics concerning the ownership of
China's existing semiconductor foundries. All existing foundries are either partnership between
foreign investors and the Chinese government or 100% foreign owned.).
261. Id.
262. Mason supra note 221.
263. See Steinberg, supra note 156, at 320-322.
264. See supra text accompanying note 173; See supra Part IV(D)(l).
265. See supra Part IV(D)(2).
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burgeoning semiconductor sector and promote substitutes for international
investors. As a foreign trade policy, FTAs thus appropriately protect the economic
interests of U.S. corporations 266 and simultaneously divert the foreign investment
upon which China's military transformation depends.267
266. See supra text accompanying notes 165 166.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 28 and 175.
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NGO's WITH AN ATTITUDE AND BAYONETS:
A CONSIDERATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS'
REVIEWED BY JOHN D. BECKER
RENSSELER LEE ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL CRIME IN THE AMERICAS: AN
INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE BOOK, Edited by Tom Farer, Routledge, New
York (1999).
JEFFREY ROBINSON, THE MERGER: THE CONGLOMERATION OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, Overlook Press, New York (2000).
Behind international terrorism, transnational crime presents one of the most
significant threats to governments across the globe, and for many of the same
reasons. Transnational crime extends beyond borders and in doing so exceeds the
legal jurisdictions of sovereign nations. Transnational criminal organizations make
use of advanced technologies, including communications, computer networks, and
all available modes of transportation, in a manner analogous to multinational
corporations. They have access to and utilize a wide variety of weapons and
weapon technologies in the pursuit of illegal ends. And finally, transnational
criminal organizations impact governmental institutions, social organizations, and
the economic foundations of our society
Yet, the threat presented by transnational crime has been little studied or
analyzed. Lack of analysis in turn has left policy makers with few options for
establishing effective responses to the problem. The need for careful analysis of
concrete situations and available financial, human, and institutional resources is
readily apparent.
Transnational Crime in the Americas, edited by Tom Farer, seeks to fill that
void, at least in regards to the Americas. Organized into ten chapters and a
conclusion, this regionally-focused text starts by looking generally at the organized
crime phenomena: its incident, functions, severity, and morphology Next,
consideration is given to its relative importance among candidates for inclusion on
the national security agenda, as well as dissecting its connection to the offshore
I. RENSSELER LEE ET AL., TRANSNAT1ONAL CRIME IN THE AMERICAS XVI (Tom Farer ed.,
Routledge 1999). Farer's metaphor is an apt and succinct one and one I seized for the title of this paper.
John D. Becker is third-year law student at the University of Denver, where he is also pursuing
Ph.D. from the Graduate School of International Studies. A retired Army officer, he has served on the
faculties of the U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Air Force Academy. Mr. Becker also serves as an
adjunct faculty member for the University of Phoenix Online and for the MBA program at Regis
University.
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economy and a comparison of U.S. and European perceptions and responses to the
problem of transnational crime. Finally, detailed case studies are used to clarify
the phenomena itself, its relationship to the politics and economies of various
states, and the effects of implementing possible anticrime strategies. The policy
implications of all of this data, specifically how measures short of war might apply
here, are sorted out in Farer's conclusion.2
Rensseler Lee's opening chapter, titled Transnational Organized Crime: An
Overview, is a concise introduction to the topic. Lee sees organized crime as being
defined by three characteristics: 1) continuity of operations, 2) practice of
corruption, and 3) a capability to inflict violence.3 He also recognizes that the
post-Cold War environment has promoted organized crime, particularly in
fractured states with weak central governments, like in parts of Latin America and
Asia. Within the context of a changed world, transnational criminal organizations
represent difficult targets for law enforcement agencies.
Lee notes that the U.S. response to this challenge has been to focus on the
more identifiable and comfortable target-narcotics production and illicit sales.
Counterorganization and military interventions have become the preferred means
to hit and destroy this target. But the problem is that drugs don't equate to
transnational organized crime per se. There is much more out there that nation-
states have to deal with-money laundering, gambling, prostitution, and other
traditional crimes-plus new threats to government institutions, like illegitimate
political actions, smuggling and sales of weapons of mass destruction, and legal-
illegal economic endeavors.
By focusing on drug intervention, the United States is missing the mark on
transnational crime. In turn, it is being wasteful of limited resources and
unproductive in overall strategy Lee suggests a reappraisal of U.S. drug policy
weighing the potential costs, benefits, and trade-offs of different counternarcotics
policies and different regulatory schemes. Doing so could result in a better
anticrime effort and free up resources for the targeting of transnational criminal
organizations. 5
The next three articles deal with some of the economic concerns involved
with transnational crime. Gregory Treverton's piece, International Organized
Crime, National Security, and the Market State, considers how much the
international system has changed since the end of the Cold War, as well as how
2. Id. at xvi. Short of the former Soviet Union, Farer notes that transnational crime is most
prevalent in the Americas. This is due, in large measure, to drug trafficking and its concomitant money
laundering, gun running, and violent crimes. The biggest danger is that drug politics, rather than
transnational organized crime, becomes the focus of government and intergovemmental responses.
3. Id. at I.Lee' discussion includes recognition that the post-Cold War environment has
promoted organized crime, particularly in fractured states with weak central governments, like in parts
of Latin America and Asia.
4. Id. at 6-25. Lee documents this breath and variety of nontraditional criminal activity quite
thoroughly.




much America has changed. The biggest change, he argues, is the emergence of
the market state. 6 By that, Treverton is referring to a more economically-oriented,
less Westphalia-like state.
in a market state world, international organizations are devalued, law is
devalued, and dramatic changes occur in private (versus public) responsibilities.
Additionally, national security concerns shift to consider both old threats-like
rogue states and terrorism-and new threats. New threats are termed "threats
without threateners" and include such things as global warming and transnational
organized crime. Threats without threateners can destabilize friendly
governments, risk wider spread violence, affect the economic well-being of
citizens, or sharply offend cherished values. As a result, Treverton thinks that
international organized crime will challenge U.S. institutions and conceptions of
governance.7
Jack Blum's article, Offshore Money, argues that international organized
crime and large-scale narcotics trafficking depend upon the money laundering and
banking services provided by the world of offshore banking and finance.8 Blum
notes that law enforcement agencies, financial regulators, and government revenue
sources are all affected by this alternative economic system. Indeed, offshore
money has both American and global impacts.
The problem is that the international legal system is decades behind the
development of the international financial system. Accordingly taking timely
action is difficult. The potential for fraud, abuse, even destabilization of the world
economy is significant. Blum suggests dramatic measures are needed, including
abolishing international business corporations (IBC's), requiring all corporations to
have responsible officers and boards of directors, and eliminating bank secrecy
laws that protect criminal activity9
The final economic concern is addressed in Peter Andreas's Smuggling Wars:
Law Enforcement and Law Evasion in a Changing World. He notes the bifurcated
trend of nation-states to both police prohibited activities, like drug, people, and
dirty money smuggling, and open their borders for the movement of goods, people,
and money in the face of globalization.'0 Andreas's analysis highlights the
paradoxical, double-edged, and even interdependent relationship between the
business of smuggling and the business of trying to thwart it." His conclusion is
that the game of smuggling and anti-smuggling efforts goes on and on and
6. Id at 47. Treverton develops a 2010 scenario to illustrate this market state world. 42.
7. Id. at 55-56. Treverton concludes by suggesting two implications derive from his analysis: I)
international concern with organized crime will grow but international capacity to deal with it will
diminish, and 2) destabilization will affect countries important to the U.S.-whether they spirals down
or reshape themselves depends-only time will tell.
8. Id. at 57
9. Id at 82-83. The problem with Blum's recommendations is that they also impact on
legitimate, transnational and international corporations.
10. Id. at 85.
II. Id. at 86.
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ultimately becomes an end in its own.'
2
One perspective position and four case studies follow in next four chapters.
In Transnational Criminal Enterprise: The Europe Perspective, Elizabeth Joyce
looks at transnational crime through an EU lens. Joyce starts by acknowledging
the European experience has been different than the American, in large measure
due to its multiple states and multiple borders. This different perception has lead
to a view that sees transnational crime as less a security concern than a law
enforcement concern. But she notes that the view is shifting to a more U.S.-like
view, in large measure because of five phenomena and their connection to
organized crime: terrorism, increased drug trafficking, the effects of the political
and economic transformation of former Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, rampant EU fraud, and illegal immigration. 13 Joyce concludes by noting
that Europe may prove a helpful case for the United States and the states in the
Western Hemisphere, with recognition to the problems that international law
enforcement poses for national sovereignty
Francisco Thoumi narrows the focus of transnational crime by looking at a
particular case: The Impact of the Illegal Drug Industry on Columbia. His
thorough treatment suggests that the economic impact of the industry has been
important but not overwhelming. Politically and socially, the drug industry has
been more dramatic, impacting Columbian society and politics. The overall effect
is more evolutionary, given the poorly-defined causal relationship between drugs
and social problems and crisis.1
4
In The Decentralization Imperative and Caribbean Criminal Enterprises,
Anthony Maingot argues that size matters in transnational crime and in small
Caribbean polities and civilities, their respective sizes impacts their ability to act
and react.'" He notes that the degree of centralized organization, in turn, can affect
the roles that Caribbean governments play in involvement with the United States.
Specifically Maingot looks at the islands of Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica,
Honduras, San Andreas Providencia, Dominican Republic and their linkage as
roads to and from the United States. 16
In another case study Transnational Criminal Organizations in Bolivia,
Eduardo Gamarra considers family-based drug enterprises and their relationships
with the police, the military and other criminal organizations and government
regimes. Key among his findings is that Bolivia's TCO's (Transnational Criminal
Organizations) have restructured, retooled and accommodated changing
circumstances dictated by the changing marketplace, more effective law
enforcement efforts, or transformations in the domestic political scene. Having
flourished under military dictatorships, Gamarra sees TCO's doing likewise in the
12. Id. at 95-96. Like offshore money, the conclusion one comes to is that smuggling and efforts
to stop it are constant or given in the international system.
13. Id. at 102.
14. Id. at 136-137
15. Id. at 145, 147,




The last case study is Peter Smith's Semiorganized International Crime: Drug
Trafficking in Mexico. Smith notes that drug trafficking has a negative impact on
U.S-Mexico relations. He analyzes this criminal activity and considers where it is
heading and what can be done about it. In his analysis, Smith looks at the 1970's
to 1990's transformation of narcotrafico, the economic and political implications
of dug trafficking with Mexico, the impact of the drug issue on U.S.-Mexican
relationships, and the range of public policy options available to Mexico. 18 He
concludes that Mexico's position is unlikely to change unless either U.S. drug
policy changes or the Colombian traffickers abandon Mexico (of which there is
already some evidence).
The book concludes with two final essays: Bad Business: A Commentary on
the Criminology of Organized Crime in the Unites States, by Alan Block and
Fighting Transnational Organized Crime: Measures Short of War by the editor,
Tom Farer.
Block's pessimistic point is simple: it is foolish to believe that any group of
countries, much less one country, even the United States can control international
crime. Criminal syndicates respond to what Block calls an opportunity structure-
demands for services and products that legitimate society does not provide-and
have found and will continue to find ways to satisfy that demand.i 9
Farer's analysis returns us to the macro-level with which Lee opens the book;
his concern is once again with states and how TCO's affect both the licit and elicit
economies, as well as how TCO's present various threats to national security The
growing connection between TCO's and legitimate business is significant in that it
blurs the lines of legality (and one expects morality). 20 Farer also sees actions like
TCO-driven computer fraud, financial scams, car theft, illegal immigration, arms
and drug smuggling, as making up the TCO phenomenon. And the TCO
phenomenon is what we should be concerned with, as opposed to the present
harms and dangers connected to particular lines of TCO enterprise.
The reason for this is simple: the impact of globalization on political, social,
and cultural mores provides increased opportunities and influences for TCO's.
Farer notes that it is only by establishing similar legitimate regulatory and
enforcement structures, that will battle be done with the TCO's.
2
1
He suggests that the solution of how to deal with TCO's, or at least how the
United States deals with them, will be found at the intersection of answers to five
questions: 1) What is the problem? 2) What are the U.S. goals in relation to the
problem? 3) What is the price the United States will pay, at least in the foreseeable
17. Id. at 172.
18. Id. at 193-194. It is interesting to see in the aggregate how much, if any impact, Vincentes
Fox has on this analysis, if any.
19. Id. Block pushes Smith's helplessness analysis to the extreme; we are stuck with what we have
and no level of intervention, even by an organization like the United Nations will make any difference.
20. Id at 249-252.
21. dat 268.
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future, to achieve these goals? 4) What are the chances of marshalling the required
degree of support from the U.S. public and other states? And 5) Assuming the
maximum investment of human and material resources, is it possible to solve the
problem, and if so, for how long?
22
What that translates into is the following definition of a victory over
transnational crime: the decimation of existing criminal organizations, the
crippling of their networks and logistical systems, and continuing repression
sufficient to prevent the restoration of TCO's to their present level of participation
in the global and certain national societies.
Clearly this sounds like war and Farer notes that is exactly what the pursuit of
victory entails. If transnational crime is the new threat (or at least one of the major
new threats) which replaces communism in the Cold War, the only way to fight it
is as a war is fought. He argues that the best, and preferred, way is through the
means of low-intensity conflict. This could include a range of options from
legalization of drugs, thus cutting off the source of profits for TCO's, to
interdiction against the sources, and supplies of TCO's goods and services, to
liquidating the leadership of TCO's, to going for the money of TCO's, including
offshore sources.23
Farer ends by noting that the challenges of fighting a low-intensity conflict
against transnational organized crime are many They are better handled by the
previously mentioned new international law enforcement agencies but until they
are developed, make-shift solutions are the only solution. It is also important to
remember that transnational crime is only one of the threats posed to national
security of the United States (and other nation-states) in the post-Cold War world.
It is clear that this is not the first time that war has been waged against a
particular form of crime in the United States. Two examples come to mind. The
first was the war against prohibition in the 1920's. The second was the war against
drugs, starting during the Reagan administration. Both of these wars were forms
of low-intensity conflicts. It appears the difference between these earlier wars is
not necessarily scale but rather one of scope. That scope is discussed in fuller
detail in Jeffrey Robinson's The Merger- The Conglomeration of International
Organized Crime.
In fifteen chapters, with a short prologue and epilogue, Robinson's work
sketches out a detailed account of the complexity of organized crime in today's
world. This international organized crime network connects the Sicilian mafia
with the Chinese Triads to the Russian, Hungarian, and Czech maffiyas, and onto
the Columbian drugs cartels, to name but a few of the key players. What links
these criminal gangs together are the same things that connect multinational
corporations: digital communication, world markets, and the Internet.
24
Robinson's book is full of vignettes and illustrations of how modem criminal
22. Id. at 275.
23. Id. at 276-282. Farer suggests that all of these strategies and tactics could fall under the
umbrella of low-intensity conflict, but with restraint, respect, and sensitivity.
24. JEFFREY ROBINSON, THE MERGER inside coverslip (Overlook Press 2000)..
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gangs increasingly operate as quasi-multinational corporations. The world, if you
will, is smaller. For example, Russian gangs run prostitution rackets in Paris,
cooperate with Columbia cartels to launder money through bureaux de change and
are believed to have invested with some Italian gangs in business along the
Riviera. Asian organized criminals are using their traditional base in Holland to
ship amphetamines to groups in Australia, which include Lebanese, 'Ndraghenta
and Romanian. Czech mobsters have forged alliances with criminals in the Middle
East to assure a constant supply of heroin, which they then move through Austria
into Germany, France, and increasingly Britain. Some of these same Middle
Eastern criminals-usually Lebanese-have become middlemen, linking Eastern
European criminals with Balkan drug-trafficking organization.25
In effect, what this has done is remapped the world. No longer are borders
barriers and no longer do nationalities and localities define who is who or where is
where.
In addition to the centrality of smuggling operations, drug trafficking, and gun
running discussed early, Robinson sees counterfeiting as being a major endeavor
and profit-maker for transnational crime. Compounding the problem is business
overlap, and with it, difficulty in sorting out what exactly is what. Illegal aliens are
smuggled into the United States, and in order to pay off their debt for entry, work
in sweatshops for associated gangs that are engaged in producing pirated software
and music CDs. And in a raid of that factory, police also found large caches of
loaded weapons, dynamite, and C4 plastic explosives.
26
And yet, they (TCO's) have the advantage here, Robinson argues, "as long as
we live in a world where a seventeenth-century philosophy of sovereignty is
reinforced with an eighteenth-century judicial model, defended by a nineteenth-
century concept of law enforcement that is still trying to come to terms with
twentieth-century technology, the twenty-first century will belong to transnational
criminals.,
27
Even worse, he argues, the future of crime will involve more and more
connections between transnational criminals and legitimate businesses. For
example, in the new millennium, Robinson can foresee a scenario where the main
targets of TCO's will be a global bank, which uses a electronic data interchange
(where certain services, like billing and invoicing, is outsourced to specialist
companies overseas. They could establish it legitimately, growing a base of
customers over several years, gaining their trust and confidence, and then,
suddenly empty out all the accounts, and resulting not in significant losses to their
bilked customers but also seriously crippling part of the banking industry and
certain economic sectors.28
The only solution, for Robinson, is for states to overcome the sovereignty
25. Id. at 180. The intercontinental connections that Robinson brings out eventually numb the
reader, with example after example, construed after a nice, developed history of that phenomena.
26. Id. at 232.
27. Id. at 19.
28. Id. at 336.
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problem and work together by instituting transnational criminal law enforcement
organizations. This is because crime is no longer a local issue. And nations must
get beyond the written agreements and the rhetoric to the nuts and bolts of viable
and effective means to combat TCO S.
29
There are a couple of areas which deserve more attention in light of the events
of September 11, 2001 and are not really mentioned in these texts. First, a major
danger with TCO's can be found in the business analogy of mergers, ° and
specifically mergers with terrorists organizations.
In many ways, TCO's resemble terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda. They
possess the same technologies--computers, cell and satellite phone, and other
electronic business devices-and often similar financial resources, as well as
possessing lack of restraints (or concern) about using violent means to achieve
illegal or immoral ends. One can imagine-and I suspect it is already happening-
transnational criminal organizations finding and providing weapons to terrorist
organizations. In extreme cases, this might include weapons of mass destruction.
The cost-benefit analysis to the TCO might not only include the immediate profits
of the sale, but also the improved image as a viable resource for other terrorist
groups and access to other markets in terrorist controlled or dominated areas.
Second, as noted in the texts, the transparency which exists between nation-
states in Europe is promoting TCO's and the levels of criminal activity worldwide.
At the same time, the EU is serving as a model for other economic development
and unions. East Asia is moving in that direction and even the current Bush
administration is discussing the possibility of one in the Middle East. Likewise,
one can imagine economic unions in Latin America and Africa-ranging from
some type of NAFTA arrangement to a fully extended EU treaty agreement. At
the far extreme, a borderless worldwide economic arrangement would promote not
only economic growth but also the growth of criminal activity.
Third, the question becomes how and by what means does the present
world order deal with TCO's in their new and emerging roles? As Farer and
Robinson note, the only real answer is to raise and resource similarly structured
anti-TCO's. The problems, of course, are many As indicated by the United
States's recent refusal to participate in the International Criminal Court, as well as
by its repudiation of a major U.N. role in post-war Iraq, it is unlikely support will
be found for other international organizational solutions. And in a unipolar-
dominated world, such support is vital to the success of any long-range, workable
solutions.
Similarly, any international, interdependent anti-crime organization would
need the support of other major powers, like the European Union, Russia, China,
and India. In other words, a U.N.-like effort, as seen in the Korean and Persian
Gulf wars would be required. If as Farer suggests this is really a war-a global
war-it requires the resources of a war-moral, political, and strategic as well as
29. Id. at 337-345. Robinson's epilogue reaches many of the same conclusions that Farer's text
does, but interestingly doesn't include that work in his own bibliography.
30. No pun intended with Robinson's book title.
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military ones.
Overall, Transnational Crime in the Americas is a useful and thorough
introduction to the topic of transnational crime and transnational criminal
organizations. Prepared prior to 9-11, it still is relevant to conceptualizing the
future impacts of TCO's in an increasingly interdependent and interconnected
world. The Merger in turn, provides insightful details and accounts of TCO
operations globally and contextualizes those organizations. Similarly, The Merger
provides illustrative examples that flesh out the academic arguments discussed
earlier.
Together these two texts provide a solid sketch of transnational crimes and
TCO's, as well as the various ways in which they are impacting our world and
national security concerns.

VAUGHN LOWE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT' PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES, edited
by Alan Boyle and David Freestone, Oxford University Press, New York
(1999); ISBN: 0-19-924807-9- 377 pp. (paperback).
International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and
Future Challenges is a collection of essays focusing on sustainable development
and its emergence as an increasingly significant issue in the international arena.
The editors begin the work with an introduction on sustainable development, trying
to find a viable definition and relaying its upcoming significance in international
law. Because sustainable development is a new and still emerging term, it is
difficult to define in any concrete description. Nonetheless, sustainable
development primarily deals with environmental protections; however, as the
editor notes, "not all aspects of the law relating to sustainable development are
necessarily relevant to the protection of the environment, nor do all aspects of
international environmental law concern sustainable development."' Sustainable
development also touches upon issues of animal rights, human rights, and general
international law. The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
modeled after the Stockholm Declaration of 1972, is the leading international
authority on sustainable development. It signals, "a system of international
environmental law has emerged, rather than simply more international law rules
about the environment." 2
Although sustainable development lacks any concrete definition, it does
consist of several identified elements, which are described in the essays contained
in the book. While all of the articles focus on sustainable development, they also
recognize that sustainable development affects and is affected by a number of other
areas of law. The articles delve into international sustainable development
concerns and include International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases, fishery law, and
international environmental law. Perhaps because of the intermingling of legal
topics within the realm of sustainable development, there is no agreement on how
much emphasis should be placed on forcing a nation to develop in a manner that
would sustain the environment or, on the other hand, allowing it to develop freely
One author insightfully points out that the task of finding the appropriate norm is a
daunting one and there is little hope of drawing any conclusions.' Although
sustainable development remains an illusory term, it is becoming more concrete as
1. VAUGHAN LOWE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST
ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES, 6 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone eds., 1999).
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 25.
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more scholars and legal authority, including the International Law Commission,
the International Court of Justice, and various UN committees, are recognizing its
importance.
The impact of sustainable development on current bodies of law has been
great. In the area of fishery law, for example, the past freedom of fishing on the
high seas has been greatly reduced in the hopes that the preservation and
conservation of fishing resources will provide for a better future for all involved.4
Although much of this book is dedicated to the effect of sustainable development
on fishery law, other essays touch upon the relationship between sustainable
development and ecosystems, marine life and resources, cetaceans, and pollutants.
Each of the articles has one common theme: preservation and conservation.
Preservation and conservation are two concepts that embody the basic foundations
of sustainable development. Inter-generational and intra-generational equity are
two subjects that compose the substantive elements of sustainable development
and focus on both preservation and conservation of natural resources in the present
and the future. Inter-generational equity deals with the relationship between one
generation and the next while intra-generational equity deals with existing
concerns.
Finally, the book concludes that sustainable development will most likely be
the foremost theme in international law in the 2 1St century While a great deal has
already been done in the name of sustainable development, further action is, no
doubt, forthcoming. Not only are new laws being fashioned, but existing laws are
also being modified to incorporate ideas encompassed in the subject matter of
sustainable development. Of course, there is still the problem of implementation.
While many laws are currently in force, several have not yet been ratified and the
international arena must await their effect. Another major problem that must be
dealt with when considering sustainable development is the financing of such
preservation and conservation. Although international organizations have formed
to help with financing, individual nations are also expected to provide for their
own funding in the implementation of sustainable development. The overall
challenge can be summarized as the "internalization of these values into national
resource assessment and decision making."5 This book presents this challenge and
demonstrates the "wealth of new concepts, institutions, and opportunities" that are
a result of sustainable development.
6
Melissa Clack
4. Id. at 133.
5. Id. at 364.
6. id.
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